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Abstract 
This thesis examines themes of American conservatism in the years 1930 – 
1950, with a focus on the politics of FDR’s New Deal and pro-free enterprise 
ideology. Its findings coincide with a growing historiography that argues that 
conservative activism, particularly in the form of corporate-evangelical 
partnerships, surfaced in the 1930s, and not in the 1980s as scholars have 
previously asserted.  It is clear from existing evidence that corporate 
conservatives and right-wing evangelicals worked together to attempt to 
reverse the economic policies of Roosevelt’s administration and salvage the 
reputation of the free enterprise system during the Great Depression and into 
the postwar period.  Public relations campaigns were at the core of their efforts, 
culminating in an abundance of corporate-sponsored educational films that 
stressed conservative notions of Americanism.   
          By utilising methodologies drawn from history, film, and cultural studies, 
this thesis will determine the success of Alfred Sloan and George Benson’s 
educational film series, Fun and Facts About American Business.  It will 
expand upon existing ground-breaking studies on the relationship between 
business and religion yet question why scholars have neglected the efforts of 
two highly influential figures.  Sloan and Benson rose to prominence during 
the 1930s and were instrumental in disseminating pro-American propaganda 
during the period under examination.  Their reputation enabled Fun and Facts 
to surpass the popularity of previously released corporate films and reach 
national audiences.  The series is a significant, yet overlooked, example of 
how the struggle against liberalism contributed to the power of conservative 
activism in the decades following the Second World War.   
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Introduction 
 
 
In 1946, a small conservative Christian college situated in the foothills of the 
Ozark mountains in Searcy, Arkansas, ventured into the realm of educational 
films.  Its flagship production, the Fun and Facts about American Business 
series, represented an alliance between Harding College President George 
Benson and the chairman and CEO of General Motors, Alfred Sloan.  Their 
partnership is a fine example of the collaboration between business and white 
evangelical religion in twentieth century America.  The study of such 
partnerships is an evolving field positioned at the core of this thesis.  During 
the 1930s, these two forces came together to defend their own brand of 
Americanism – faith in God, constitutional government, and private enterprise 
– against the interventionist policies of President Roosevelt’s administration.1  
Recent studies by scholars such as Kevin Kruse, Darren Grem, and Timothy 
Gloege have added to the growing historiography of corporate-evangelical 
alliances by exploring the response of conservative Americans to the 
emergence of the New Deal.2  Their research provides a valuable insight into 
the propaganda tactics of these anti-New Dealers.  Sources for such studies 
                                                        
1 Throughout this thesis, the term Americanism will be defined by the three 
components of faith in God, constitutional government, and the free enterprise 
system.  The free enterprise system may also be referred to as ‘private enterprise.’   
2 Kevin Kruse, One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian 
America (New York: Basic Books, 2015), Timothy Gloege, Guaranteed Pure: The 
Moody Bible Institute, Business, and the Making of Modern Evangelicalism (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), and Darren Grem, The Blessings of 
Business: How Corporations Shaped Conservative Christianity (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).  These studies have added to the growing historiography of 
corporate-evangelical alliances.  They differ, however, in their assertion that these 
partnerships can be traced back to as early as the 1920s and were not a product, 
as previous research concluded, of the postwar period.  On the latter, see Kim 
Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009) and Bethany Moreton, To Serve God 
and Wal-Mart (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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include an accumulated wealth of materials: an array of films, radio programs, 
pamphlets, advertisements, and public speaking engagements.   
          As vital as these studies are, however, there is still much to be examined.  
It is understandable that scholars have not covered every relationship forged 
between business and religion, given the magnitude of the topic, yet the lack 
of research on Sloan and Benson is a significant oversight.  Sloan, for instance, 
was a leading financial backer of national anti-New Deal propaganda.  Instead 
of contributing to the campaign publicly, GM’s giant chose to donate 
substantial sums of money to those willing to stand up to the New Deal.  
Groups ranging from the National Association of Manufactures to the 
American Liberty League benefited from his largess, often receiving $10,000 
per donation.  Sloan’s efforts were magnified through the actions of his self-
titled philanthropic organisation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.  Although the 
foundation would later become a leader in scientific development and 
education, the organisation was initially avowedly partisan and focused its 
efforts on disseminating pro-free enterprise propaganda.3  To avoid criticism, 
its director, Harold S. Sloan, claimed the economic-based research institute 
sought to bombard ‘the American mind with elementary economic principles,’ 
though he assured the public that the foundation had ‘no particular economic 
                                                        
3 The vision of the Sloan Foundation has evolved over time; from the ardent right-
wing and pro-free enterprise stance of its founder to a leader in scientific 
development.  The main aim of the current foundation is to provide grants to support 
original research in the fields of science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and 
economics.  Today, many Americans will recognise the institute for its role in PBS’ 
NOVA series.  The ‘Public Understanding of Science and Technology’ program 
provided generous grants to the series.  See, ‘About Us,’ Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation [https://sloan.org], accessed 25 October 2015 and ‘Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation,’ NOVA: PBS [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/funders/sloan.html], 
accessed 25 October 2018. 
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philosophy to promulgate.’4  However, as film historian Dan Streible argues, 
the foundation was anything but neutral.5   In the immediate post-Second 
World War era, Alfred Sloan’s organisation formed a contract with George 
Benson’s Harding College.  Together, the two embarked on an ambitious 
animated series to educate the public on the workings of the free enterprise 
system; one of the three pillars that defined conservative notions of 
Americanism.  The Sloan Foundation devoted large sums of money to the Fun 
and Facts series.  It allocated an impressive $80,000 per cartoon. 
          There are several reasons why research has lagged on Sloan and his 
pro-free enterprise propaganda activities.  Though not secret, his funding 
campaigns went largely unnoticed at the time.  As an intensely private man, 
Sloan elected to support business interests from the backbenches to avoid 
damaging the reputation of his corporation.  It was not often that the public 
was offered an insight into his personal political actions.  On the other hand, 
scholarly oversight concerning Benson is surprising.  Benson’s humble 
beginnings as a Christian missionary in China paved the way for his 
transformation into one of America’s leading religious activists.  After suffering 
at the hands of China’s United Front Alliance, a coalition of Nationalist and 
Communists forces, Benson returned to the US dismayed with the situation 
that plagued his home country.  The Great Depression and consequent New 
Deal had disrupted the natural order.  Through his eyes, the public now relied 
                                                        
4 Quote by Harold S. Sloan, cited in Caroline Jack, ‘Fun and Facts about American 
Business: Economic Education and Business Propaganda in an Early Cold War 
Cartoon Series,’ Enterprise & Society 16:3 (2015), p. 497. 
5 Dan Streible, ‘The Failure of the NYU Educational Film Institute,’ in Learning with 
the Lights Off: Educational Film in the United States, eds. Devin Orgeron, Marsha 
Orgeron, and Dan Streible (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 271 – 
294.  
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on government handouts whilst it blamed big business for the ills of the nation.  
In response, Benson rushed to the aid of the supposedly beleaguered free 
enterprise system and began a nation-wide campaign in support of the 
business community.  Capitalism, he believed, was intrinsically linked to 
Christianity as the two represented the foundations of American heritage.6  In 
the 1940s and 1950s, Benson’s ideology resonated with influential 
businessmen, many of whom donated substantial sums of money to both 
Benson’s campaign and his college.  What ensued was a barrage of radio 
broadcasts, newspaper columns, and public speaking engagements that 
disseminated Benson’s opinions to large national audiences.  The momentum 
he garnered continued into the postwar period with the release of the Fun and 
Facts series and defined Benson as a leading advocate of private enterprise.   
          Benson’s story, as well as his influence on American conservatism, is 
documented in the works of L. Edward Hicks and John Stevens.7  Though 
impressive in their scope and detail, these publications are the only substantial 
                                                        
6 L. Edward Hicks, ‘Sometimes in the Wrong, But Never in Doubt’: George S. 
Benson and the Education of the New Religious Right (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1994), p. xxii.  Kruse argues that this was also the view of many 
like-minded, right-wing religious leaders.  See, Kruse, One Nation Under God, p. 8.  
Such ideas were then promoted later in the century by the likes of televangelist 
Jerry Falwell.  See, Susan Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist, 
Language, and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
7 Hicks, ‘Sometimes in the Wrong, But Never in Doubt’ and John C. Stevens, Before 
Any Were Willing: The Story of George S. Benson (Searcy, AR: Harding University 
Press, 1991).  There are wider studies on American business and religion that 
provide information on Benson, though these are brief in their scope.  For a leading 
example, see Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sun Belt: Plain-folk Religion, 
Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2011).  Despite the lack of publications on Benson, Robbie 
Maxwell’s recent dissertation, together with this work, offers new opportunities for 
the field.  Like previous studies, however, Maxwell provides only a brief overview of 
the Fun and Facts series.  See, Robbie Maxwell, ‘Educator to the Nation: George S. 
Benson and Modern American Conservatism’ (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 
2015).   
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pieces on Benson and are now outdated.  Since the 1990s, the archive at 
Harding College has been organised and expanded with the introduction of 
additional materials.  Consequently, both Hick’s and Steven’s accounts have 
inaccuracies, if only minor, due to misplaced or new sources.  Their studies 
also contain few details on the production and release of the Fun and Facts 
series; a startling omission.  Similarly, David Farber has produced a 
noteworthy biography of Alfred Sloan.8  His work chronicles Sloan’s life from 
his early beginnings as a student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
to his business activities following the Second World War.  However, the 
collaboration between the Sloan Foundation and Harding College is, yet again, 
noticeably absent.   
          This thesis aims to build upon the existing work of Hicks, Stevens, and 
Farber and fill the scholarly gap concerning the ambitious, technically 
advanced, and remarkably expensive, animated production of Fun and Facts.  
Doing so will shed light on a significant corporate-evangelical alliance and 
demonstrate the pair’s own interpretations of Americanism in response to 
domestic policies.  The series will also be put into the larger perspective of the 
American right, so influential in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
          The Fun and Facts series itself consists of ten animated shorts, running 
at approximately ten minutes each.  It was produced by ex-Disney employee 
John Sutherland through his self-titled production studios in Los Angeles, 
California between 1948 and 1951.  The cartoons he created were expertly 
stylised and utilised the most modern animation techniques in the industry, 
                                                        
8 David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
 16 
most notably the use of Technicolour.  Through the use of carefully crafted 
drawings and enhanced colours, the Fun and Facts cartoons attempted to 
appeal to both adults and children alike in order to preach Sloan and Benson’s 
free market principles to the widest audience possible.  Furthermore, having a 
producer previously associated with Disney was ideal for Sloan’s desire to 
implement what he labelled the ‘Disney effect’ in which the cartoons employed 
a similar style and structure throughout the series, together with the 
appearance of reoccurring characters.  Each of the ten shorts concentrated 
on a particular aspect of the free enterprise system, covering the subjects in 
depth to provide viewers with what the team believed was a much needed 
education in American economics.  The subjects were then linked to the wider 
importance of the free enterprise system to the nation.  In doing so, Sloan and 
Benson hoped the series would help to reinstate the pre-Depression 
reputation of big business and showcase what they believed made America 
‘the finest place in the world to live.’9 
          The deeper context of this thesis explores a variety of themes pertinent 
to modern American history.  Although Fun and Facts did not enter production 
until 1946, the conditions for its release can be traced back to the 1930s.  
Some of these points of conflict and tension even date back to the 1920s.  The 
emerging corporate-evangelical alliances clearly formed in response to FDR’s 
New Deal.  Mutual interests rallied big business after the economic success of 
the roaring twenties.  As Kim Phillips-Fein notes, the decade before the 
                                                        
9 This quote was placed on the opening slide of every Fun and Facts cartoon and 
explains the team’s desire to ‘create a deeper understanding of what has made 
America the finest place in the world to live.’  To them, this was first and foremost 
the free enterprise system.  A visual of this slide can be found in ‘Why Play 
Leapfrog?,’ YouTube [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7BjO65--JE&t=171s]. 
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Depression was considered an ‘employer’s paradise’, a time when business 
leaders stood as the heroes of American prosperity. 10   When the public 
demanded new consumer goods, industry dutifully obliged by producing an 
abundance of commodities to a mass market driven by high purchasing power.  
Though not every American benefitted from the growing prosperity, the lucky 
participants in this consumer culture propelled business leaders to new 
heights.  Under such circumstances, the demand for labour unions decreased 
and ultimately eliminated organised opposition to corporate practices. 
Acknowledging the position of the business community during this period of 
affluence is necessary in order to understand the significance of its fall with 
the onset of the Depression, as well as its subsequent recovery.  In looking for 
someone to blame for the economic crisis, the public turned against big 
business.  This was not wholly unjustified given the poor response of 
conservatives to economic crises.  The downturn, business leaders believed, 
was yet another cyclical glitch.  If left alone, the economy would return to its 
pre-1930 state of prosperity within a couple of years.  However, such 
assurances rang hollow for many Americans. 
          The Depression persisted deep into the 1930s.  As the business 
community refused to accept responsibility and played down the crisis, its 
                                                        
10 Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, p. 6.  For an overview on the American economy 
during the 1920s, see David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American 
People in Depression and War, 1929 – 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), Phillip G. Payne, Crash! How the Economic Boom and Bust of the 1920s 
Worked (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2015), David E. Kyvig, Daily Life 
in the United States, 1920 – 1939: Decades of Promise and Pain (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2002), James Grant, The Forgotten Depression, 1921: The 
Crash That Cured Itself (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), Thomas K. McCraw 
and William R. Childs, American Business Since 1920: How it Worked third edition 
(Medford, MA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2018), and Peter James George, The 
Emergence of Industrial America: Strategic Factors in American Economic Growth 
Since 1870 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982). 
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reputation continued to deteriorate.  In response, the nation chose to elect a 
president willing to tackle the problem with new initiatives.  Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s election in late 1932 marked a turning point for corporate 
conservatives.  In 1933, the government’s interventionist New Deal policies 
set business leaders on a frenzy of public relations campaigns as they rushed 
to defend the free enterprise system.  Notable companies such as E.I. du Pont, 
General Electric, and General Motors, as well as larger organisations like the 
NAM, produced a barrage of pro-business propaganda.  Their message was 
simple: the government had no place in business and it was under their 
leadership that America would return to its prosperous past.11  These efforts 
were multiplied as New Deal policies continued to be introduced and gained 
widespread approval.  The National Labour Relations Act of 1935 (also 
referred to as the Wagner Act) caused a particular outcry as the government 
sought to interfere with relations between management and unions.  The 
backlash from this legislation was unprecedented.  The NAM, together with its 
allies, lobbied against the bill and when this failed, public relations expenditure 
was increased substantially.  The national strike wave of 1937 reinforced 
corporate fears concerning the diminishing power of big business and the 
threat of government control of the economy.   
                                                        
11 For important works on conservative business propaganda during the interwar 
period, see William Bird, “Better Living”: Advertising, Media, and the New 
Vocabulary of Business Leadership, 1935 – 1955 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1999), Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate 
Propaganda Versus Freedom and Liberty (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
1995), Inger L. Stole, Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism and Corporate Public 
Relations in the 1930s (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2005), Kathryn S. 
Olmsted, Right Out of California: The 1930s and the Big Business Roots of Modern 
Conservatism (New York: The New York Press, 2015), J. Michael Sproule, 
Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass 
Persuasion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and Edward L. 
Bernays, Public Relations, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952). 
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          Sloan, who was already providing large donations to the NAM, 
personally joined the fight against the New Deal as strike action had a direct 
impact on GM.  His response culminated in the corporation’s 1939 educational 
film, Round & Round.12  This ten-minute animated short utilised stop-motion 
animation to explain the basic workings of the economy and the importance of 
the free enterprise system to the wellbeing of the nation.  The film symbolised 
Sloan’s disdain for the New Deal and was an early example of pro-free 
enterprise propaganda.  The techniques used in Round & Round, coupled with 
Sloan’s desire to protect his economic philosophy from forces that threatened 
GM’s productivity, would later be transferred to the Fun and Facts series.  The 
trials and tribulations of 1930s business, therefore, is an important area of 
exploration when examining the reasons behind Sloan’s involvement in 
Harding’s flagship production. 
          If the role of business constitutes an important element of this work, so 
too does religion.  In the fight against the New Deal, Benson, the Arkansas 
educator and evangelical, took the side of America’s leading corporate 
conservatives.  The success of his career relied on the financial support of 
these men, who shared his desire to re-educate the public in the workings of 
the free enterprise system and the importance of big business to the prosperity 
of the nation.  For the business community, the creation of a corporate-
evangelical alliance was a blessing.  As men of God, their partners could give 
voice to the same conservative complaints as business leaders, but without 
suspicion that their actions were motivated solely by self-interest.  In doing so, 
                                                        
12 ‘Round & Round,’ YouTube [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGqF7PFs-Y4], 
accessed 3 May 2018. 
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Benson, together with like-minded religious leaders, produced a new blend of 
politics, economics, and conservative religion that one observer aptly dubbed 
‘Christian libertarianism.’13  Throughout the 1930s, and into the postwar period, 
their activities reshaped the national debate surrounding the role of federal 
government, the political influence of corporations, and the role of religion in 
national life.  In aligning with business leaders, Benson and his colleagues, 
Kruse argues, built a ‘foundation for a new vision of America in which 
businessmen would no longer suffer under the rule of Roosevelt but instead 
thrive – in a phrase they popularised – in a nation ‘Under God.’’14 
          In exploring Sloan and Benson’s response to the New Deal, it is 
important to note the radical nature of their conservative ideology.  Roosevelt’s 
economic policies were subject to criticisms from across the political spectrum; 
from disgruntled leftist commentators who argued that the New Deal did not 
do enough for the disadvantaged, to hard-line, right-wing conservatives who 
viewed it as an attack on American liberty.  To the latter, the New Deal was a 
threat to economic freedom and marked the beginning of the end of free 
market principles that exacerbated Sloan and Benson’s desire to protect the 
status quo.  However, in reality, the New Deal was not as radical a break with 
the policy of previous administrations as it has sometimes been viewed.  As 
Kevin E. Schmiesing argues, ‘the reformers of the thirties were faced with an 
economic crisis and their main goal was recovery . . . security for farmers, 
business, and workers, but he [Roosevelt] did not intend to restructure 
                                                        
13 Kruse, One Nation Under God, p. 7. 
14 Ibid, p. 8.  Also, see Gloege, Guaranteed Pure in which he describes the 
emergence of the ‘corporate evangelical.’ 
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radically the American economy.’15  Other scholars, such as Barton Bernstein 
have focussed on the lack of reform achieved during the 1930s.  They distance 
their arguments from earlier historians that deemed the New Deal 
revolutionary to claim that Roosevelt naturally sought limited reform within the 
American political consensus.16 
          Against the backdrop of such studies, it is Sloan and Benson’s ideology 
that appears radical, not the New Deal.  Their rhetoric during the 1930s and 
40s, together with the groups they chose to align themselves with, reveals a 
highly charged, and somewhat extreme, reaction to government intervention 
in the economy.  This view was mirrored through public opinion towards big 
business, particularly in the dismissive response to organisations such as the 
American Liberty League and the NAM who were often the subject of jokes 
instigated by the press and more moderate spectators.  In religious circles, 
Benson’s position echoed the fears promulgated by Christian doomsayers 
who associated the changes in American politics to the apocalyptic time-
period of the end times, yet another extreme position prescribed to those 
deemed as radical.  Consequently, it is necessary to remember that 
throughout this thesis, Sloan and Benson’s conservative, and decisively anti-
New Deal, ideology resonated with groups comprised of like-minded, right-
wing individuals, rather than the wider public.   
                                                        
15 Kevin E. Schmiesing, Within The Market Strife: American Catholic Economic 
Thought from Rerum Novarum to Vatican II (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 
83. 
16 Barton Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal 
Reform (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970) and Paul Conkin, The New Deal 
(Berkeley, CA: The University of California, 1992).   
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          The role of religion in the defence of free enterprise also played a 
significant part to the development of Fun and Facts.  Therefore, it is important 
to provide wider context on the nature of Benson’s religious affiliation.  Much 
of Benson’s early life was dominated by his work as a member of the Churches 
of Christ.  Over the years, the Churches of Christ has divided and subdivided 
into eight major wings, according to The Encyclopedia of American 
Religions.17  However, this thesis will concentrate on the mainstream tradition 
that traces its American heritage to Barton W. Stone and Alexander Campbell 
in the Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century.  Benson 
aligned  himself with this denomination after abandoning the Methodist church 
upon entering college.  He was attracted by the notion of the restoration of 
primitive Christianity, a defining feature of the Churches of Christ that sought 
to restore the Christian faith as it was believed to have been practised in the 
first century.  Elements of evangelicalism also spoke to Benson.  As defined 
by George Marsden, the essential evangelical beliefs include: 
(1) the Reformation doctrine of the final authority of the Bible, 
(2) the real historical character of God’s saving work 
recorded in Scripture, (3) salvation to eternal life based on 
the redemptive work of Christ, (4) the importance of 
evangelism and missions, and (5) the importance of a 
spiritually transformed life.18 
 
                                                        
17 J. Gordon Melton, The Encyclopaedia of American Religions eight edition 
(Farmington Hills, MI: Cengage Gale, 2009). 
18 George M. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1991), pp. 4 – 5.  Also, see Roger E. Olsen, 
Westminster Handbook to Evangelical Theology (Louisville, Westminster John 
Knox, 2004), Christian Smith, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), Frances Fitzgerald, The 
Evangelicals, The Struggle to Shape America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 
David Martyn Lloyd Jones, What is an Evangelical? (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 
1993), Steven P. Miller, The Age of Evangelicalism: America’s Born-Again Years 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), Heath W. Carter and Laura Rominger 
Porter (eds.), Turning Points in the History of American Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2017. 
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The importance of evangelism was of particular interest to Benson.  He 
strongly believed in the power of Christian education and devoted much of his 
life to this cause.  During the 1920s, he left the US to work as a missionary in 
China.  His experiences in the Far East shaped his actions on his return to the 
US a decade later after witnessing the influence of Communism there.  
Chinese Communism clashed with Benson’s view of Americanism, as shared 
by fellow conservatives.  Communism, as far as he was concerned, threatened 
the US during a time of great economic hardship.  Stung by his experiences 
in the China, Benson quickly came to the conclusion that ‘socialism’ as he 
wrongly termed Keynesian economics, ‘was already knocking at the nation’s 
front door.’19  As Leo Ribuffo has observed, right-wing Christians such as 
Benson deemed Roosevelt’s actions ‘un-American as well as unwise’ and 
‘routinely compared the whole New Deal to “Russianised government.”’20  In 
response, Benson initiated a large-scale offensive that aimed to defend the 
free enterprise system on the one hand, whilst developing Christian education 
on the other.  These two themes became intrinsically linked during his rise as 
a leading figure of twentieth century conservatism.  
          It is also useful to note the definition of fundamentalism given the 
ideological alliance formed between the Churches of Christ and the 
fundamentalist movement after WWI.  In Fundamentalism and American 
Culture, Marsden describes the movement as ‘militantly anti-modernist 
Protestant evangelicalism’ that found its origins in the revivalist tradition, 
Common Sense realist philosophy, and a non-Wesleyan branch of the 
                                                        
19 Quote by Benson, in Hicks, ‘Sometimes in the Wrong, But Never in Doubt,’ p. 27. 
20 Leo Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great 
Depression to the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), p. 15. 
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holiness movement.  Its characteristic beliefs include an intense focus on 
evangelism, the premillennial second coming of Christ, and the absolute 
authority of the Bible.21  As one of the most influential books in American 
religious history, Marsden’s work has, according to Matthew Sutton, ‘carried 
the day for so long.’22  In the last few years, however, a series of new books 
have surfaced that seek to overturn Marsden’s consensus.  New definitions 
introduced by Sutton and Gloege provide a meaning of fundamentalism that 
aligns far more closely to Benson’s idea of Americanism.  According to Sutton, 
‘fundamentalism, far from being a backwards-looking reaction to religious 
modernism, was instead just another variant of modernist faith. Adherents, just 
as ambitiously as their liberal counterparts, sought to shape a Christianity that 
represented and spoke to the needs of its time.  Furthermore, the Christianity 
they developed was not a sectarian and isolationist faith, but one that sought 
to transform the United States in every way – from politics to social issues to 
mass media to religion.’23  Gloege elaborates on this, arguing that the core 
leadership of the early fundamentalist movement was profoundly influenced 
by modern business.  As well as being decidedly urban and ideologically 
                                                        
21 George M. Marsden,  Fundamentalism and American Culture new edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 4.  Other notable works on fundamentalism 
include Ernest Sandeen, The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American 
Millenarianism, 1800 – 1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), Joel 
Carpenter, Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Matthew Avery Sutton, American Apocalypse: 
A History of Modern Evangelism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 
David S. New, Christian Fundamentalism in America: A Cultural History (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2012), Douglas Carl Abrams, Selling the Old-
Time Religion: American Fundamentalism and Mass Culture, 1920 – 1940 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2001), and Kenneth J. Collins, Power, Politics, and the 
Fragmentation of Evangelicalism: From the Scopes Trial to the Obama 
Administration (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012). 
22 Matthew Avery Sutton, ‘New Trends in the Historiography of American 
Fundamentalism,’ The Journal of American Studies 51:1 (2017), pp. 240 – 241. 
23 Ibid. 
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aligned with the professional and elite bourgeoisie, fundamentalists were also 
early adopters of modern corporate organisation and marketing strategies for 
religious ends. 24   Benson’s Americanist ideals concerning business and 
religion, as well as his engagement with modern technology to disseminate his 
faith, placed him firmly within the fundamentalist camp.  Facets of Marsden’s 
definition are applicable to Benson, most notably the focus on evangelism and 
the absolute authority of the Bible, yet recent studies provide a profound 
explanation to the role of fundamentalism in business and economic 
propaganda.  The Fun and Facts series is a fine example of how 
fundamentalists, like Benson, utilised modern strategies that enabled them to 
become powerful social actors in a changing society. 
          Within the context of corporate-evangelical partnerships, the larger 
theme of American conservatism is particularly noteworthy.  The first half of 
this thesis will explore the decline of conservative power, as well as its 
response to a changing political landscape, through the lens of business and 
religion.  For this, the New Deal remains central to the narrative as the rise of 
a liberal state, the expansion of labour unions, and the rejection of laissez-
faire economics gave rise to conservative agitation.  The state of the 
Republican Party amid Roosevelt’s four presidential elections for the 
Democrats is, of course, worth a mention. However, it is the actions of 
corporate leaders and religious activists that will take centre stage.  The 
organisational forces of the American Liberty League and the NAM provide an 
insight into the propaganda techniques used by right-wing businessmen in an 
effort to combat the New Deal, as well as their decision to enlist the aid of 
                                                        
24 Gloege, Guaranteed Pure, p. 14. 
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prominent evangelicals.  Yet, despite the support of some of the nation’s 
leading figures, their efforts were dismissed with cries of self-interest.  During 
the 1930s, conservatives failed to organise politically against the New Deal.25     
          The fortunes of American conservatism changed dramatically following 
the Second World War.  On the political front, the strong performance of 
conservative candidates in the electoral field helped revive the moribund 
movement.  In the 1946 midterm elections, the Republicans recaptured the 
majority of both houses of Congress for the first time since 1930, breaking 
sixteen years of Democratic control.  This coincided with the drastic decline of 
Truman’s approval rating in response to his actions towards the 1945-46 strike 
wave.  In primarily siding with employers and threatening to draft strikers into 
the military, Truman’s rating fell from 63 percent at the beginning of 1946 to 
an abysmal 27 per cent in October, a month before the midterm election.26  In 
control of Congress, the Republicans chipped away at the New Deal and 
passed legislation beneficial to big business.  The most notable of these was 
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.  The passing of this legislation was a direct attack 
on the Wagner Act and restricted the activities and power of labour unions.  It 
was a remarkable win for the business community which, for the first time since 
the Depression, was optimistic about its future.   
                                                        
25 For 1930s conservatism, see George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: 
A History of the American Liberty League, 1934–1940 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1962), James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The 
Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1967), Robert F. Burk, The Corporate State and the 
Broker State: The Du Ponts and American National Politics, 1925-1940 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), and Gregory L. Schneider (ed.), Conservatism in 
America Since 1930: A Reader (New York, New York University Press, 2003). 
26 ‘Presidential Job Approval,’ The American Presidency Project 
[http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php?pres=33], accessed 30 July 
2018. 
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          Hope for the revival of corporate America was further aided by the anti-
Communist crusade of the Cold War.  Truman’s 1947 ‘Loyalty Order’, an act 
that required federal employees to be screened for possible association with 
subversive activities, paved the way for the Red Scare and the witch hunts 
conducted by conservative Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House of Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC).  Against this hostile political backdrop, 
business leaders reignited their fight of the 1930s to defend the free enterprise 
system against continuing threats from liberals and the left.  The resurgence 
of American conservatism bolstered their efforts.27  
          As the Fun and Facts series was, first and foremost, an educational 
production, it is essential to note the importance of film and its relation to the 
deeper context of this thesis.  Here, the term ‘educational’ is used in a broad 
sense to encompass films that were made to teach, inform, instruct, or 
persuade viewers in a variety of ways and contexts.  Most nontheatrical films 
of the twentieth century fall into this category and may be referred to elsewhere 
as industrial films, training films, sponsored productions, or even propaganda 
pieces.  An estimated 300,000 educational pictures have been made in the 
                                                        
27 Notable work on postwar conservatism includes, Godfrey Hodgson, The World 
Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), Jonathan M. Schoenwald, A Time For 
Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), Donald T. Critchlow and Nancy MacLean, Debating the 
American Conservative Movement, 1945 to the Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2009), Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right at the Sixties: The 
Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1995), Sean P. Cunningham, American Politics in the Postwar Sunbelt: 
Conservative Growth in a Battleground Region (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), Alan Brinkley, ‘The Problem of American Conservatism,’ The 
American Historical Review 99:2 (1994), pp. 409 – 429, Donald T. Critchlow, 
‘Rethinking American Conservatism: Toward a New Narrative,’ Journal of American 
History 98: 3 (2011), pp. 752 – 755, Kim Phillips-Fein, ‘Conservatism: A State of the 
Field,’ Journal of American History 98:3 (2011), pp. 723 – 743. 
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US, making it the largest film genre to date.28  Accompanying these films was 
a large collection of how-to literature, mainly consisting of a range of academic 
journals aimed to promote the medium to sponsors, educators, and film 
producers.  Despite the vast body of source material, these films constitute a 
neglected aspect of film studies and film history.  For years, nontheatrical 
productions have been overshadowed by their cinematic counterparts.  As 
instructional pieces, they lack the aesthetic appeal, fictional narratives, and 
technological innovation used to attract attention.  As Elizabeth Ellsworth 
notes, ‘as long as debates about auteurs, aesthetics, popularity, and filmic 
enunciation dominated media studies, the highly formulaic, seemingly banal 
styles and structures of educational media . . . ensured their marginalisation.’29  
This preconception hindered any serious research into educational films until 
the 1990s.   
          The past two decades have seen a significant increase in the study of 
nontheatrical productions.  Most notably, Anthony Slide’s Before Video (1992) 
provides an in-depth look at the use of 16mm films in American institutions, 
complete with appendices providing information on distributors from 1920 to 
1940.  This paved the way for further research, culminating in works such as 
Charles Acland’s and Haidee Wasson’s Useful Cinema (2011) and Devin 
Orgeron, et al., Learning with the Lights Off (2011).30  Similarly, film archivist 
                                                        
28 Rick Prelinger, The Field Guide to Sponsored Films (San Francisco: National 
Film Preservation Foundation, 2006), p. vi 
29 Elizabeth Ellsworth and Mariamne Whatley, The Ideology of Images in 
Educational Media: Hidden Curriculums in the Classroom (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1990), p. 2. 
30 Historiography on nontheatrical films steadily increased after the publication of 
Anthony Slide, Before Video: A History of the Non-Theatrical Film (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1992).  Notable works include, Ken Smith, Mental Hygiene: 
Classroom Films 1945 – 1970 (New York: Blast Books, 1999), Elizabeth Wiatr, 
‘Between Word, Image, and the Machine: Visual Education and Films of Industrial 
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Rick Prelinger has dedicated much of his time arguing for the cultural and 
historical significance of nontheatrical films, publishing The Field Guide to 
Sponsored Films in 2007.  These influential studies are bringing educational 
films to the foreground of film studies and film history. Prelinger’s own 
collection of 50,000 books, periodicals, and pieces of print ephemera and the 
60,000 films he donated to the Library of Congress are supporting these 
advancements.31 
          Through these studies, a narrative on the developments of twentieth 
century educational films unfolds.  For the purpose of this thesis, these 
developments will be explored through the industrial productions funded by 
anti-New Deal corporate giants such as Sloan, the du Ponts, and the NAM.  
The success of industrial sponsored films, as well as the genre of educational 
films in general, was hindered by the negative publicity the business 
community received during the Depression.  The pro-free enterprise 
messages conveyed in features like Republic Steel’s Steel: A Symphony of 
Industry (1936) and Chevrolet’s From Dawn to Sunset (1937) were dismissed 
as acts of self-interest.32  As researcher F. Dean McClusky found, critics 
thought such productions were full of ‘commercialism, low moral tone, 
propaganda or controversial issues.’  These unsatisfactory pictures, he 
continued, were ‘found to be so numerous that the good ones suffered from 
                                                        
Practice,’ Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 22 (2002), Orgeron et al, 
Learning with the Lights Off, and Charles R Acland and Haidee Wasson (ed.), 
Useful Cinema (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).  Slide’s work also 
inspired the Orphan Film Symposium, established in 1999 by Dan Streible.  
31 ‘Rick and Megan Prelinger,’ KQED 
[https://ww2.kqed.org/forum/2009/05/14/richard-and-megan-prelinger/], accessed 
29 September 2017. 
32 ‘Steel: A Symphony of Industry,’ YouTube 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGM5J2nwV90] and ‘From Dawn to Sunset,’ 
YouTube [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbeSVmEwBMk]. 
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being too frequently found in bad company.’33  Yet, in subsequent years, 
educational films gained a newfound respectability.  
          The turning point for educational films came with the onset of the 
Second World War as America’s entry into the conflict caused a boom in the 
production of nontheatrical features.  Filmmakers produced movies to instruct, 
inform, sell, inspire, convince, and unite.  They were serious, entertaining, 
enlightening, but above all, blatant propaganda.  Their success was aided by 
a nation of moviegoers that viewed the thousands of propaganda films 
routinely shown before the main feature they had paid to see.  By the end of 
the war, these patrons were convinced of the benefits of the motion picture as 
an educational tool.  Consequently, the demand for educational films in the 
postwar period was unprecedented.  The war had created a desire for film and 
every possible venue of film exhibition was equipped with a 16mm projector.  
In a 1954 study on the developments of the genre, researcher Paul Wagner 
reported that the number of 16mm projectors available in communities 
throughout the country was in the range of 250,000 to 400,000.  In addition, 
25,000 nontheatrical films were produced in the first seven years after 1945; 
this total surmounted to only 500 before the war.34  Postwar America, therefore, 
provided the perfect conditions for the production of an animated economic 
series. 
          In regard to existing historiography, there is a vast body of literature on 
the themes central to this thesis, as well as the overarching contexts of 
                                                        
33 Abstract from McClusky’s 1937 report, in Paul Saettler, The Evolution of 
American Educational Technology (Charlotte: Information Age Publishing, 1990), 
pp. 106 – 107.  
34 Film Council of America, Sixty Years of 16mm Film, 1923 – 1983: A Symposium 
(Evanston, IL: Film Council of America, 1954), p. 12. 
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interwar and postwar America.  The 1930s - with the economic collapse and 
subsequent Depression, the introduction of the New Deal, and the decline of 
conservatism - is a pivotal moment in business and religious history and has 
generated a wealth of scholarship.35  This thesis will, to a great extent, engage 
with existing works to explore conservative agitation amid the rise and 
solidification of the liberal state.  Doing so will bring greater understanding of 
the actions of corporate leaders and religious activists during a time of great 
upheaval.  Though their efforts were unsuccessful in changing public attitudes 
towards big business, corporate-evangelical allies formed a foundation for 
conservative activism in the postwar era.  The political, economic, and cultural 
changes instigated by the Second World War provided a lifeline for American 
business which, together with its religious partners, continued the feuds of the 
past decade with vigour.  As such, literature on the long-1950s, defined as the 
period from 1945 to 1960, will also be fundamental to this thesis.   
          Characterised by the revival of conservatism, increased religious 
engagement, and fervent anti-Communism, this decade provided the 
backdrop to the Fun and Facts series.  Therefore, works by scholars such as 
Godfrey Hodgson, Richard Fried, and Phillips-Fein will provide the much 
needed context to the era, as will the wider studies of John Patrick Diggins 
and James T. Patterson.36  Additionally, the works of Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf 
                                                        
35 For notable works, see Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2002), Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labour, and Politics in 
America, 1920 – 1935 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and 
James Hoopes, Corporate Dreams: Big Business in American Democracy from the 
Great Depression to the Great Recession (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 2011). 
36 For an overview of 1950s America, see Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side 
Up, Richard M. Fried, A Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer (eds.), 
What’s Good for Business: Business and American Politics since World War II (New 
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and Lizabeth Cohen will help to explain the cultural conditions that allowed for 
the success of conservative propaganda.37  With the aid of these studies, this 
thesis will illuminate how the postwar period offered an ideal setting for the 
Fun and Facts series. 
          From a narrower perspective, historiography concerning the 
collaboration of business and religion in twentieth century America will be of 
great importance.  Here, the work of Kruse and Grem is indispensable.  This 
thesis supports their arguments that corporate-evangelical links can be traced 
as far back as the 1920s, changing the perceptions of those such as Bethany 
Moreton and Phillips-Fein who suggest these partnerships were exclusive to 
the postwar era.  As such, the following work will add to a growing consensus 
within the field of business and religious history.  The arguments within this 
thesis, however, will not merely regurgitate Kruse, Gloege’s, and Grem’s 
arguments, but expand on their work and offer a study on a surprisingly 
overlooked alliance between two of America’s leading figures.  The works of 
Hicks, Stevens, and Farber will provide the biographical details on Sloan and 
Benson whilst the innumerable sources held within Harding’s Ann Cowen 
Archives & Special Collections library will help to offer new perspectives and 
missed opportunities on research concerning Fun and Facts.    
          Other scholars, such as Caroline Jack and Robbie Maxwell, are among 
the few who have provided a brief overview of the Fun and Facts series.  Their 
                                                        
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: 
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37 Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor 
and Liberalism 1945-60 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1994) and 
Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in 
Postwar America (New York: Random House, Inc., 2003). 
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studies offer interesting, albeit sweeping, thoughts on the project that will 
contribute to this thesis in several ways.  Jack, for example, is highly critical of 
the series in her article, ‘Fun and Facts about American Business: Economic 
Education and Business Propaganda in an Early Cold War Cartoon Series.’  
Here, she argues that due to rising tensions within the corporate-evangelical 
alliance, Sloan and Benson failed to produce a successful animated series 
that appealed to the public due to a lack of balance between education and 
humour.  This thesis will challenge Jack’s claim, in its entirety, to show that 
this was not the case.  Although cracks did appear within Sloan and Benson’s 
partnership, these were swiftly remediated through an unwavering, shared 
dedication to the free enterprise system.  Moreover, Maxwell’s analysis of 
Benson as a highly skilful orator and popular figure lends credence to the 
argument that large swathes of the public were in fact influenced by his 
teachings, including those broadcasted through the Fun and Facts series.  
Maxwell’s study of Benson is valuable, and his findings support this project’s 
main conclusions.  This research, alongside that of Maxwell’s, provides a new 
trajectory within the existing historiography of Benson and his National 
Education Program to argue that, although he was very much a figure of the 
long-1950s, Benson successfully stood as a prominent defender of the free-
enterprise system with Fun and Facts representing conservative notions of 
Americanism following its revival after a damaging period of decline.38  Unlike 
Hicks and Stevens, however, these new additions offer a bleaker conclusion 
to Benson’s later life, arguing that there was no place for Benson’s radical anti-
                                                        
38 Jack, ‘Fun and Facts about American Business,’ and Maxwell, ‘Educator to the 
Nation.’ 
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New Deal ideology after the fervent anti-anticommunism of the Second Red 
Scare.  Though popular, Fun and Facts was very much a project of its time. 
          Chapter one, Alfred P. Sloan and the Fight Against the New Deal, will 
focus on the subject of business during the interwar years with a particular 
emphasis on the actions and opinions of Sloan.  Through Sloan, conservative 
opposition to the New Deal will be explored, as well as responses to 
government intervention in the economy.  Whilst this will rely greatly on 
existing work concerning anti-New Deal conservative activism, it is vital that 
the reader has an understanding of corporate propaganda techniques given 
that it provides the foundation for Fun and Facts, the origins of which can be 
traced back to the 1930s.  Sloan’s ideological developments here, as elusive 
as they can be with a lack of private papers and behind-the-scenes 
contributions, will offer insight into his involvement with Harding’s postwar 
project.   
          Chapter two, George S. Benson: From Humble Beginnings to a Leader 
in Christian Education, will follow a similar structure but with a focus on Benson.  
Here, the emphasis will be placed on the religious side of the corporate-
evangelical partnership and explore the actions of Benson in response to the 
New Deal and his perceived threat of Communism.  As with Sloan, Benson’s 
ideology will shed light on his decision to embark on an ambitious economic 
film series.   
          Chapter three, A New Era For The Non-Theatrical Film: Producing an 
Economic Cartoon Series in Postwar America, will provide the turning point to 
the thesis and introduce Fun and Facts, starting with the production process.  
The contextual backdrop will explain how America’s victory in the Second 
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World War gave rise to a new and thriving consumer culture that helped 
improve attitudes towards big business.  Simultaneously, educational films 
won a newfound respectability after their effective use as wartime propaganda.  
In addition to exploring the rise of conservatism, this chapter will explain how 
the immediate postwar period provided the ideal climate for an anti-New Deal 
film series.  Following this, the Fun and Facts production process will be 
explained, introducing two new, but key, players in the series.  The cartoons 
were produced by ex-Disney animator John Sutherland, a character more 
elusive than Sloan when it comes to biographical materials.  Whilst few details 
about Sutherland’s ideology remain, his correspondences with Sloan and 
Benson, as well as research provided by online animation journals, suggest a 
shared ambition for the series.  Such sources, though few in number, have 
been indispensable in deciphering Sutherland’s character and work history.39  
Similarly, information concerning Arnold Zurcher, the Sloan Foundation’s 
director, are scarce.  Although, his involvement in the series as the 
organisation’s lead signifies his right-wing position.  Discussions between 
these four individuals will highlight the trials and tribulations behind the 
creation of Fun and Facts and reveal telling differences in opinion.  Ultimately, 
the production of the series will determine the success of Sloan and Benson’s 
corporate-evangelical alliance.   
                                                        
39 Although Sutherland was a pioneering animator of the postwar era, there is a 
profound lack of sources on both him and his studio, John Sutherland Productions.  
Leading sources central to this thesis are the correspondences found in the 
archives at Harding, as well as the following online animation journals: ‘Animating 
Ideas: The John Sutherland Story,’ Hogan’s Alley 
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          Chapter four, Selling Free Enterprise Through Animation, introduces the 
cartoons within the series.  It is important to note that not all of the cartoons 
are analysed here, only the first six in the series.  Those that are present in 
the chapter provide a well-rounded representation of the themes pertinent to 
both the project, and those involved in its production.  The excluded four would 
only repeat covered aspects of the analysis of the series, adding very few new 
details.  The contents of the remaining six are viewed within the wider context 
of the long-1950s and explore a range of economic themes situated at the core 
of the free enterprise system.  Additionally, the style of the cartoons is 
discussed in the latter half of the chapter to explain how Sutherland utilised 
advances in animation technology to appeal to viewers and increase audience 
attendance.   
          Finally, chapter five, ‘The Sort of Propaganda That Parents Should Take 
Their Children to See,’ will determine the success of the series through viewer 
reception.  A range of sources will be employed, including audience comment 
cards, media coverage, and letters received by the team.  Public reaction to 
the series, through both primary and secondary channels of distribution, will 
determine the success of the series, as well as its place within modern 
conservative propaganda.40  It will also highlight the importance of a forgotten 
partnership between two unlikely figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
40 In regard to film releases, primary distribution refers to a cinematic release, 
whereas secondary distribution effectively means straight to video. 
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Chapter One 
 
Alfred P. Sloan and the Fight Against the New Deal 
 
 
The origins of the Fun and Facts series can be traced back to as early as the 
1930s when domestic politics threatened conservative notions of the 
‘American way of life.’  The Great Depression changed America’s business 
class who labelled the downturn a political disaster as much as an economic 
one.  During the 1920s, many Americans regarded corporate leaders as the 
heroes of American politics.  As Kim Phillips-Fein explains, the veneration of 
business, the promise of easy riches through the magic of the stock market, 
and the absence of a political challenge to capitalism made the decade an 
ideal time for private enterprise.41  It was a period of phenomenal abundance, 
defined by a foreign visitor in 1928 as ‘an employer’s paradise.’ 42  
Consequently, the onset of the Depression in 1929 came as a shock to the 
business community.  Only a few saw the calamity coming.  Its leaders 
suddenly found themselves in the midst of a cataclysm; a stark difference to 
the age of prosperity that had been abruptly taken from them.  Without warning, 
these once influential giants lost the confidence of the people and were 
blamed for the nation’s misfortune.  The ‘employer’s paradise’ of the 1920s 
had ended. 
          The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared to many 
businessmen as a chance to redeem themselves and rebuild a positive 
relationship between the business community and the public.  Even lifelong 
                                                        
41 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New 
Deal (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009), p. 6. 
42 Quote from a foreign visitor to the United States, in Ibid. 
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Republicans, such as Walter Chrysler and the du Pont brothers, were 
optimistic about the new President after the failures of his predecessor Herbert 
Hoover.  Sloan, who had supported Hoover during the election, felt confident 
in the choice of his associates.  As David Farber claims, Roosevelt indicated 
his preference for sound money principles and said little during his campaign 
that did not meet with Sloan’s approval. 43  Roosevelt’s victory, while not 
Sloan’s preference, did not pose a threat. 
          Things changed, however, with the introduction of the New Deal.  The 
implementation of its policies represented a turning point for American 
business.  As Lizabeth Cohen argues, the New Deal was largely ‘made’ by the 
people across the country who responded to the impact of the Depression by 
taking part in strikes, protests, and in politics more generally.44  Their actions, 
alongside the initiatives that came from the White House, symbolised the 
rejection of laissez-faire economics and threatened to disrupt the power of big 
business.  In response, the business community embarked on an intense 
assault against FDR and his New Deal programmes.  Public Relations 
campaigns became the weapon of choice.  ‘The Public does not understand 
industry’, the National Association of Manufacturers argued, ‘because industry 
itself has made no effort to tell its story.’ 45   To remedy this, the NAM 
encouraged big business to follow its lead in promoting the gospel of free 
enterprise through a bombardment of films, radio shows, advertisements, and 
                                                        
43 David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 154. 
44 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1929 – 1939 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
45 Quote from the NAM, cited in Kevin Kruse, One Nation Under God: How 
Corporate America Invented Christian America (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 
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more.  Right-wing evangelists were also recruited.  As Kevin Kruse explains, 
these men of God could give voice to the same conservative concerns as 
business leaders, without suspicions of self-interest.  Thus began a long-
standing relationship between business and religion in the form of corporate-
evangelical alliances that worked to fight against the New Deal and 
government intervention in the economy.46  Sloan and Benson eventually 
formed their own alliance in the late 1940s that culminated in Harding’s 
flagship Fun and Facts series.   
          To understand the influences that led to Sloan and Benson’s partnership, 
this chapter will explore the actions of the business community through the 
lens of Alfred Sloan.  Although Sloan had little contact with religious figures 
until his interaction with Benson, his fight against the New Deal explains how 
big business rejected a Keynesian economy and fought for the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the American people.  Ultimately, it was the New Deal that instilled 
a sense of urgency in Sloan and encouraged him to enter the realm of public 
relations to preserve his own brand of Americanism: the free enterprise 
system.47 
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          As the head of the nation’s largest automobile company, Sloan 
embodied the characteristics of America’s twentieth century conservative 
business class.  His passion for industry and economic management 
developed at a young age as a result of his career-orientated upbringing.  Born 
on 23 May 1875 in New Haven, Connecticut, Sloan was the eldest of five 
children.  His parents, originally from upstate New York, belonged to ‘old’ and 
respectable families of little wealth.  On his mother’s side, Sloan’s grandfather 
had been a Methodist minister and the family remained close to the 
denomination until their deaths. Alfred’s religious affiliation is unknown.  His 
paternal grandfather had been a private school master until an illness pushed 
him to retire and forced Alfred Sr. to drop out of school.  By the time Alfred Jr. 
was born, his father was already a successful merchant and a partner of the 
tea, coffee, and tobacco company Bennett, Sloan & Co.  It was perhaps due 
to his own educational experience that Sloan Sr. wished for his son to have 
the best possible schooling.  As such, Sloan Jr. attended the Brooklyn 
Polytechnic Institute where his passion for the field of mechanics, and 
education as a whole, flourished.  In 1892, at the age of seventeen, he enrolled 
at the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
          As a student of electrical engineering, Sloan expected the work to be 
difficult.  He devoted himself fully to his studies, seeing it as the training ground 
for professional life.  In 1895, he graduated from MIT, completing the four-year 
course in just three.  His father’s connection with one of Brooklyn’s richest men, 
John E. Searles of the American Sugar Refining Company, secured him a 
position within the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company of which Searles held a 
majority interest.  Sloan’s professional rise was meteoric. By 1899, he was 
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president of the company.  He reformed the failing business in just six months, 
setting the precedent for his professional career.  In 1916, Hyatt merged with 
William C. Durant’s United Motors Corporation and Sloan was given the 
position of president.  When Durant later incorporated United Motors into 
General Motors, Sloan was immediately appointed vice-president.  He 
remained in this position after Durant’s departure from GM in 1920, working 
closely with the newly assigned Pierre du Pont to re-organise the company 
into one of America’s leading corporations.  In du Pont’s eyes, the success of 
GM was evidence of Sloan’s remarkable business skills.  Du Pont later 
nominated his vice-president, Sloan,  to lead the company following his 
departure in 1923.  As he had been working towards the top position for years, 
Sloan accepted the request without hesitation.  His appointment as president 
of GM marked the beginning of his most prolific era in which he would stand 
as one of America’s leading industrialists and campaigners against the New 
Deal.48 
          Almost immediately, Sloan was thrown into the world of public relations 
despite his status as an intensely private man.  In 1922, a study on the 
reputation of the company revealed, as Sloan put it bluntly, that it simply had 
none.49  ‘People throughout the United States, except at the corner of Wall 
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and Broad Streets, didn’t know anything about General Motors’, he later 
recalled.50  As such, Sloan worked to promote GM to the public and educate 
Americans on the importance of his corporation to the nation.  To lead the task, 
he hired the advertising executive and devout Christian Bruce Barton.  As 
Roland Marchand argues, Barton was legitimately hailed within business 
circles as the ‘boy wonder’ of American advertising during the 1920s. 51  
Barton’s professional portfolio was impressive, comprising of hundreds of 
publications on topics concerning business and Christianity.  After WWI, he 
participated in a post-war project with the Interchurch World Movement (IWM) 
aiming to ‘win the world for Christ.’52  Here, Barton displayed his talent for 
combining the methods, aspirations, and language of religion and business.  
The extent to which ‘the cult of business [had] penetrated American 
Protestantism,’ Eldon Ernst observes, could be seen within the IWM’s 
advertisements in which church-going readers learned that they were 
'stockholders in the greatest business in the world.'53  These ideas penetrated 
Barton’s most famous work, The Man Nobody Knows (1925), in which he 
disseminated his own brand of Americanism in the portrayal of Jesus Christ 
as a businessman.  In this best-selling book, Barton described the son of God 
as a go-getting young executive who ‘picked up twelve men from the bottom 
ranks of business and forged them into an organization that conquered the 
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world.’54  His ideas signified the merging of these two worlds, long before the 
corporate-evangelical alliances of the New Deal era. 
          Sloan, whose religious activity was almost non-existent, was drawn to 
Barton’s reputation as a proficient business consultant.  As an advertising 
executive, Barton offered political and industrial consultancy through the 
Barton, Durstine, and Osborn advertising agency.  Before adding GM to his 
list of clients, Barton provided his services to corporate giants such as General 
Mills and the Lever Brothers, helping them sell cereal and soap to mass 
audiences.  His success led him to believe that politicians could be sold in the 
same way as corporations.  In the early 1920s, Barton worked as the publicist 
and strategist for Governor Calvin Coolidge in the latter’s successful 
Republican presidential nomination bid. 55   As Kerry W. Buckley notes, 
Coolidge was introduced ‘not as a political commodity, not by discussing the 
issues of the day, but by presenting a personality with whom Americans could 
identify.’56   
          Barton transferred that strategy to GM’s advertising campaign in which 
he worked to impart a deeper understanding of the corporation to the public.  
The 1923 booklet, ‘A Famous Family,’ is one of the first publications from the 
company’s public relations department and an early example of Barton’s 
influence.  The objective was to personalise the institution.  ‘The word 
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“corporation” is cold, impersonal, and subject to misunderstanding,’ a GM 
representative observed.  ‘Family is personal, human, friendly.  This is our 
picture of General Motors – a big congenial household.’57  As such, ‘A Famous 
Family’ spent time advertising each division within GM, emphasising their 
‘specialised experience’ and ‘particular capacity for service.’ 58  Instead of 
using a sweeping family portrait, the campaign introduced each member one 
by one in the hope that the public would develop a stronger attachment to GM 
and its sister companies. 
       Barton’s carefully crafted introduction of GM was rolled out to the public 
over the course of one year.  The campaign then intensified to win the hearts 
and minds of the nation by ‘the indirect but graceful procedure’ of praising (and 
thus associating itself with) the nation’s most important unsung servants.59  In 
a flurry of advertisements, Barton described the indispensable contributions of 
GM’s automobiles to the work of doctors, teachers, letter carriers, mothers, 
and farmers (to name a few).  His flagship campaign, ‘That the Doctor Shall 
Arrive in Time,’ was a leading example of what the advertising executive was 
trying to achieve.  The two-page sociodrama depicted a dying girl, her mother, 
and the doctor, whose GM car had enabled him to deliver artificial respiration 
just in time.  ‘The little girl would never have seen another sunrise had it not 
been for the automobile’, the ad proclaimed. 60 GM offered the ad as ‘an 
inspiration’ suitable to be hung ‘in every factory and plant, in every showroom 
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and service station.  May it be a reminder that the service of the automobile is 
a part of the most sublime service that any human being is privileged to render 
to another. . .’  The ad won a Harvard Award for its effectiveness, whilst a 
survey of GM dealers found that nearly nine out of ten believed that GM’s 
overall ‘institutional campaign is helping mightily in the actual sale of cars.’61 
       Barton was delighted with the result of the campaign, as were Sloan and 
GM’s board of directors.  His relationship with GM had proved to Sloan the 
power and necessity of corporate advertising during a time of increased 
consumer spending.  For many Americans, the standard of living throughout 
the 1920s improved remarkably over the decade.62  From 1922 to 1928, 
disposable income in the United States rose by 50 percent.  Industrial 
productivity doubled and the wage of the average worker – with automobile 
workers doing considerably better than the mean – was the highest in world.  
The American economy became a ‘buyer’s market.’ Production soared and, 
as Marchand argues, only advertising could bring about a balancing level of 
consumption with mass marketing and an emphasis on consumer credit.63  
Sloan, with the help of Barton, recognised this.  Under his leadership, GM 
spent an average of ten dollars per car in advertising and was the single 
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largest buyer of magazine advertising space in the nation during the 1920s.64  
Sloan’s critics, many within the automobile industry, rejected the rise of 
corporate advertising.  Most notably, Henry Ford argued that style-based 
advertising was a malicious trick that fooled consumers into buying products 
they did not need for reasons that could not stand up to moral scrutiny.65  
However, the decision of Sloan’s rivals to abandon advertising and mass 
consumption only served to strengthen his corporation.  The public legitimacy 
of big business depended on its success of providing economic sustenance 
and consumer riches to an appreciative people.  As such, Sloan ensured GM 
continued to advertise its new automobiles to a mass market eager to have 
the latest products, regardless of their need.  This was undoubtedly the right 
strategy.  In 1921, GM sold 193,000 vehicles at just 12.7 percent of automobile 
market.  Ford owned 55.7 percent of that market.  In 1927, GM had surpassed 
Ford, selling over 1.8 million vehicles.66  The ‘Famous Family’ was now the 
largest in the industry and among the most popular stocks in America.  With 
the assistance of the nation’s leading advertising executive, GM secured its 
place in the aptly labelled ‘employer’s paradise.’ 
       The influence of Barton’s relationship with the business community 
extended beyond his successful advertising campaigns of the 1920s.  His 
collaboration with companies such as GM, General Mills, General Electric, and 
the Lever Brothers is evidence of the existence of corporate-evangelical 
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alliances before the well-documented rise of religious activism during the post-
Second World War period.  As Darren Grem argues, the involvement of 
conservative evangelicalism in corporate affairs did not begin, as is usually 
believed, in the lead up to the presidential election of 1980.67  Instead, as 
Barton’s activities proved, these collaborations began in the early decades of 
the twentieth century and would continue to rise in prominence during the 
1930s and 1940s.  For Sloan, his experience with conservative evangelicalism 
(though not entirely explicit in GM’s ads) was indispensable.  In the long-term, 
it would eventually lead to his partnership with Benson.  In the short-term, 
however, it had shown not only to him, but the rest of the business community, 
the power of ‘goodwill’ PR campaigns.  Such advertising, alongside the 
continuation of evangelical cooperation, became the choice of weapon for 
corporate conservatives fighting for their ‘American Way of Life’ during the 
Great Depression and FDR’s ground-breaking New Deal. 
 
The New Deal and Corporate America         
          After the prosperity of the 1920s, Sloan could not have predicted the 
onset of the Depression.  Nor could the rest of the business community, 
despite claims that an overzealous automobile industry contributed to the 
downturn of the economy.68  When the stock market faltered on 23 October 
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1929, the financial sector expected a swift recovery.  Orthodox economic 
theories held that economic downturns were an inevitable aspect of the 
business cycle, evident by the short-term recessions of 1923-24 and 1926-27.  
There was little reason to believe the initial October fluctuations were any 
different.  For three days, panic swept the New York Stock Exchange as 
investors rushed to sell shares amid plummeting prices.  By the Friday, cool 
heads seemed to have prevailed and the market stabilised.  The New York 
Times reported that ‘order came quickly out of the chaos in Wall Street’ and 
that officials were ‘optimistic.’69  President Hoover also reported positively to 
the unexpected, and dramatic, drop in share prices, claiming that ‘The 
fundamental business of the country, that is production and distribution of 
commodities, is on a sound and prosperous basis.’70  Sloan followed suit, 
echoing the phrase ‘Business is sound.’ 71   The crisis, however, was not 
averted and panic once again swept the stock market.   The economy 
continued to slump, culminating in the greatest financial crisis of the twentieth 
century. 
       Despite being thrown into the midst of a cataclysm, many high-profile 
industrial leaders continued to dismiss the Depression as a mere cyclical 
downturn.  In his memoirs, Hoover recalled that ‘the business world refused, 
for some time after the crash, to believe that the danger was any more than 
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that of run-of-the-mill, temporary slumps such as had occurred at three to 
seven-year intervals in the past.’72  As matters deteriorated, rejections of the 
severity of the crisis persisted.  In 1931, one Maryland building contractor 
wrote to Hoover, ‘There is not five percent of the poverty, distress, and general 
unemployment that many of your enemies would have us believe.’73  Others, 
such as Charles M. Schwab, offered practical advice to the nation, 
encouraging Americans to ‘Just grin, go on working, stop worrying about the 
future, and go ahead as best we can.’74   
          Even Hoover, who argued his administration ‘took a more serious view 
of the immediate future’, underestimated the longevity of the Depression.75  In 
an address to the Chamber of Commerce in 1930, the President announced, 
‘While the crash only took place 6 months ago, I am convinced we have now 
passed the worst and with continued unity of effort we shall rapidly recover.’76  
The worst was, of course, far from over.  Nevertheless, the President was 
reluctant to intervene.  In his 1922 publication, American Individualism, Hoover 
argued that expanding the authority of the government was dangerous.  As a 
detached arbiter in the economy, the government perpetuated individualism.  
However, as an active competitor, it would destroy the American way of life.77  
Hoover applied this philosophy to his presidency, advocating volunteerism 
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rather than government intervention in tackling the deepening crisis.  He called 
on individuals, charities, churches, local governments, and businesses to work 
cooperatively to alleviate suffering and distribute relief.  This was not the 
immediate, large scale aid needed to offset the increasing poverty and the 
administration’s non-interventionist policies were soon rejected by those 
greatly affected by the Depression.  Towards the end of his presidency, 
Hoover did take some direct action, following two, long drawn-out, years of 
consultations with the nation’s leading industrialists.78  For the public, however, 
it was too little, too late. 
       On the eve of the Depression, unemployment in the United States was 
at 1,550,000.  By 1933, the year Roosevelt entered the White House, this 
figure had risen to 12,060,000.79  The superficial reassurances from Hoover 
and his band of corporate supporters did not resonate well with the public who 
saw their leaders as not only incompetent, but absurd.  They had been trusted 
with the future of the nation yet refused to admit the seriousness of the crisis 
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that the business community arguably started.  As the Washington Post 
reported in 1932, ‘Public opinion is wearied and cynical.’80  Consequently, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s landslide victory in the 1932 presidential election came 
as no surprise.  The result was hailed as a radical change and, ‘on the theory 
that “things could not be worse,”’ FDR’s revolutionary New Deal policies were 
welcomed. 81   Many of America’s leading industrialists shared the same 
sentiment, despite initially supporting Hoover in both the 1928 and 1932 
elections.  Even Sloan, who donated large sums to Hoover’s presidential 
campaign, did not recoil at the thought of a Democrat in the White House.  
Though he wished for Hoover to remain in office, Sloan recognised that the 
President’s economic policies of limited government intervention were 
unsuccessful and jeopardising the reputation of big business.  Additionally, a 
number of Sloan’s closest associates publicly supported FDR, including the 
three du Pont brothers and his closest friend, Walter Chrysler – a life-long 
Republican.82  In trusting the judgement of those around him, Sloan shook off 
his disappointment at Hoover’s defeat and welcomed the change with cautious 
optimism.   
          The deepening of the Depression gave Sloan a heightened sense of 
responsibility.  He was highly concerned with the well-being of his corporation 
amidst the continuing deterioration of the economy.  Although GM was able to 
maintain profits, sales and revenues were hit particularly hard and the 
company lost half of its workforce by the end of 1932.  Those that remained 
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faced two hourly wage cuts of ten percent each.83  By this time, GM was so 
intertwined with the nation – and the economic fortune of much of the world – 
that Sloan felt he had to intervene in order to preserve the company.  However, 
public work did not come easily to Sloan and, at first, he tried to delegate much 
of it.  His position changed with the introduction of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA).  Its purpose was to cooperate with businesses 
in setting industry wide standards for minimum wages and maximum working 
hours, ‘to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by 
increasing purchasing power.’84  Sloan was not opposed to the idea, nor were 
his associates.  In fact, it was first promoted by Gerard Swope of General 
Electric in 1931 in the hope to re-stimulate mass consumption.85  Believing in 
its principles, Sloan tentatively supported the NIRA and agreed to join the 
Industrial Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administration in an 
attempt to keep the New Deal in line with the values of private enterprise.   
          However, the NIRA was not accepted without reservations.  Despite 
intense lobbying from the right, the act was passed with the inclusion of pro-
labour policies.  Under section 7(a), employees were given the right ‘to 
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of 
employers of labour.’86  This sent a wave of apprehension throughout the 
automobile industry.  During the 1920s, the fight against unionisation was met 
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with great success: after representing 19.4 percent of the workforce in 1920, 
the ranks of the labour movement dwindled to 10.2 percent in 1930.87  Unions 
were no longer considered a threat to the manufacturing sector.  Consequently, 
the inclusion of section 7 in the NIRA produced fears of radicalism and the loss 
of managerial authority.88  These fears were not wholly unjustified as the 
nation witnessed a sharp increase in strikes during 1933; with approximately 
less than 50 strikes at the beginning of the year, rising to over 200 before its 
end.89  It was certainly an issue for Sloan as the potential for strikes reached 
GM and threatened to cease production.  In seeing the rise of unionisation as 
a danger to business, Sloan and his fellow corporate conservatives 
announced their contempt for Roosevelt’s pro-labour attitudes and publicly 
denounced the New Deal.90   
          Sloan’s rejection of Roosevelt and his economic policies was 
demonstrated by his involvement in the rabidly anti-New Deal organisation of 
the American Liberty League.  Established in 1934, the League aimed to 
organise a coalition of Democrats and Republicans capable of defeating 
Roosevelt in the 1936 election.  It presented itself as a ‘non-partisan’ 
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educational group, dedicated to ‘teach the necessity of respect for the rights 
of persons and property . . . and . . . the duty of government to encourage and 
protect individual and group initiative and enterprise, to foster the right to work, 
earn, save, and acquire property, and to preserve the ownership and lawful 
use of property when acquired.’ 91   As Frederick Rudolph describes, the 
League was essentially ‘the spokesman for a business civilisation, and a 
defender of that civilisation from the attacks of the administration in 
Washington.’92  It was a direct response to what its founders perceived as a 
threat to the ‘American way of life,’ or more specifically, private enterprise. 
          Whilst Sloan was becoming more vocal in his objection to the New Deal, 
he still remained a private man.  He had carefully crafted the public persona 
of a clean-cut, head-strong businessman in which GM was his top priority.  
Through this persona, Sloan appeared as a leader that only concerned himself 
with matters that related directly to his company.  Therefore, whilst he agreed 
to sit on the Liberty League’s advisory board, Sloan refused to appear publicly 
on behalf of the organisation.  In informing Irénée du Pont, one of the League’s 
founders and a substantial financial backer, of his decision, he explained ‘It is 
absolutely essential that I confine myself to the corporation’s [GM] work, and 
only depart in things of this character where the corporation is rather directly 
involved.’93  As a result, very few Americans identified Sloan with the Liberty 
League.  It also makes his role in the organisation difficult to trace.  He was, 
however, a leading donor and provided at least $10,000 (approximately 
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$122,000 in current dollars) to the dissemination of anti-New Deal 
propaganda. 94   These funds contributed to 135 pamphlets, monthly 
newsletters, and dozens of radio broadcasts published by the League in 1935 
and 1936.  Such propaganda generally fell into three categories: attacks on 
the New Deal as a whole (with titles like Is the Constitution for Sale?, 
Americanism at the Crossroads, and What is the Constitution Between 
Friends?), attacks on specific New Deal legislation (The AAA Amendments: 
An Analysis of Proposals Illustrating a Trend Towards a Fascist Control Not 
Only of Agriculture but Also of a Major Sector of Manufacturing Distributing 
Industries), and explicit denunciations of Roosevelt that often compared him 
to Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and George III (all of which could appear in a single 
pamphlet).  In financing the Liberty League’s propaganda, Sloan aligned 
himself with an extremist organisation that was not afraid to mix its anti-New 
Deal rhetoric with direct attacks on the President.   
          Sloan continued to financially contribute to the Liberty League even as 
the organisation’s rhetoric and alliances became far more frantic and fanatical.  
In 1936, Senator Hugo Black announced an investigation into the League 
under the guise of the Special Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities.  
In reality, as Jared Goldstein argues, Black’s investigation was a deliberate 
attempt to discredit New Deal enemies. 95   His findings succeeded in 
demonstrating that the Liberty League was deeply connected to other 
extremist anti-New Deal organisations, including the fascist-leaning Sentinels 
of the Republic which declared that ‘old line Americans of $1,200 a year want 
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a Hitler’ and believed a ‘Jewish threat’ was undermining ‘the fundamental 
principles of the Constitution.’96  As the Washington Post reported, both Irénée 
du Pont and Sloan provided small, albeit significant, donations to the 
organisation, linking the Sentinels to the Liberty League. 97   Another 
beneficiary was the Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution, of which 
Sloan donated $50.98  Whilst this is a meagre sum compared to the thousands 
he invested in the Liberty League, Sloan’s contribution leant his support to an 
organisation that mixed anti-New Deal populist diatribes with fervent racism.  
Infamously, the Committee circulated pictures of Eleanor Roosevelt in the 
company of two African American Howard University ROTC students.  Her 
husband, the caption warned, was permitting ‘negroes to come to the White 
House banquets and sleep in the White House Beds.’99  Despite the overt 
racism, the Committee claimed that it was apparent the Liberty League ‘did 
not disapprove’ as they contributed more money after learning of the 
photos.100  Sloan himself allegedly donated a further $1000, whilst Pierre du 
Pont (the brother of Irénée) provided an extra $5,000.101  ‘What could Sloan 
have been thinking?,’ Farber asks. 102   Unfortunately, Sloan’s personal 
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thoughts towards the activities of these organisations are unknown, but his 
actions reveal a staunch opposition to government intervention in business 
following the pro-labour policies of the NIRA, as well as a willingness to 
support the far-right in his attempts to dismantle the New Deal and oust 
Roosevelt from the presidency. 
          In 1936, Sloan and his associates abandoned the Liberty League.  The 
organisation failed to organise an effective coalition against Roosevelt who 
swept to victory against Republican Alf Landon in the Presidential election.  It 
also failed to attract widespread appeal, with two thirds of the organisation’s 
money coming from thirty men donating $5,000 each.103  The dozens of 
speeches and pamphlets disseminated by the League, in which they spoke of 
the ‘ravenous madness’ of the New Deal as a monstrous usurpation of power, 
fell on deaf ears and those involved became the subject of a string of jokes.  
Democrats dubbed it the ‘millionaires Union’, whilst the party’s chairman 
quipped that it ‘ought to be called the American Cellophane League because, 
first, it’s a du Pont product, and second you can see right through it.’104  In the 
midst of the Great Depression, a handful of ‘economic royalists’, as Roosevelt 
dubbed them in his acceptance speech, could not effectively defend 
capitalism.105  The disparity of wealth between its members and the working 
population of the United States was simply too vast; and the reputation of big 
business too severely damaged.  Nevertheless, its existence represented the 
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first widespread, though flawed, attack conducted by the business community 
against the New Deal. 
          The demise of the Liberty League did not signal the end of Sloan’s, nor 
his associates’, attack on the New Deal.  On the contrary, legislation passed 
in 1935 led to aggressive, nation-wide PR campaigns that extended beyond 
the confines of the New York elites.  In May, the Supreme Court struck down 
the NIRA after concluding it was an unconstitutional exercise of federal 
power.106  Yet, before the business community could rejoice, its controversial 
section 7(a) was embodied within new legislation.  In July, Roosevelt marked 
the beginning of the second phase of the New Deal with the enactment of the 
National Labour Relations Act; otherwise known as the Wagner Act.  Its 
similarity to the NIRA was almost identical with the new section 7(a):  
Employees shall have the right to self-organisation, to form, 
join, or assist labour organisations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .  
 
To prevent employers from interfering with workers’ rights, section 8 
emphasised that ‘It shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7.’107  The pro-labour policies of 1933 were there to stay, 
even if the NIRA was not. 
          The effects of the Wagner Act were damaging across all industrial 
sectors.  In the closing months of 1936, the Chicago Tribune reported several 
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large-scale ‘sit-down’ strikes.  On 17 November, ‘hundreds of workers settled 
down inside the Bendix Products Corporation’ in an effort to ‘force the 
corporation to permit 100 percent unionisation of workers.’108  Whilst there was 
no immediate threat to production schedules in the automobile industry, 
companies such as Ford, GM, and Chrysler relied on the brake systems 
supplied by Bendix.  A long strike had the potential to interfere with the entire 
industry.  To make matters worse, approximately 15,000 workers were ‘idle’ 
as a result of strikes at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company on 4 
December.109  The lack of production had indirectly caused the shutdown of 
the Lincoln-Zephyr division of the Ford Motor Company.  A few weeks later, a 
two-month strike affected several GM plants in Flint, Michigan, hitting Sloan 
directly.  With workers barricaded inside the factories from 30 December 1936 
to 11 February 1937, assembly lines came to a halt.  In December, GM had 
manufactured approximately fifty thousand automobiles.  In the first week of 
February, they produced 125.110  The year of 1937 recorded the highest 
number of strikes in the country’s history, culminating in 4,740 during the 
twelve-month period.111  The largest of these were against GM in January and 
Chrysler in March.112  Evidently, the pro-labour policies of the Wagner Act 
caused widespread disruption to the automobile industry.  It marked a 
significant turning point for corporate conservatives who agreed that 
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government intervention in business had gone too far.  It is little wonder that, 
in the following years, Sloan and his associates worked so tirelessly to 
promote the free enterprise system.  They were now intent on educating the 
public and dismantling the New Deal.  The most effective way to achieve this, 
industry believed, was through a bombardment of aggressive pro-business 
propaganda campaigns that would attempt to bolster the reputation of big 
business and stress the importance of conservative notions of Americanism to 
the welfare of the nation.  The public would be targeted through mass media, 
the ideal medium to reach large audiences in an age of technological 
advancements.113 
          After the failures of the Liberty League, the National Association of 
Manufacturers stood as the leading organisation in the fight against the New 
Deal.  Formed in the late nineteenth century to coordinate opposition to 
organised labour, the NAM worked to ‘serve the purposes of business 
salvation’ during the Depression.114  In 1935 its president Clinton L. Bardo 
announced:  
Whether we like it or not, industry, much against its will, has 
been forced, in sheer self-defence, to enter the political arena 
or be destroyed as a private enterprise.  For the past two 
years . . . the normal problems of depression have been 
magnified many times by a deliberate and well-timed rapid 
fire and devastating attack by economic crackpots, social 
reformers, labour demagogues, and political racketeers. 
 
                                                        
113 For historiography on the strike wave following the enactment of the Wagner 
Act, see Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1997), Aaron 
Brenner, Benjamin Day, and Immanuel Ness (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Strikes in 
American History (London: Routledge, 2009), and Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the 
Union: A Century of American Labour (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).  
For the sit-down strikes at General Motors, see Sidney Fine, Sit-down: The General 
Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1969). 
114 Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, p. 14. 
 61 
Instead of living under the ‘American System’ of limited federal control, as 
outlined by the Constitution, Bardo claimed the nation was living under a 
government ‘which assumes and exercises a growing dictatorship over the 
economic and social life of the people.’115  To prevent further government 
intervention, he devised a two-part strategy to restore the free enterprise 
system.  Its first step was to have NAM members testify against the Wagner 
Act before Congress.  When this failed, its legal department argued that it 
violated the Constitution in regards to traditional property rights and individual 
freedom.116  NAM lawyers urged industrialists to resist the law, challenge it in 
court, and wait for it to be overturned.  There was hope that the Supreme Court 
would judge the Wagner Act unconstitutional as it did two months prior with 
the NIRA. 
          After an unsuccessful legal battle, the NAM turned to public relations.  
In 1937, it found that 66 per cent of the public had an unfavourable opinion of 
business.117  The citizenry, the NAM argued, had embraced Roosevelt’s New 
Deal and the White House’s criticism of business through federal government 
dominance over the public debate.118  To counter this, the organisation hired 
its first full-time director of public relations and more than doubled its 
propaganda expenditures from 18.2 per cent of its total budget in 1935 to 39.9 
                                                        
115 Anonymous, ‘Business in Politics,’ New York Times, 8 December 1935, p. 1. 
116 James Hoopes, Corporate Dreams: Big Business in American Democracy from 
the Great Depression to the Great Recession (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2011), p. 53. 
117 Burton St. John III & Robert Arnett, ‘The National Association of Manufacturers' 
Community Relations Short Film Your Town: Parable, Propaganda, and Big 
Individualism,’ Journal of Public Relations Research 26 (2014), p. 104. 
118 Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, p. 14. 
 62 
per cent in 1936.119  Though not all corporations joined or agreed with the NAM, 
Richard S. Tedlow believes the organisation played a pivotal role in promoting 
the free enterprise system during a time of corporate crisis.120  It certainly 
sparked the interest of Sloan who, in 1934, chaired the NAM’s National 
Industrial Information Council (NIIC).  From its inception, the NIIC was 
responsible for the circulation of 2 million copies of cartoons, 4.5 million copies 
of newspaper columns, 2.4 million foreign language news pieces, and 11 
million employee leaflets.  Its educational film series, shown in schools and 
theatres across the country, achieved approximately 18 million views.121  As 
was the case for Fun Facts, Sloan made regular donations for the production 
and distribution of these educational materials, though his input in the content 
is unknown. 
          Together with traditional forms of propaganda, the NAM also reached 
out to conservative Christians in its efforts to thwart the New Deal.  The 
barrage of pro-free enterprise materials released by the organisation was not 
enough to salvage the reputation of big business.  Ultimately, its attempts at 
self-promotion were seen as precisely that.  As one observer later commented, 
‘Throughout the thirties, enough of the corporate campaign was marred by 
extremist, overt attacks on the unions and the New Deal that it was easy for 
critics to dismiss the entire effort as mere propaganda.’122  This was certainly 
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the case for the Liberty League whose efforts were seen as a collection of 
tycoons looking out for their own gains.  To counter such criticisms, the NAM 
recognised that it needed spokesmen that appeared objective in their defence 
of pro-business interests.  The idea to enlist religious activists to attack 
Roosevelt and the New Deal came from the actions of the President himself.  
As a practising Episcopalian, Roosevelt often drew on spiritual themes and 
imagery throughout his career.  According to his biographer, James 
MacGregor Burns, ‘probably no American politician has given so many 
speeches that were essentially sermons rather than statements of policy.’123  
The forging of politics and religion was evident in the introduction of the New 
Deal, in which Roosevelt and his allies revived the language of the Social 
Gospel to justify the creation of a welfare state.  Defined by one of its 
adherents, the Social Gospel centred on ‘the application of the teaching of 
Jesus and the total message of the Christian salvation to society, the economic 
life, and social institutions . . . as well as to individuals.’124  In this sense, the 
proposal for a vast welfare state as set out by the New Deal was described by 
liberal clergyman as simply ‘the Christian thing to do.’125  Prominent endorsers 
of the Social Gospel dominated the ranks of the New Deal administration, 
including the Secretary of the Interior, Frances Perkins, and the head of the 
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Works Progress Administration and one of Roosevelt’s top advisors, Harry 
Hopkins.126   
          To anti-New Dealers, the public service themes of the Social Gospel 
were incompatible with the central tenet of Christianity.  The salvation of the 
individual.  As Kruse explains, if any political or economic system was to fit 
with the religious teachings of Christ in this sense, it would have to be rooted 
in a similarly individualist ethos. 127   This line of thought, motivated by a 
rejection of Roosevelt’s liberal Christianity, provided the NAM with a new 
means of attack.  NAM president, H. W. Prentis, argued that the organisation 
needed to beat Roosevelt at his own game.  ‘The only antidote’, he warned, 
‘is a revival of American patriotism and religious faith.’128  At the NAM’s annual 
conference in 1940, Prentis invited Reverend James W. Fifield Jr. to deliver a 
passionate speech in defence of the free enterprise system to five thousand 
leading industrialists.  The immediate reaction was overwhelmingly positive, 
demonstrating to the audience the effectiveness of recruiting religious activists 
for business propaganda.   
          Prentis’ initial efforts, however, were undermined by the NAM’s forceful 
approach in appealing to ministers in the aftermath of the conference.  The 
religious community was targeted with aggressive outreach campaigns and 
mass mailings in the hope of swinging them over to industry’s side.  For all the 
time and effort, the NAM’s strategy was met with little success.  Writing to J. 
Howard Pew Jr. in 1945, Alfred Haake explained why the NAM’s campaign to 
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ministers had failed.  ‘Of the approximately thirty preachers to whom I have 
thus far talked, I have yet to find one who is unqualifiedly impressed,’ Haake 
reported.  He continued, 
One of the men put it almost typically for the rest when he 
said: ‘The careful preparation and framework for the 
meetings to which we are brought is too apparent.  We 
cannot help but see that it is expertly designed propaganda 
and that there must be big money behind it.  We easily 
become suspicious.’129    
 
If industrialists wished to convince clergymen to side with them in the future, 
they would need a subtler approach.  Yet, despite the initial failings of the NAM 
in the mass recruitment of clergymen, its efforts demonstrate an attempt to 
forge links between business and religion before the conservative revival of 
the 1950s.  Furthermore, as a leading member of the organisation and an 
active participant in the NIIC, Sloan would have been aware of the power of 
religious activism in the fight for American individualism, as well as the failures 
of forming significant alliances.  It is possible that Sloan, encouraged by the 
reception of Fifield, learnt from the mistakes of the NAM and employed a subtle 
approach in his first meeting with Benson.   
          Alongside religious involvement in anti-New Deal propaganda, the use 
of educational films as a means to promote American industry is of particular 
importance.  The medium was positioned at the centre of the Fun and Facts 
project, together with Sloan and Benson’s corporate-evangelical alliance.  As 
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the term suggests, these films were produced for the sole purpose of 
educating the viewer though, as George Kleine states, the word ‘educational’ 
is used in a wide sense.  It ‘does not indicate that these films are intended for 
school or college use exclusively.  They are intended rather for the education 
of the adult as well as the youth, for the exhibition before miscellaneous 
audiences, as well as for more restricted use.’130  The NAM, together with 
smaller organisations and individual companies, sought to capitalise on the 
rising popularity of the motion picture and the increase of cinema attendance 
during the 1930s.  The average weekly audience at cinemas in the US was 
higher than anywhere in the world with an estimated 61 percent of the 
population watching at least one film per week.131  Educational films were 
approximately ten-minutes in length and often shown before the main feature.  
There was also a growing market for the genre in the classroom, providing a 
large audience for industrial sponsored films.  Armed with this innovative and 
evolving technology, corporate conservatives hoped to capture the attention 
of the everyday American and educate them in the workings of the free 
enterprise.  If the public understood the service big business provided to the 
nation, the ‘employers paradise’ would be restored and the New Deal 
eradicated.  Educational films had the potential to effectively showcase the 
contributions of business through the use of moving pictures and engaging 
narratives, during the golden years of the film industry.  As such, the genre 
witnessed a boom in production during the mid-1930s and into the 1940s. 
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          The NAM’s 1940 production, Your Town, is an early example of the 
organisation’s venture into educational films.  The opening scene of the film 
aptly describes its aim, claiming ‘Our duty to ourselves and to our country is to 
study the American way of life . . . to understand the institutions that have 
made this country great, and understanding, to cherish and defend them.’  
What follows is a ten-minute explanation on the NAM’s interpretation of the 
‘American way of life’ – the free enterprise system.  This is done by a 
grandfather explaining to his grandson the importance of the town factory.  In 
a link to the New Deal, the grandfather states, ‘There are a lot of people who 
seem to think that it’s smart to criticise an established institution, like the 
factory . . . but that factory isn’t just a building of bricks and steel.  It's more 
than that . . . It’s your town.’  He then goes on to describe the humble 
beginnings of the town.  It was a small place, very few lived there, and 
business was quiet.  It all changed when Mason, an aspiring businessman, 
built the factory.  ‘As the factory prospered, the whole town prospered.’  The 
influx of people, the building of hospitals, schools, and media outlets – 
everything was directly or indirectly linked to the factory.  It is a success story 
with a larger meaning; ‘The story of your town is the story of America.’132  Your 
Town is a fine example of the message anti-New Deal industrialists wished to 
impart to the public.  Industry was what made America ‘great.’  The freedom 
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to showcase such direct, pro-industrialist views to an audience of 6.5 million 
Americans in the cinema (within its first year alone), was evidence of how 
useful educational films were to corporate conservatives during the 
Depression.133 
          With encouragement from the NAM, small organisations and individual 
businesses began to increase their public relations output through educational 
films.  Prominent companies included those such as United States Steel and 
Republic Steel, as well as GM’s sister company Chevrolet.  Though not 
recognised as significant producers of films, US Steel and Republic Steel were 
heavily involved in sponsoring educational materials for public relations 
purposes from the late 1930s to the 1950s.  Examples of their work include 
Steel: A Symphony of Industry (Republic Steel & American Iron and Steel 
Institute, 1936) and Steel: Man’s Servant (US Steel, 1938).  Despite coming 
from different companies, these films present the same message.  They both 
show the workings of the steel industry whilst advocating for ‘public reliance 
on free-enterprise capitalism as well as on technological progress, experts, 
and corporate paternalism.’134  For individual companies, it was common for 
films to show how their particular industry operated and benefitted society.   
          Similarly, the Chevrolet Motoring Company released a twenty-six-
minute film in 1937, entitled From Dawn to Sunset.  Whilst promoting the free 
enterprise system, this film also emphasised the importance of the consumer.  
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It depicted employees serving both the corporation and the nation as 
purchasers of goods, rather than stereotypical workers in factories.  The idea 
was to present the corporation’s workers as well-paid and job-secure 
consumers instead of ‘tenacious rank-and-file unionists.’135  This added an 
additional element to public relations campaigns.  As well as showing the 
workers the importance of the free enterprise system, it highlighted the 
benefits of their hard work.  The Fun and Facts series would later adopt this 
tactic, possibly originating as an idea from Sloan himself, given his position as 
President of General Motors. 
          Although Chevrolet released the first educational film as part of the GM 
family, From Dawn to Sunset did not use the corporation’s name.  The first 
production produced specifically by GM was entitled Round and Round (1939).  
Unlike those released by the NAM, Chevrolet, and the steel industry, Round 
and Round was a simple, stop motion film made to provide a straightforward 
explanation of a free economy.  Produced by the Jam Handy Organisation, 
the film itself is short, at approximately six minutes long, and features the 
workings of a ‘widget’ factory.  The principal purpose of the film was to explain 
how the factory benefited society as a whole.  The consumers’ money that 
they used to buy the ‘widgets’ is spent on raw materials needed for the items, 
and this is then given back to the same consumers who just so happened to 
be those who provided the materials in the first place.  As the narrator 
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emphasises, ‘Money seems to travel round and round in this widget business’, 
finishing with ‘Maybe that’s true in other lines of business too.  Don’t you think 
so?’136  As a simple production, it does not hold the same entertainment value 
as other films produced during the Depression.  However, like all of Sloan’s 
messages, it is short, informative, and to the point.  
          Unfortunately, the impact of Round and Round on the public is unknown, 
though it was considerably more successful than Sloan’s venture with the self-
titled Sloan Foundation later that year.  Established in 1934 as a non-profit, 
philanthropic organisation, the Sloan Foundation stood as a separate entity to 
the General Motors Corporation.137  In a PR announcement, Sloan stated ‘This 
particular foundation proposes to concentrate to an important degree on a 
single objective, i.e. the promotion of a wider knowledge of basic economic 
truths generally accepted by authorities of recognised standing and as 
demonstrated by experience.’138  In 1937, after the damaging effects of GM’s 
sit-down strike, Sloan donated $10 million dollars to the foundation for this 
purpose.139  The following year, the Foundation Director (and Sloan’s brother), 
Dr Harold S. Sloan, announced the initiation of ‘a bombardment of the 
American mind with elementary economic principles’ through the foundation’s 
partnering colleges and universities.  He assured the public that the foundation 
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‘has no particular economic philosophy to promulgate’ but wished to help 
‘disseminate the facts.’140   
          The Foundation, however, was anything but neutral.  Both Alfred and 
Harold Sloan ardently opposed the New Deal and were unwilling to support 
economic principles that did not align with the free enterprise system.  Their 
refusal to provide a platform for differing economic theories was demonstrated 
by the Foundation’s failed live-action project at New York University (NYU) in 
1939.  Initially, it was the university’s administrators’ hesitance to imply 
favouritism towards a particular school of economic thought that almost 
prevented the project’s launch.141  Despite their reservations, NYU went ahead 
and established the Educational Film Institute (EFI) with Sloan Foundation 
funding.  A group of the nation’s best-known progressive documentarians and 
artists (Willard Van Dyke, Irving Lerner, Ben Maddow, and members of the 
Group Theatre, etc.) were paid to produce three educational films on rural and 
working-class America; The Children Must Learn, And So They Live, and 
Valley Town.  The first of these, Valley Town, set the precedent for the 
remainder of the project.  The film focused on the role of the machine in the 
manufacturing sector and how automation displaced workers, exploring 
solutions of systemic unemployment.  Originally running at thirty-five minutes, 
Valley Town made its debut at a Steel Workers’ convention in Chicago on 14 
May 1940. 142  Its release angered Sloan.  He could not believe that his 
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foundation’s money had been used to produce a film that blamed corporations 
for not aiding workers who were causalities of the machine age.  He reiterated 
that the Sloan Foundation’s efforts were to persuade the public, not to ‘set up 
an educational debate.’143  Edits were made to the film. However, funding for 
the project was withdrawn before their completion as the following two films 
failed to meet Sloan’s ideological approval.  Sadly for Sloan, he had fallen 
victim to the hostile attitudes of educators who refused to showcase 
propaganda in academic institutions during the interwar period.144  
          Sloan was not alone in his failure to produce successful educational 
films.  The business community sought to revitalise its public standing through 
the use of the motion picture, however, its damaging reputation prevented any 
meaningful progress.  In the two decades prior to the Depression, the future 
of industrial sponsored educational films seemed promising.  According to 
Joseph Corn, both commercial and non-profit organisations initially clamoured 
for ‘educationals and industrials.’145  It became a common policy for theatres, 
such as the Strand in New York, to demand at least one educational picture 
per week and by 1915, these productions were considered ‘an indispensable 
part of a well-balanced theatre program.’146  Whilst statistics on early films are 
hard to come by, there was one company in particular who benefited from such 
positive responses towards educational films.  The Ford Motoring Company 
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offered its signature newsreel, Ford Animated Weekly, free of charge to 
theatres across the US resulting in 3 million viewers in 2,000 movie houses.147  
It was estimated that each film attracted a weekly attendance of 11.3 per cent 
of the nation’s film audience.  ‘A distribution’, stated the Ford Times, ‘that any 
of the great exchanges may envy.’148  With the success of Ford’s newsreel, 
there was a significant increase in the production of educational films.  Articles 
on ‘important industrial films’ listed 120 firms (not including trade associations) 
that had jumped on the motion picture bandwagon in 1920.149   
          By the 1930s, Americans, both in the cinema and in the classroom, had 
lost faith in their corporate leaders and saw the films for what they were; 
propaganda.  As William Bird argues, whilst there is little evidence on the 
reception of individual films, what does remain suggests that developments in 
sponsored productions were hampered by business’ transparent and self-
interested defence of its own welfare.150  Paul Saettler echoes this sentiment, 
arguing ‘no commercial educational producer could achieve success without 
national support, and that support could not be attained until the users of 
educational films were convinced that no “special interests” were invading the 
classroom’ (or the big screen).151   
          The issue of corporate propaganda in the classroom is particularly 
interesting.  Evidence on the response to these films in the cinema is scarce, 
particularly for the 1930s.  Reactions from sceptical educators, however, is 
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plentiful. In 1937, David H. Stevens of the Rockefeller Foundation hired 
educational psychologist F. Dean McClusky to investigate the causes for the 
failure of educational films so that remedies could be put in place.  Abstracts 
from the report support Bird’s conclusion that industrial films had damaged the 
genre, stating: 
4.  . . .While leading educators have recognised the potential 
value of motion pictures in education, they have quietly and 
continuously opposed all attempts to introduce into broad 
classroom use motion pictures which smacked of 
commercialism, low moral tone, propaganda or controversial 
issues.  The unsatisfactory pictures were found to be so 
numerous that the good ones suffered from being too 
frequently found in bad company. 
 
5. The stupidity which has characterised the advertising, 
propaganda, and sales methods of companies producing 
and distributing so-called ‘educational’ motion pictures 
created strong opposition in educational circles to school 
films, good or bad.152 
 
As these films dominated the market until the Second World War, the genre 
continued to be rejected by both commercial and non-profit institutions.  
Consequently, the motives of the business class had a damaging and long-
lasting effect, not only on itself, but on the use of educational films during the 
1930s in general. 
           
Competition From The Left 
          The rejection of corporate sponsored propaganda by various film and 
educational institutes was not the only issue that plagued the business 
community in the realm of public relations.  In trying to sway public opinion, 
corporate conservatives had to compete, once again, with the propaganda 
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efforts of Roosevelt and his New Deal administration.  Roosevelt himself was 
a masterful public speaker who strongly believed that he was his own best 
propagandist.153  Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the President used his 
oratory skills to sell the New Deal directly to the public through a series of radio 
speeches known as the Fireside Chats.  The Great Depression, Randal L. Hall 
argues, coincided with the routinisation of radio listening despite financial 
hardships.154  As technology improved, radios became smaller and cheaper, 
making them more accessible to the average American family.  At the start of 
the decade, 12 million households owned a radio, a number that rose to more 
than 28 million by 1939; in Mississippi, where the national average was at the 
lowest, statistics rose from 12.3 percent in 1930 to 39.9 percent in 1940.155  
Radio, therefore, was the ideal medium in which to reach out to masses.   
          In his Fireside Chats, Roosevelt employed certain techniques and 
rhetorical devices with great effectiveness, allowing the audience to feel closer 
to the President like never before.  As one of his speech writers, Judge 
Rosenman, recalled, Roosevelt ‘looked for words that he would use in an 
informal conservation with one of two of his friends.’156  He frequently referred 
to himself as ‘I’, whilst addressing the American people as ‘you.’  Many of his 
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speeches sought to unite the audience against a common enemy: ‘the few 
men, who might thwart this great common purpose by seeking selfish 
advantage’; ‘the professional economists who insist that things must run their 
course and that human agencies can have no influence on economic ills’; 
‘those in industry who are guilty of unfair practices.’157  These attacks on the 
business community were perfectly timed - coinciding with its rapid decline in 
popularity - and were often accompanied by a defence of New Deal 
programmes.  The ‘unmistakable march toward recovery,’ Roosevelt argued, 
would be achieved by the creation of organisations such as the Works 
Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps.  These 
programmes, he claimed, were ‘giving opportunity of employment to a quarter 
of a million of the unemployed.’ 158   The language used in justifying the 
existence of New Deal programmes was simple, whilst his arguments offered 
hope during a time of crisis.  The messages presented by a clear, resonant 
voice, convincing the American people that it was their government and their 
country, appeared far more successful than the aggressive corporate 
campaigns from New York’s tycoons.  Unlike his conservative counterparts, 
Roosevelt instilled a sense of familiarity that resonated with scores of his 
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listeners.  A poem by the New York writer and folklorist, Carl Lamson Carmer, 
summed up the feeling of many Americans:  
 . . . I never saw him –  
But I knew him.  Can you have forgotten 
How, with his voice, he came into our house, 
The President of the United States, 
Calling us friends . . .159 
 
          With the success of the Fireside Chats, Roosevelt expanded his New 
Deal propaganda campaign beyond the confines of the radio and into the 
genre of the nonfiction film.  His radio broadcasts demonstrated an ability to 
connect with the public, whilst the business community failed to rally any 
substantial support.  The next logical step was to counter pro-business 
propaganda in the realm of the motion picture.  Like his most staunch critics, 
Roosevelt recognised the increasing power of film.  According to Variety:  
The President of the United States is close to being the most 
avid film fan and student of the screen in America today . . . 
He is said to see the screen as mirroring current public 
sentiment and to believe that this provides him with an 
opportunity of getting closer to the people.  One Spokesman 
declares: ‘The President is sold on the idea of the influence 
of films on the American people.’160 
 
The implementation of New Deal film propaganda was entrusted to the 
Resettlement Administration (RA).  Created to aid farm families in the process 
of relocation, the RA sponsored radio and photography campaigns and 
financed the work of artists and authors such as Walker Evans, Dorothea 
Lange, Ben Shahn, and James Agee.161   In 1934, the RA appointed Pare 
Lorentz as its film consultant.  Like Roosevelt, Lorentz believed that film was 
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an enormously powerful medium.  In 1934, he sought to publish a motion 
picture retrospective of the President’s first year in office, capturing the 
problems that America faced, as well as the attempts of the New Deal in 
resolving the crisis.  Funds were short, however, and Lorentz was forced to 
abandon his initial idea.  Instead, he collected a large series of photographs 
that captured the major events of the year and published them in a book 
together with captions and commentary.  Roosevelt was impressed with the 
publication and invited Lorentz to work with the RA to produce a number of 
films.  From here, Lorentz was known, first and foremost, as FDR’s filmmaker. 
          During the 1930s, Lorentz produced two key films for the New Deal 
administration.  The first of these, The Plow that Broke the Plain (1936), was 
set in the Great Plains and sought to convince farmers and ranchers that the 
search for profits in the West had resulted in misplaced settlement, misuse of 
the land, and the great dust storms that battered the area in the 1930s.  The 
Dust Bowl, as described by Donald Worster, was the darkest moment in the 
twentieth-century life of the southern plains.162  It was an event of national 
significance, caused by a culture that deliberately dominated and exploited the 
land for all its worth.  The condition of the soil following the storms led to 
widespread hunger and poverty, forcing families to leave the region.  In 1935, 
the head of the RA, Rexford Tugwell, approached Lorentz to produce a film 
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that would explain the causes of the Dust Bowl, whilst simultaneously 
advocating for the resettlement of farmers.  The twenty-eight minute 
production depicts scenes of acres of lush, billowy grasslands whilst a narrator 
explains how beautiful the region had been before the period of European 
American settlement.  As the music grows louder, with increasingly harsh 
tones, the film shows the movement of cattlemen onto the Plains, the coming 
of railroads, and waves of farmers with horses and gang plows breaking up 
the grasslands.  This may have brought immediate prosperity, the film argues, 
but it led to a desolate wasteland and crippling poverty.163   
          Despite the remarkable imagery, blended with a powerful musical score, 
The Plow the Broke the Plains was initially blocked from exhibition in most 
commercial cinemas.  The reason given was due to an issue with the film’s 
length.  At twenty-eight minutes, it was too long for a short piece, yet too short 
for a full-length feature.  In truth, as William Uricchio and Marja Roholl claim, 
the RA-produced film was seen by many as little more than New Deal 
propaganda.164  It was only after New York’s Rialto Theatre was persuaded to 
show the film, and the film demonstrated its powerful impact, that it received 
widespread distribution.  It appeared that New Deal films were not immune to 
fears concerning the use of propaganda in the nonfiction genre.  Once 
accepted, however, The Plow, encouraged a national debate on the issue of 
the Dust Bowl whilst, at the same time, promoting the efforts of the RA.  As 
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the film’s narrator explains, those that were forced to leave the Great Plains 
simply wanted ‘a chance for their children to eat, to have medical care, to have 
homes again.’  The resettlement program of the RA, the film inferred, would 
provide all of this. 
          Lorentz’s second film, The River (1937), surpassed the 
accomplishments of his first feature to stand as the New Deal’s most 
successful propaganda piece.  In a similar fashion to The Plow, The River 
blamed the short-sighted greed of the individual for the plight of the land; this 
time both farmers and lumberjacks.  The practises of these workers had 
caused topsoil to be swept down the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico, 
leading to catastrophic floods and, once again, impoverished farmers.  The 
imagery is powerful, together with another impressive score.  The 
consequences of the floods are described in astounding figures of deaths, 
injuries, homelessness, disease, and poverty. ‘We built one hundred cities and 
one thousand towns,’ the narrator states, ‘but at what cost.’  In a more 
reassuring second half, The River explains how Congress provided essential 
aid to flood victims.  Unlike the pro-business propaganda of corporate 
conservatives, it emphasises that direct help is at hand.  Additionally, the work 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority is introduced in the clean-up operation.  This 
New Deal program was actively working to resolve the crisis through a series 
of dams authorised by the government.  Only through government intervention, 
the film implies, can the nation receive the support it needs in times of 
crises.165   
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          Public reaction towards for The River was overwhelmingly positive.  
Frank Nugent from the New York Times called it ‘poetic, stirring, and majestic’, 
whilst the Herald-Tribune praised its ‘brooding beauty and impact’ and the 
ability to make ‘social history vital, understandable, and dramatic.’166  The film 
also won the top award for the documentary feature at the 1938 Venice Film 
Festival, beating Leni Riefenstahl’s two-part feature Olympiad for the 
prestigious award.  Yet, despite its success, certain cinemas, once again, 
refused to showcase the film.  This time, there was an unprecedented 
backlash from Hollywood which, after recognising Lorentz’s talents, fought to 
reduce competition in the nonfiction genre.  Roosevelt, who was enthusiastic 
about the film, directly intervened by having Tom Corcoran, an important New 
Deal figure, apply direct pressure on Hollywood.  Corcoran threatened anti-
monopolistic action if studios continued the boycott.167  As Paramount was 
already under investigation, it reluctantly agreed to distribute the film.  The 
River was eventually screened in over 3,000 theatres.168   
          As with The Plow, there were also fears concerning the inclusion of New 
Deal propaganda in motion pictures, though these critics were few and far 
between.  Republicans and anti-New Deal Democrats in Congress attacked 
the RA, as well as its successor the United States Film Service, claiming the 
programs were direct extensions of the Roosevelt administration.  As a result, 
Congress attempted to cut its funding, on multiple occasions, alleging that 
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Lorentz was using public funds to make pro-Roosevelt propaganda. 169  
Nevertheless, both The Plow and The River were far more successful than the 
pro-business films financed by Sloan and his associates.   
          Through his New Deal documentary work, Lorentz contributed to the 
growth of factual films during the 1930s and 40s.  Whilst right-wing, industrial 
productions suffered under their propagandist label, the documentary film 
genre as a whole developed an increasingly prominent social status that was 
expertly managed by artists on the left.  As Jonathan Kahana explains, the 
documentary film was used as a mode of expression ‘in which radicals and 
progressive intellectuals grappled with the problem of how cultural form and 
social action could be related,’ as well as a mode that organised audiences ‘in 
a hegemonic capacity, announcing crises and managing them on behalf of the 
state.’170  These categories include far-left groups such as the Workers’ Film 
and Photo League of America (WFPL) who sought to awaken the working 
class through unsophisticated films that relied on the fact of the event for their 
effectiveness, together with the basic power of sheer documentation.  They 
generally shot ‘footage’ rather than films and covered politically charged 
events that often revolved around workers’ strikes.  Kahana’s description also 
involves filmmakers such as Lorentz, who worked to rally their audiences 
around major national problems in which solutions could be found in the 
actions of the state.   
          Despite their different motives, both radical and governmental  
filmmakers rejected the aesthetics of Hollywood productions to create raw, 
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emotive pictures that reached out to audiences in ways that full length features 
could not.  WFPL films, such as Worker’s Newsreel, Unemployment and 
National Hunger March 1931 (1931), and Bonus March (1932), 
counterbalanced a lack of cinematography with an emotional intensity and 
political commitment that mirrored the historical moment in which the films 
were made.  They recorded the daily struggles of the unemployed through 
rough footage of breadlines, evictions, and nationwide protests.  The hand-
held, close-range angles of the camera allowed the audience to feel as though 
they were a part of the action, whilst the timely release of the films reinforced 
a sense of involvement.171  Similarly, The Plow  and The River sought to stir 
public emotion through powerful imagery of America’s disadvantaged working 
class.  Unlike the WFPL, however, Lorentz utilises a range of cinematic 
characteristics such as strong narratives, a surging musical score, and a 
heavy-handed voiceover.  Rather than simply advocate for the New Deal, his 
films provided audiences with messages of direct action through government 
intervention.  Corporate conservatives, who were seen by the public as being 
primarily concerned with saving their own reputations, could not compete with 
the images of hope that followed intentionally powerful scenes of crises.  Very 
few documentary titles are on the National Film Registry, though the two 
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Lorentz’s films discussed here made the list.172  There is a stark omission, 
however, of those produced by anti-New Dealers.173 
          Nevertheless, corporate conservatives would later benefit from the 
successes of 1930s documentary films as the genre continued to grow 
throughout the 1940s and into the 1950s.  After damaging internal struggles, 
the WFPL later reorganised as Frontier Films and produced timely 
documentaries such as Native Land (1942), People of the Cumberland (1937), 
and Heart of Spain (1937).174  The latter, which depicts the horrors of the 
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Cumberland depicts the economic and environmental devastation of rural 
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Spanish Civil War, utilised techniques that were later adopted by wartime 
filmmakers.  The director aimed to influence the viewers’ emotions through 
graphic scenes that showed the devastation of war on innocent civilians.  
Amongst the images, the film expressed a need for intervention to fight against 
the fascist forces whose bombs were causing immeasurable suffering.  As 
Thomas Waugh explains, Heart of Spain was instrumental in the invention of 
the ‘solidarity film’ which became central to US documentary filmmaking during 
the Second World War.  ‘This rare archival film,’ he states, ‘was offered by the 
American Popular Front to the Loyalist effort and fashioned both as artistic 
testimony and political support for a struggle towards which the official U.S. 
neutrality was morally and politically unacceptable.’175  The impact of such 
powerful messages, including those in the films by Lorentz, later influenced 
the work of major Hollywood companies.  Walt Disney Studios, MGM, and 
Warner Bros were amongst those who produced an unprecedented number 
of propaganda films during the war in an effort to train, instruct, and persuade 
national audiences that their sacrifices were integral to the war effort.  Many 
of these films mirrored the efforts of their predecessors in an attempt to form 
a wartime community spirit based on solidarity.  Their successes, in turn, gave 
rise to a postwar boom in the production of nontheatrical films that greatly 
influenced the Fun and Facts team.  These early developments also 
contributed to the progressive cinema vérité social documentaries of the 
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1960s, involving some of America’s most distinguished filmmakers.  As 
Richard Wormser argues, the success of the documentary genre during the 
1950s and 1960s can be traced back to the visionaries of the interwar years, 
with both the WFPL and Lorentz taking the lead.176 
          Regardless of its best efforts, the business community failed to produce 
popular PR campaigns through the use of educational films that could rival the 
success of their competitors.  The New Deal was very much alive and well and 
the reputation of America’s leading corporate conservatives remained at an 
all-time low.  Nevertheless, these efforts do provide an explanation to the 
origins of the Fun and Facts series through Sloan’s venture into public 
relations.  His first steps into this realm are reminiscent of his later partnership 
with George Benson.  Barton’s influence at GM signified the early cooperation 
between the corporate world and evangelicals that, for Sloan, culminated in 
Harding’s educational series.  His partnership with Barton, however, was only 
the beginning.  Whilst the goodwill campaigns of the ‘famous family’ ushered 
Sloan closer, if only a fraction, to the public eye, it was the New Deal that 
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provided the turning point.  By the 1930s, the welfare of GM was directly 
intertwined with that of the nation and Sloan could no longer restrict his 
interests to the confines of his company.  The Depression and subsequent 
New Deal instilled a sense of urgency that encouraged Sloan, and his 
associates, to intervene.  However, Sloan remained reluctant to fight the New 
Deal publicly and continued, instead, to donate large sums of money to the 
production of corporate sponsored educational films in retaliation to the pro-
labour policies of the Wagner Act.  Unfortunately, the reputation of big 
business during the 1930s seemed irreversible.  Whilst Americans continued 
to suffer through an economic crisis that industry, arguably, started, the 
propagandist messages within PR campaigns were ignored.  The business 
community could not rectify its position during times of hardship.  For these 
educational films to be successful, corporate leaders required two things: the 
prosperity that only the Second World War could generate and third-party 
organisations with no apparent connection to industry.  In 1948, Sloan, having 
not lost hope, turned to Benson; the charismatic and pro-business leader of 
the Churches of Christ affiliated Harding College. 
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Chapter Two 
 
George S. Benson: From Humble Beginnings to a Leader in 
Christian Education 
 
 
In 1936, George Benson accepted the position of president at Harding College 
in Searcy, Arkansas.  This marked the pinnacle of an extraordinary career in 
religious education that intertwined with both the political and business worlds.  
Benson’s evangelicalism merged with his economic ideology concerning the 
free enterprise system and attracted the attention of influential conservatives, 
many of whom provided wealthy donations to Harding.  Benson used these 
funds to rebuild the failing college, making it a popular institution during the 
1950s and 60s, whilst embarking on a nation-wide propaganda campaign that 
showcased his own brand of Americanism – upholding faith in God, 
constitutional government, and the private ownership of the tools of production.  
Though Benson’s most successful propaganda effort, Fun and Facts, is the 
focus of this thesis, it is important to first examine the events that led to its 
production.  As such, this chapter will investigate Benson’s life, pre-1950, in 
order to fully understand his views on religion, politics, and the economy, which 
in turn will shed light on the development of Fun and Facts. 
          Born in the Cheyenne-Arapaho Territory (now Dewey County) of 
Oklahoma in 1898, Benson had somewhat of an ordinary upbringing 
compared to that of his business partner, Alfred Sloan.177  His parents, Stuart 
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and Emma Benson, instilled the importance of self-reliance and hard work in 
their son from an early age in preparation for the challenges associated with 
life on the frontier.  Conditions in the newly established settlement were harsh, 
particularly for farmers such as the Bensons.  Periodic droughts hindered the 
growth of crops whilst the absence of the railroad prevented access to markets 
and hampered business development.  Many initially lived in sod houses or 
dugouts and relied on the production of their own produce for sustenance.178  
As the eldest son, and of working age at eight years old, Benson was expected 
to work full-time on the family farm to support his parents through these tough 
times.  Though the family owned two farming plots, money was always scarce 
and the young Benson began to hire himself out for odd jobs in the local 
community.  He continued to work, both on the farm and for his neighbours, 
until he left home to begin his second year of high school at the U.S 
Government Indian School in Claremore, Oklahoma.  To support himself, and 
to pay for his education, Benson took a job as the school’s janitor.  He did not 
have the liberty of dedicating himself fully to his education, unlike Sloan, and 
graduated from high school at the age of twenty-one.  His childhood 
experience with work and education formed the foundation for his personal 
characteristics as an adult.  He later reflected, ‘I had the love and care of 
wonderful, God-fearing Christian parents, and they had done the first 
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groundwork, but the foundation that is laid only by the individual himself began 
to be laid in Claremore.’ As he had demonstrated, ‘anybody could get an 
education who wanted to work hard enough for it.’ 179   Like many other 
Americans, Benson took in the gospel of self-help.  He would later go on to 
help those who wished to do so, dedicating his life to the teachings of the 
Gospel that dominated his early beginnings. 
With strict religious parents, Benson was deeply influenced by an 
evangelical message and devoted much of his life to spreading the missionary 
cause.  Though his family attended a nondenominational community church 
when he was a child, Benson joined the Methodists at the age of sixteen. This 
provided him with the opportunity to teach at the local Bible school whilst acting 
as the superintendent of the Sunday school.  However, as Ted Altman argues, 
it was not the denomination that attracted Benson to religious education, but 
the Bible.180  It was Benson’s devotion to the Word of God that inspired his 
passion for preaching.  As he later explained, ‘My dedication to the Lord began 
in early life.  I decided that I was going to serve the Lord and make that my 
major goal regardless of where it might lead me or what work it might 
require.’181   
These feelings intensified when, in 1916, Benson was introduced to Ben 
Elston, a travelling evangelist from a town in western Kansas near Harper 
College.  Elston, a member of the Churches of Christ, preached a 
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nondenominational Christianity based upon the Bible, not on creeds or 
religious doctrines that were not clearly stated in the Scripture.  Despite its 
rejection of organised religion, the Churches of Christ was, and remains to this 
day, a fully-fledged denomination with 1.1 million members as of 2018.182  It 
continues to preach nondenominational, restorationist,  Christianity, with its 
most widely distributed tract stating: 
the Church of Christ is neither Catholic, Protestant, nor Jewish.  
We are unique and different for we are endeavouring to go all 
the way back to the original New Testament church.  Using the 
New Testament as our blueprint we have re-established in the 
twentieth century Christ’s Church.  It fits no modern label.  It is 
not just another denomination.183 
 
This notion of the restoration of primitive Christianity – the attempt to recover 
the Christian faith as it was believed and practised in the first century – is a 
defining characteristic of the Churches of Christ.184  It appealed to a young and 
impressionable Benson whose dedication lay with the Bible, not with his 
Methodist denomination.  Together with restorationism and the centrality of 
the Bible, the Churches of Christ, like other evangelicals, emphasise ‘the death 
and resurrection of Jesus, the necessity of individual conversion, and 
spreading the faith through missions.’ 185   As a form of ‘militantly, anti-
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modernist Protestant evangelicalism’, the Churches of Christ is 
fundamentalist.186  
Elston’s ideas reached Benson who, at the time, was confused with the 
numerous denominations visiting his school.  He later recalled: 
“How do I know which one is best?” I thought, “Well, I’m going 
to study the creeds all of them and I’m going to decide which 
one of them is the best.” Well I listened to Elston preach and I 
saw I didn’t need to do it that way.  I could just take the Bible 
and work through the Biblical pattern of the Lord’s church.187  
 
In discussing the experience with Ted Altman, Benson elaborated, ‘As I 
listened to him and closely followed his discussion about the undenominational 
aspects of the church and the restoration of the New Testament church, I 
became very interested . . . That winter, I was baptised into the church of the 
Lord.’  The following year, at the age of 17, Benson was officially baptised into 
the Churches of Christ, marking a turning point in the direction of his religious 
life. 
          Following Elston’s advice on further education, Benson enrolled at 
Harper College in 1921.  Here, faculty trained students to preach, and the 
students began to do so whilst still in school, making it the ideal institution for 
Benson.  After only one month of study, Benson began speaking at a small 
church every Sunday.  His religious training flourished at Harper, as did his 
passion for the missionary cause.  There was a strong interest in missionary 
                                                        
186 George Marsden’s definition of fundamentalism in, George M. Marsden,  
Fundamentalism and American Culture new edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 2.  There is a wealth of research in the area of Christian 
fundamentalism.  Notable works include those from Marsden as well as, Ernest 
Sandeen, The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism, 1800 
– 1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and Joel Carpenter, Revive Us 
Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  For a more recent study, see: Sutton, American 
Apocalypse.   
187 Benson cited in, Hicks, ‘Sometimes in the Wrong, But Never in Doubt,’ p. 4. 
 93 
work among his peers and Benson soon formed a study group with like-
minded students who sought to preach the Gospel to the rest of the world.  
They would often study maps and compile information on countries that were 
deemed most ‘needy.’  Benson later narrowed his options down to China 
arguing that it had ‘about one fourth of all the people in the world and at that 
time, we didn’t have a single church missionary in China.’188   
          As a member of the Churches of Christ, however, Benson’s 
adventurous missionary ambitions seemed unusual.  As he later recalled to 
his Harding successor, Clifton Ganus: 
there was, among the Churches of Christ, very little 
missionary zeal.  There wasn’t a single one of our colleges 
giving a single course on missions, and you rarely heard a 
preacher preach on missions . . . Nearly everybody wanted 
to dissuade me . . . When I began seeking support, that was 
very hard to come by and contributions were very small.189 
 
The anti-missionary stance of the Churches of Christ was a surprising trait 
during a period that witnessed a growth in missionary appeal.  Protestant 
missionaries began arriving in China in the early 1800s, with greater 
expansion from 1860 to 1900.  By 1925, their numbers totalled 8,000.  A small 
but significant part of this explosion in missionary work in the Far East included 
preachers from the Stone-Campbell tradition.  However, this did not include 
the Churches of Christ.190  It was the more mainline Disciples of Christ that 
dominated the missionary field with the establishment of fourteen 
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congregations by 1925.  At its highest point in 1926, the denomination 
supported sixty-four missionaries in China.191 
          With little interest in missionary work, the Churches of Christ had no 
missionaries in China.  Benson, and his wife Sally Ellis (formerly, Hockaday), 
would be the first to undertake such work in the Far East on behalf of the 
denomination.  They would later be joined by Benson’s former classmate 
Lewis T. Oldman and his wife Grace in 1927.  Benson and Oldman were 
influenced by Churches of Christ member Don Carlos Janes who, despite 
opposition from the denomination, frequently attempted to generate interest in 
foreign missions.  The reasons for the rejection of missionary work from the 
Churches of Christ, as well as Janes’ uncharacteristic break from this position, 
are unclear.  Janes’ enthusiasm, however, was contagious amongst the new 
generation of members.  The number of missionaries from the Churches of 
Christ had increased from 8 in 1892 to 32 by 1926.192  It is likely that Benson 
and Oldman chose to work in China based on Janes’ publications that often 
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advertised the country as ‘ready for the Gospel.’193  After four years of further 
education and religious training, the Benson’s heeded Janes’ calling and left 
America for China in 1925. 
          To an outsider, the decision to embark on a foreign mission to China 
during the mid-1920s would have seemed absurd.  Political unrest had defined 
the country since the inception of the Chinese Republic in 1912, however, 
conditions deteriorated during the 1920s as a result of famine and a growth in 
independent provinces. In 1925, the newly appointed leader of the nationalist 
Kuomintang (KMT) party, Chiang Kai-Shek, sought to unify the country with 
the aid of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  Despite their political 
differences, both the KMT and the CCP advocated for the reunification of 
China.  The First United Front Alliance was formed, and violence swept the 
nation in an attempt to eradicate warlord power.194 
          The Bensons, who had initially arrived in Hong Kong, avoided much of 
the initial violence.  They did, however, witness the strong anti-foreign 
sentiment sweeping the nation.  Anti-imperialism constituted a major aspect of 
extreme Chinese nationalism during the 1920s after years of foreign 
aggression from the Japanese and the West.195  Under the influence of the 
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Soviet Union and the CCP, the United Front Alliance instigated a pro-
nationalist agenda that engulfed a substantial part of the Protestant World in 
China.  As the Bensons rode through the streets of Hong Kong, they were 
confronted with signs that, in the Chinese language, equated to slogans such 
as ‘Yankees Go Home!’, and ‘Missionaries Get Out!’  The situation was far 
worse for missionaries on the Chinese mainland, many of whom encountered 
the Benson’s on their search for sanctuary in Hong Kong.  Among those fleeing 
was the W. G. Smiths, a family of independent missionaries from the Kwing Si 
Providence in Southern China.  They provided assistance to the Bensons and 
advised them to stay in Hong Kong until the dangers had settled.  Once it was 
safe to travel, they offered to take the Bensons with them to their establishment 
in Kwei Hsien, 500 miles into the interior. 
          The Benson’s first six months in Kwei Hsien were relatively successful.  
They lived and worked at the Faith and Love Mission, an orphanage that 
delivered care for sixty-five blind children.196  The Smiths continued to offer 
their support, sharing their knowledge of Chinese missionary work with the 
Bensons.  It was the perfect opportunity for experience.  George and Sally 
planned to open their own Bible school once they had become accustomed to 
the culture and were proficient in the language.  Their progress was halted, 
however, when anti-foreign sentiment reached Kwei Hsien in the Spring of 
1926.  Influenced by the KMT and Soviet sympathisers, a mob of students and 
soldiers descended on the Benson’s, chanting, ‘Kill the foreign Devils.’  Whilst 
the anti-foreign sentiment was a product of the United Front Alliance, 
missionaries were quick to view the KMT, and Chinese nationalism in general, 
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through the prism of Russian bolshevism.  Dubbed ‘the Red General’, Kai-
Shek had visited Russia on a number of occasions in the early 1920s and so 
the political turmoil was almost entirely attributable to a Soviet-directed 
Communist conspiracy.197  Benson shared this view, choosing to focus on the 
Communists in particular.  He later recalled, ‘the Communists started moving 
in at that time and started agitating against all foreigners.’198  He considered 
the Communists ‘deceitful’, describing how they successfully branded foreign 
missionaries as the enemy by blaming them for China’s poverty.  As the threat 
of physical violence intensified, friendly local officials encouraged the 
Benson’s to flee.  They did so, making a perilous journey through Nationalist 
held territory to make it back to Hong Kong. 
          The consequences of the political turmoil against foreign missionaries 
soon reached national newspapers in the US.  On 23 January 1927, the 
Washington Post printed the headline ‘Attacks Against Americans and 
Europeans Aided by Armed Forces Crying, “China for Chinese.”’199  In March, 
Nationalist troops reached the city of Nanking and initiated large-scale attacks 
against the foreign presence.  Robberies and looting occurred at foreign 
consulates, residences, churches, missionary schools, and businesses.  
Some foreigners were even killed, including J. E. Williams, the vice president 
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of Nanking University, who was shot by undisciplined soldiers.200  In covering 
what became known as the Nanjing (Nanking) Incident,  the New York Times 
published a report on the violence in the region from a Nanking missionary 
group that read: 
Foreigners are steadily being forced out of all parts of China 
under Nationalist control and the Government, despite all its 
assurance, either is unable or unwilling to alter the situation.  
The same facts are true regarding opposition to 
Christianity.  The Christian religion is persistently and 
systematically attacked, its leaders are being maligned and 
persecuted, it properties are being destroyed, looted and 
seized and no power or influence appears to check this 
condition.201 
 
The situation across China continued to deteriorate throughout 1927, placing 
foreign settlers in serious danger from physical attacks.  As a result, all but a 
handful of missionaries fled to the coast.  Over two thousand returned home 
with many deciding never to return.202 
          The anti-foreign violence of the 1920s had shaken the missionary field 
to its core, leaving a profound impact on Benson.  As Ted M. Altman argues, 
the Bensons learnt great lessons in China, lessons ‘that were to shape the 
future course of individuals and institutions in America whose lives he had 
touched and influenced.’203  In China, he saw a heathen land filled with great 
poverty.  He was introduced to what he labelled ‘the treachery of Communism’; 
an anti-Christ, anti-God organisation that undermined what little strength 
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remained in the Chinese government and manipulated its people with 
deceptive cunning.204  In contrast, the American people were blessed.  Benson 
developed a rejuvenated appreciation for his home country.  He recognised 
that individual freedom, backed by the democratic institutions of a republic, 
was mankind’s greatest blessing.  His experiences in China would later shape 
his interwar activities at Harding, transforming him from a humble missionary 
to one of the nation’s leading educators and a producer of pro-American 
propaganda. 
          In 1929, the Bensons returned to China, settling in Canton.  Though 
pockets of anti-foreign sentiment still existed on the mainland, Benson’s 
missionary work was far more successful in Canton than it was in Kwei Hsien.  
The threat from the United Front Alliance was no longer a concern when in 
1927, the KMT initiated a purge of the Communists on the orders of Kai-Shek.  
Its members dwindled, dropping from 60,000 in 1927 to fewer than 10,000 just 
one year later. 205  As the CCP was the largest political group opposed to 
Christianity, its demise was a blessing to foreign missionaries.  The Nationalist 
government was far less radical in its stance towards religion and many of the 
missionaries who had fled in 1926 – 1927 returned in 1928 – 1929, 
approximately 6,000 of them.206  There were, however, certain restrictions 
placed upon foreign Christian schools under the new Chinese leadership.  The 
Ministry of Education prohibited any religious activity in primary schools and 
insisted all middle schools and colleges register their institutions with the 
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government.  Graduates from unregistered schools would not be granted the 
same rights and privileges as those from registered intuitions.  For example, 
these students would be prohibited from voting, applying for government 
positions, and receiving government scholarships.  As Lawrence D. Kessler 
explains, missionaries were divided on how to respond to the series of 
registration regulations.207  There were those who found it difficult to accept 
the restrictions on religious instruction and preferred to close their schools 
rather than conform to government policy. The majority of missionaries opted 
to follow the new restrictions in an effort to continue providing Christian 
education to Chinese citizens, at least from middle school upwards.  By 1920, 
around 70 percent of the approximately 200 Christian middle schools in China 
had registered or were in the process of doing so.208  The Bensons and 
Oldmans were amongst those willing to conform to the new rules.  Their 
mission to protect China from the influence of Communism through the 
teachings of the Bible remained a top priority.  
          In searching for a location to open a Bible school, the Bensons and 
Oldmans discovered that there were already more than a hundred different 
missionary societies now working in China and that virtually every section of 
the coastal areas had been ‘claimed’ by one or more missionary groups.209  
Canton, however, remained relatively untouched as missionaries were afraid 
to travel far into the mainland.  Benson saw this as an opportunity, creating 
the Canton Mission with the Oldmans in 1929. Through the adoption of a 
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threefold strategy involving the creation of Chinese literature, Bible training, 
and active evangelistic work, the Canton Mission established its first church in 
the centre of the city before moving to new villages.  This approach ensured 
its success until the Canton Mission churches were forced to close at the 
hands of the Communists in 1949. 
          During the construction of the Canton Bible School, Benson returned to 
the US where he enrolled at the University of Chicago in 1930 to study East 
Asian History.  He believed that with further study of the history and customs 
of China, he would be better equipped to educate its citizens.  Evidently, 
education was an important tool for Benson, not only for himself, but also in 
disseminating his beliefs to others.  His dedication to the teaching of others 
was apparent in China, where he planned to settle for a ‘lifetime of work.’210  
This was his initial response to J. N. Armstrong when in 1936, the President 
of Harding College asked him to return to the US to take up the leadership of 
the school.  Benson had first caught the attention of Armstrong during his time 
at Harper.  As the president of the college, Armstrong observed the missionary 
zeal and leadership qualities Benson had and was impressed with his 
dedication to religious education.  After learning of Benson’s activities in China, 
Armstrong believed he had found a successor.211  On 3 March, he wrote to 
Benson, who had returned to Canton, stating: 
There has never been a man within my knowledge that I would 
as soon to turn my mantle to.  We have some fine ‘boys’ in the 
vineyard, but I believe in your vision, your unselfishness, and 
your faithfulness to the word of the Lord.212 
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However, Benson was hesitant to leave China.  His fellow workers in Canton, 
and former students of Harding college, urged him to accept the position.  They 
argued that more workers were needed in the Chinese mission field, and that 
if he returned as President of Harding, he could train and encourage students 
to travel to the Far East for work.213  Armstrong agreed, adding in his letter ‘It 
is likely that in one year you can put some fine pair of Christians in the work 
there.’214  Benson recognised the need for more workers in China.  Reflecting 
on his decision process, he recalled:  
At that time, we had not a single course in a single one of our 
colleges on missions.  Consequently, our missionaries were 
going out unprepared, and half of them were coming home 
within less than three years and home to stay.  So, I finally 
decided I would accept the invitation and would undertake to 
develop courses in Missions and also to encourage work in 
Missions in our other Christian colleges.215 
 
With the benefits of religious education in mind, the Benson’s returned to the 
US to embark on a new project in Searcy, Arkansas. 
When Benson agreed to accept the position of President at Harding, he 
could not have predicted just how far his career would propel him into the 
realms of politics and the economy.  Though he was eager to establish 
missionary courses, he first had to deal with Harding’s difficult financial 
situation.  In 1934, the college acquired the Galloway College property in 
Searcy from the Methodist Church for $75,000.216  This appeared to be a 
bargain price, however by 1936 Harding had failed to make any substantial 
payments towards the initial cost, or the added interest.  Therefore, Benson 
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inherited a debt of $67,400 with payments of $4,000 a year including 
interest.217   
Consequently, his immediate aims for the college changed.  His new 
primary goals were: ‘(1) to attain North Central Association accreditation, (2) 
to pay off the debt and to add to the college plant, (3) to increase salaries and 
build a stronger faculty, and (4) to retain this dedicated faculty, with its deep 
spiritual commitment to cultivating genuinely Christian character in 
students.’218  To achieve this, Benson began a difficult fundraising campaign 
that would soon become a national success for both himself and Harding, 
despite its humble beginnings.  It was a task that Armstrong believed suited 
Benson’s passion for Christian education.219 
Benson’s first step was to appeal to the citizens of Searcy, as well as the 
Churches of Christ.  Although he managed to raise $17,000, an impressive 
feat during the Depression era, Benson faced significant hurdles with local 
churches due to a continuing controversy that surrounded his predecessor.  
Whilst at Harding, Armstrong’s reputation fell dramatically within the Churches 
of Christ due to his stance on premillennialism.220  In 1934, Armstrong refused 
to side with other Churches of Christ college presidents in their condemnation 
                                                        
217 Armstrong to Benson, letter, 3 March 1936. 
218 Hicks, ‘Sometimes in the Wrong, But Never in Doubt,’ p. 15. 
219 Armstrong to Benson, letter, 3 March 1936. 
220 Premillennialism holds to the idea that a period of peace will begin with the 
Second Coming of Christ.  It is based upon a literal interpretation Revelation 20:1-6 
– a Biblical passage that describes Jesus Christ throwing the Devil and his believers 
into a pit for a thousand years, marking the beginning of a millennium of peace.  
Postmillennialism, on the other hand, is the belief that a period of one thousand 
years of peace will take place before the Second Coming of Christ.  
Postmillennialism was the dominant force within the Churches of Christ.  See, 
Timothy Weber, ‘Premillennialism and the Branches of Evangelicalism,’ in The 
Variety of American Evangelicalism, eds. Donald W. Dayton and Robert K. 
Johnston (Westmont, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991), Sandeen, The Roots of 
Fundamentalism, and Sutton, American Apocalypse. 
 104 
of the premillennialist stance, casting doubt on his allegiance to the church.  
Due to the rising criticism, Armstrong later declared his rejection to certain 
tenants of dispensational premillennialism but did not deny his apocalyptic 
worldview.221  As Richard Thomas Hughes argues, this left the door wide open 
for his enemies to pursue his destruction, which would ultimately leave lasting 
effects on Benson and Harding College.222 
Tensions between premillennialists and postmillennialists date back to 
the beginnings of the Churches of Christ during the Restoration movement of 
the early nineteenth century.  Led by Barton W. Stone and Alexander 
Campbell, the Churches of Christ began as a thriving religious movement that 
greatly appealed to Christians on the frontier.  As Hughes describes it, Stone 
and Campbell believed that ‘the restoration of primitive Christianity would 
provide a solid foundation for the unification of Christians not only in America 
but throughout the world.’223  However, factions began to appear due to the 
fundamental differences between Stone and Campbell.  In American 
Apocalypse, Matthew Sutton explains how most nineteenth century 
Protestants felt optimistic about the future and longed for the coming 
millennium; a thousand-year period of peace, prosperity, and righteousness, 
which they hoped to inaugurate through their own good deeds.224  The second 
coming of Christ would then conclude the millennium.  It was this 
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postmillennialist stance that Campbell, and many of his followers, adhered to.  
A few others identified as amillennialists, believing that the millennium was 
more metaphorical than literal. 
Stone, on the other hand, subscribed to an apocalyptic world view and 
fell into the premillennialist camp.  Sutton describes premillennialists as ‘a 
group of radical white evangelicals’ who kept a sceptical eye on the events 
unfolding around them.225  With the rise of the modern university system, 
increasing urbanisation, political turmoil, and the Civil War, premillennialists 
argued that their way of life was under threat.  Ultimately, they believed they 
were living in the end times; a period that would precede the battle of 
Armageddon and the second coming of Christ.  This pessimistic worldview 
was a stark contrast to that of the optimistic postmillennialists. The tensions 
that grew from these differences eventually led to the division of the Churches 
of Christ in 1906.  Campbell and the Churches of Christ retained their 
postmillennialist views, whilst Stone and his followers formed the Disciples of 
Christ with their premillennialist stance.226 
As a matter that divided the Churches of Christ, it is unsurprising that 
Armstrong’s position resulted in such controversy – and his eventual 
resignation.  When Benson took over as president of Harding in 1936, 
members of the church hoped he would steer the college away from the 
premillennialist leanings of Armstrong by, first and foremost, firing his former 
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teacher and close friend.  Benson’s own position within this controversy is 
unclear. Hicks believes Benson was a strong proponent of Restoration 
theology, echoing both its rationalistic and postmillennial sentiments. 227  
However, Hughes, and more recently Robbie Maxwell, argue that he was in 
fact influenced by the premillennialism of Armstrong, though he began to 
slowly move away from this upon his return to this US.228  Instead, he adopted 
a stridently patriotic, pro-capitalist, and anti-Communist perspective influenced 
by experiences in China. Regardless of his views, Benson refused to fire 
Armstrong.  The decision not to do so angered members of the church, many 
of whom had already made the decision not to financially support Harding on 
the eve of Armstrong’s resignation.  This forced Benson to look elsewhere for 
donations to save the college.  Unbeknownst to the church, his new campaign 
strategy would combine right-wing politics with Christian patriotism and 
separate Harding from the premillennial leanings previously instilled by 
Armstrong and fervently opposed by the Churches of Christ. 
          Rejected by the upper echelons of the denomination’s hierarchy, 
Benson turned to wealthy individuals within the Churches of Christ.  He knew 
certain members did not care for the premillennialist controversy and they 
became his new targets.  The most influential of these was Clinton Davidson, 
a former graduate of Harding College.  By the 1930s, Davidson was a 
successful businessman.  Inspired by the Bible, which he used as a finance 
manual, he created his fortune as a life insurance salesman for wealthy New 
Yorkers.  On the eve of Armstrong’s resignation, Davidson visited the college 
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and offered an initial donation of $5,000. Armstrong rejected it, explaining that 
he would soon be replaced by Benson and so Davidson would have to discuss 
monetary matters with the new president.  Nevertheless, during this meeting, 
Armstrong brought up a subject that would greatly benefit Harding: 
‘Clinton, through your contacts could you get some very 
important men – presidents of large corporations – to come 
to Harding and make speeches?’ – Armstrong. 
‘Yes, I think I Can’ – Davidson. 
‘If you can, we can get instructors and professors from all 
over the state to come to our auditorium and hear them.’ – 
Armstrong.229 
 
Armstrong thought of this idea as a means to raise the academic respectability 
of Harding, rather than as a source of financial contributions.230  When Benson 
succeeded the presidency, he would take Armstrong’s plan and apply it to the 
latter.  Though he would always place the needs of the college first, Benson 
discovered that his ideas surrounding Christian education could have a much 
larger impact.  
In 1936, Davidson approached Benson with a $10,000 proposition.  As 
Benson recalled, ‘He offered to make a contribution of $10,000 or to use the 
$10,000 in launching and helping direct a financial campaign.  All of us 
favoured the latter.’ 231   Unfortunately, Harding lacked the wide reputation 
needed for such a small-scale fundraising campaign to succeed and the effort 
was labelled a ‘complete failure.’  Regardless of the outcome of this initial 
attempt, Benson’s link to Davidson proved to be fruitful in the long run.  
Davidson’s powerful contacts enabled Benson to stumble into an activity that 
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‘did make for us friends that could underwrite a successful financial 
campaign.’ 232  These ‘friends’ would be instrumental in both Benson and 
Harding’s success in an era defined by the financial difficulties of the Great 
Depression.  
          When Benson returned to the US in 1936, the country appeared 
remarkably different from what it had been in the mid-1920s.  The second 
phase of the New Deal had been implemented with the passing of large-scale 
legislations such as the Works Progress Administration, the Social Security 
Act, and the infamous Wagner Act.  Tensions between working-class 
Americans and the business elite were at their highest.  The prosperous 
decade of the 1920s had ended.  ‘I came back to the United States and 
accepted the Presidency of Harding College’, Benson recalled, ‘in the middle 
of the Great Depression which most of our current generation never 
experienced.’233   
For Arkansas, however, economic hardships began long before the 
Depression.  During the 1920s, the state embarked upon modern 
diversification and market integration through the construction of railroads and 
the creation of new manufacturing and processing plants.  The progressive 
attitude of its citizens encouraged optimism for Arkansas’ future.  It is, perhaps, 
this positive outlook that remained with Benson during his time in China and 
made the conditions of the Depression appear far greater upon his return.  In 
reality, Arkansas suffered during the apparent national prosperity of the 1920s.  
Eighty percent of its population lived on farms or villages and relied heavily on 
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the agricultural sector.  The Depression of 1920 – 1921 had a devasting effect 
on the price of cotton and farmers struggled to recover for the remainder of 
the decade, relying on the federal government to provide solutions to their 
chronic problems.  To make matters worse, a large-scale flood damaged large 
sections of the state in 1927, followed by a drought in 1930 – 1931.  Conditions 
in Arkansas were anything but prosperous during the nation’s economic 
boom.234 
          By 1931, Arkansas was facing a crisis of enormous proportions.  The 
ongoing effects of the natural disasters coupled with a nation-wide economic 
crash left the state with limited resources and without basic provisions.  Charity 
relief poured into the area from neighbouring states as one-third of the 
Arkansas population faced starvation.  The Red Cross reported that by 
February, it was feeding more than half a million Arkansans.  In some counties, 
almost every family was dependent on Red Cross rations.  By September 1922, 
15 percent of all families were on the federal relief roll, one of the highest 
percentages in the nation.235  In regard to unemployment, Arkansas had lost 
35,000 from its industrial workforce between 1930 and 1932.236  Yet amid this 
crisis, President Hoover clung to his belief that: 
It is not the function of the Government to relieve individuals 
of their responsibilities to their neighbours, or to relieve 
private institutions of their responsibilities to the public, or the 
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local government to the States, or the responsibilities of State 
governments to the Federal Government.237 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Arkansans voted overwhelmingly for 
Roosevelt in the 1932 election.238   With the introduction of the New Deal, 
Arkansas received relief from several of its programs including the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration and the Works Progress Administration. 239  
Furthermore, the NIRA and the Wagner Act mobilised workers and 
encouraged strike action amongst those suffering the most under the 
conditions of the Depression.  In particular, agricultural workers banded 
together to form the Southern Tenant Farmers Union.  The union advocated 
for higher wagers under its socialist leader, H. L. Mitchell, who announced in 
1936 that cotton choppers would not enter the field for less than one dollar a 
day.  A number of successful strikes followed Mitchell’s statement.240  During 
the strike wave of 1937, 4,799 workers participated in 15 strikes across 
Arkansas.241  Whilst this number is significantly lower than that of the larger 
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states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, it is evidence of the far-
reaching effects of the pro-labour policies of the New Deal.  By the time 
Benson arrived in Arkansas, the poverty-stricken state was reliant on 
government intervention and attracted to the promises of organised labour. 
          To Benson, the situation was critical.  The self-reliant frontier 
individualism, the source of ‘America’s greatness,’ was under threat from the 
social welfare reforms of the New Deal.  As he later observed:  
when railroads were scarce, and neighbors were neighbors 
indeed, nobody felt underprivileged so long as he had the 
right to work hard, save money and use his wits to make his 
wealth work for him.  American character in those days 
included industry, frugality, and ingenuity, honesty, liberality 
and pride in economic independence … People were 
relatively poor in those days, but one small ‘poor farm’ in 
every county took care of persons not able to provide for 
themselves and their own. Children cared for aged parents 
and, in times of distress, one another. Incompetence was 
considered shameful.  But that changed between 1930 and 
1940. Since then countless people have shunted off their 
dependents on the government, and even men with jobs 
have been known to go on relief so they could subsist in 
idleness. Such dependents never have constituted a really 
large class, but its existence has been a reproach to the 
sturdy, self-reliant American character.242 
 
This change in American character, Benson argued, altered the perceptions 
of the working class towards industry and damaged the reputation of big 
business.  In describing the Depression, he later recalled: 
Our people were very unhappy about the long, continuing 
nature of the depression.  They were being told by some 
political leaders that the hardships and the poverty and the 
distress was due to the profiteering of big business.  In fact, 
big businessmen were referred to as ‘economic royalists,’ 
‘profiteers’ and ‘coupon clippers.’243  
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This analysis did not sit well with Benson.  He had long admired the business 
elite, believing they were responsible for the nation’s economic growth.  Their 
societal position also conveyed his frontier values of hard work and sacrifice.  
From this perspective, ‘businessmen like Henry Ford, the du Ponts, and Henry 
Kaiser’ (‘men of vision, courage and initiative’) decided their own destiny 
through their determination to make it to the top.  Likewise, those at the other 
end of the economic scale, including the ‘swarm of idle poor’ that emerged in 
the 1930s, must accept responsibility for their own position.  As Maxwell 
argues, the New Deal upset the natural order and Benson’s own view that hard 
work produced results; as demonstrated by his own experiences.244 
          As such, Benson argued that the economy represented one of the three 
major planks that formed the foundations on which America had been built.  In 
his own words,  
Faith in God was the foundation rock on which we built 
character and honour.  A Constitution made the government 
the servant of the people and assured the freedom of 
individuals.  Then private enterprise, allowing ownership of 
land and businesses, allowed a man to dream his dream and 
set about to fulfil it.  That’s why America rapidly became 
foremost among the nations of the world.245 
 
This was Benson’s own brand of Americanism and the focus of his anti-New 
Deal campaign of the 1930s and 1940s.  America, he argued, was blaming 
the economic crisis on the very people it so desperately needed.  The private 
enterprise system was an integral part of the nation’s heritage and, as he had 
witnessed in China, without big businesses, the country was susceptible to 
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Communism.246  In a stark warning, ‘Socialism,’ Benson claimed, was already 
‘knocking at the nation’s front door.’247 
          Benson’s attitudes towards New Deal liberalism and the threat of 
Communism resonated with corporate conservatives who had already begun 
their fight before Benson had returned to the US.  Meanwhile, his dedication 
to the Gospel and Christian education appealed to many of his fellow college 
presidents.  Using Davidson’s connections, the opportunities for fundraising in 
both of these areas came pouring in.  The first of Harding’s early donations 
came from Benson’s former acquaintance, George Pepperdine. 248  The 
Californian businessman was also one of Davidson’s contacts and so the two 
appealed to Pepperdine’s generosity in funding Christian education.  
According to Darren Dochuk, Pepperdine agreed to make a donation of 
$25,000 to Harding if Benson helped to bring ‘Head, Heart, and Hand’ 
pedagogy to Southern California. 249   To Pepperdine, this educational 
philosophy was the only way to raise a generation of Americans that would 
mobilise against ‘the sinister influences of New Deal liberalism’ and bridge the 
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political gap between plain-folk and wealthy conservatives.250  Benson agreed, 
assuring Pepperdine that he would help to improve religious education in the 
West, as well as using the money to create an environment to better develop 
Christian character in the students at Harding.251   After all, Pepperdine’s 
educational ethos resembled his own, and was one that he applied to Harding.  
True to his word, Pepperdine gifted the $25,000 to Benson and cemented a 
relationship that would benefit both Harding College and the newly established 
Pepperdine College in California.  
Realising that he could obtain sizeable donations from likeminded 
individuals, Benson followed up on Armstrong’s earlier idea to Davidson.  
Businessmen were to be invited to speak at Harding to raise the profile of the 
college.  The first distinguished speaker arrived in 1937 and was Dr E. W. 
Kemmerer of Princeton University, a leading authority on monetary and 
economic problems.  His lecture, ‘Inflation and Higher Education’ was 
attended by many of Arkansas’ business leaders, as well as educators from 
several colleges and universities.252  In the opening speech, Benson outlined 
the aims for this new lecture programme arguing that ‘there should be a closer 
relationship between business and education.’253  Again, he wished to appeal 
to big businesses with his own brand of Americanism to further the college’s 
agenda.  Following the success of Kemmerer’s lecturer, Benson was able to 
secure future speakers such as Sterling Morton, Director of the Morton Salt 
Co. and Director of the Chamber of Commerce; James L. Kraft, President of 
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the Kraft-Phenix Cheese Co.; Raymond H. Folger, President of Montgomery 
Ward & Company; and Dr James K. Hunt, Research Director of the highly 
influential DuPont Co.254  The attendance of such prominent businessmen 
certainly attracted attention for Harding.  Furthermore, it raised the reputation 
of Benson from an unknown president of a small Christian college in Searcy 
to an influential evangelical whose ideology did not go unnoticed by corporate 
conservatives outside of Arkansas.  Soon, Benson was inundated with 
invitations from the presidents of companies such as New York Central 
Railroad, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the Chemical Bank and Trust 
Company, and Eastman Kodak.  As Stevens put it, ‘their doors were open to 
him.’255 
As he travelled outside the state to raise money, Benson seized every 
opportunity to speak publicly.  In doing so, he translated his evangelical zeal 
and missionary fervour into a new campaign.  He believed that he had a 
message for Americans, explaining how he ‘wanted them to understand the 
fundamentals that had guided our country from its earliest days and had led 
the country from a very modest beginning to the recognised place among the 
leader of the nations.’256  Naturally, his speeches contained the three pillars 
that constituted his own ideology: God, Constitutional government, and the 
free enterprise system.  In preparation for his speeches, Benson collected a 
wide variety of materials concerning politics and the economy.  Examples from 
the Benson Papers at Brackett Library are predominantly dated from the 
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1950s onwards, however, they still provide an insight into Benson’s 
preparations.  The materials include publications such as, Vital Speeches of 
the Day and NAM News, as well as the Communist Party newspaper, Daily 
Worker. 257   He was also interested in understanding the objectives of 
Communism in order to use them as fuel for his attacks.  As well as educating 
the public on the fundamentals of Americanism, Benson also made it his 
‘mission’ to ‘help acquaint the American people with the realities of 
Communism which they seemed not to yet understand.’258  As such, the 
Benson Papers also contain a wealth of Communist literature. 
          Benson’s determination to preach his own brand of Americanism during 
his travels eventually caught the attention of big business. His fortunes were 
also aided by the level of his preparedness.  When he spoke, Benson’s 
intelligence, passion, and resolve were clear.  He appeared as a self-made 
and well-educated American which appealed to the leaders of big business, 
particularly those who had also worked hard for their position.  Consequently, 
Benson found that he ‘kept getting more and more invitations to speak and 
finally was speaking to large groups.’ 259   His audiences soon included 
organisations and industries such as the US Chamber of Commerce, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, the Iron and Steel Institute, and the 
National Bankers’ Association.  Additionally, Benson also received invitations 
from civic clubs, schools, and churches.  His success, he believed, was due 
to his being ‘the only person in the country really coming out with a persistent 
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voice for private enterprise and for big business.’260  Whether or not this was 
this case, Benson was certainly in high demand for public speaking by the late 
1940s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
                      Benson’s speaking engagements for the first half of 1949.261 
 
            Of course, Benson was not the only evangelical working alongside big 
business during the 1930s and 1940s.  During the 1930s, corporate 
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conservatives enlisted right-wing Christians to improve their image and 
disseminate their ideology, just as Sloan had acquired the help of Bruce Barton 
a decade earlier.  Notable figures included the highly controversial 
fundamentalist J. Frank Norris, Presbyterian and businessman J. Howard Pew, 
and the anti-Semitic Gerald L. K. Smith, all of whom argued the New Deal 
would lead to the formulation of a Communist state.262  Religious organisations 
also joined the fight and benefited from corporate donations, including the 
Christian American Association and the Church League of America.263  These 
individuals and their organisations were vital to groups such as the American 
Liberty League and the NAM after their early propaganda efforts were easily 
dismissed as matters of self-interest rather than a concern for the nation.  
During a speech to the US Chamber of Commerce in 1938, NAM President H. 
W. Prentis argued that, ‘We must give attention to those things more cherished 
than material wealth and physical security.  We must give more attention to 
intellectual leadership and a strengthening of the spiritual concept that 
underlies our American way of life.’264  For this to work, business needed men 
of God.  In One Nation Under God, Kevin Kruse explains that these men could 
give voice to the same conservative complaints as business leaders, but 
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without the suspicion that they were motivated by self-interest.265  To continue 
the example of the NAM, the organisation recruited Reverend James W. Fifield 
Jr to argue that Roosevelt and his New Dealers were violating the Ten 
Commandments by making a ‘false idol’ of the federal government, causing 
Americans to worship it over the Almighty.266  His rhetoric was similar to that 
of other evangelicals working for, or being financially supported by, big 
business.267 
Amongst a growing crowd of pro-business evangelicals, there was one 
particular event that raised Benson’s popularity and allowed him to stand 
above others as a leading advocate of the free enterprise system.  On 15 May 
1941, Benson attracted national attention when he testified before the House 
Ways and Means Committee regarding a pending tax measure that sought to 
subsidise the government’s increased defence spending.  A national debate 
was in progress over the scope of federal spending and taxation, as well as 
the costs of the possibility of joining the war in Europe.  In early April, assistant 
secretary of the treasury, John L. Sullivan reported to Congress that at the end 
of the fiscal year (30 June 1940), the government had spent $3.5 billion more 
than the tax revenue collected.  By the end of June 1941, he estimated the 
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deficit would rise to $6 billion.  To make matters worse, the proposed budget 
for 1942 was projected to be 45 percent more than that of 1941, totalling $19 
billion.  Defence spending alone totalled $13.7 billion in 1941, with an 
additional $7 billion in lend lease aid to Britain.268  To resolve this issue, 
Roosevelt pushed to increase taxes rather than reduce nondefense spending.  
However, he was met with resistance from the House Ways and Means 
Committee.  On 28 April, the committee began hearing testimonies in the hope 
of identifying budget cuts that would appeal to the public.  By 15 May, 146 
witnesses had been called to testify.  Benson, introduced by Arkansas Rep. 
Wilbur Mills, was witness 147.   
          Similar to his speeches to big businesses, Benson’s opening remarks 
warned of a country in crisis.  The very foundations of America’s heritage were 
under attack from the threat of Communism.  He addressed the committee, 
stating 
The people of the United States are headed directly towards 
three steps which occur in the following order.  Inflation, 
Socialism, and the worst type of Dictatorship.  Unless the 
proper initial steps are taken by your committee and the 
Finance Committee of the United States Senate, it is my 
sincere belief that the people of this country will witness these 
events . . . Individual initiative, private ownership, the stirring 
of ambition through financial incentive, all of these and many 
other of our cherished ideals will no longer exist.269 
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His solution to the problem was the very opposite of Roosevelt’s proposed 
idea.  Rather than raise taxes, the US needed to reduce its nondefense 
spending.  Again, his all-important experiences in China surfaced to support 
his arguments, as he continued: 
I managed a school in Canton, China, for several years – 
raised and expended all the Income – and there I learned the 
value of a tenth of a cent – so gentlemen when I say that I 
have had considerable experience in pruning unnecessary 
expenses, please do not think that I am boasting or that I am 
a theorist.270 
 
Benson aimed to prove his worth to the committee by speaking of his own 
experiences in reducing costs.  He proposed to the committee a series of cost 
cutting measure that would save approximately $2 billion.  Here, his disdain 
for the New Deal was evident as many of its programs became targets.  By 
eliminating the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, 
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, and federal aid to roads, 
Benson estimated that the government could save over $1 billion.  Additionally, 
another $1.325 billion could be saved from cutting the Works Progress 
Administration budget by half.  According to Davidson, who was present during 
this speech, Benson received a standing ovation after finishing his 
testimony.271 
          Although his plans were not brought to fruition, Benson’s ideas had 
reached the ears of the masses.  His greatest publicity came from the Chicago 
Journal of Commerce, where editor Phil S. Hana printed Benson’s speech in 
its entirety.  In his opening remarks, Hana pointed towards a statement from 
an observer within the committee, which read 
                                                        
270 Ibid. 
271 Hicks, ‘Sometimes in the Wrong, But Never in Doubt,’ p. 37. 
 122 
An amazing thing happened in the tax bill hearings today – 
something which never happened before.  An unknown 
witness appeared from a small town in Arkansas to request 
the reduction of $2,000,000,000 in the budget.  Immediately 
after completing his prepared report, the chairman (Mr 
Doughton, ranking Democrat) said he would have the 
address included in the Congressional Record, that he would 
read it several times himself and that he would urge every 
member of Congress to read it.272 
 
Hana himself urged his readers to do the same, arguing that ‘You just know in 
these days that a man who can arouse a congressional committee to cheer 
his testimony has said something worthwhile.’273  Reprints of the speech from 
the Journal of Commerce reached 300,000.  Additionally, Benson recalled that 
various industries and individual groups and organisations had also reprinted 
his speech, making a total of two million copies (though these were only the 
ones he was aware of).274  Although his previous speaking engagements in 
front of big business groups had created a modest reputation for Benson, they 
could not compare to the impact that resulted from his success in front of the 
House Ways and Means Committee.275 
Following this success, Benson received invitations to speak at widely 
publicised national events.  For the creation of the Fun and Facts series, the 
most important of these occurred in December 1941 when Benson addressed 
the National Tax Foundation.  Approximately 750 people from twenty-eight 
states witnessed Benson receive a silver medal from the president of the 
foundation, and head of the Johns-Manville Corporation, Louis H. Brown, for 
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his efforts in advocating the free enterprise system.  When Brown presented 
the medal to Benson, he spoke of his famous speech before the House Ways 
and Means Committee, commenting ‘A number of you present know well that 
committees of Congress are difficult to impress.  But George S. Benson went 
before the Congressional Ways and Means Committee last May and made the 
most remarkable impression in recent years, with a plain common-sense 
appeal.  This common-sense appeal for economy found immediate nationwide 
recognition.’ 276  This nationwide recognition would follow Benson into the 
Second World War and reach new heights, yet again, during the postwar 
period with the help of one of his audience members, Alfred P. Sloan.  
Benson’s particular brand of Americanism resonated with Sloan, who 
introduced himself to Benson at the event.  Unbeknownst to Benson, this 
meeting would result in a postwar business contract with the Sloan Foundation 
that would make Harding College a leader in Christian and economic 
education. 
Benson’s two largest engagements of 1941 – his speeches before the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the National Tax Foundation – were 
held in the midst of an ongoing debate regarding America’s entry into the war.  
His presence at the National Tax Foundation, in particular, occurred the day 
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before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour.  However, Benson’s emphasis 
on ‘non-defence’ expenditure did not signify his stance on the issue of 
interventionism as his assaults were never accompanied by any engagement 
with this heavily disputed question.  They were, first and foremost, both anti-
New Deal and pro-business.  Increasing corporate and personal taxes, he 
believed, was counterproductive as it undermined two essential aspects of a 
successful economy: the incentive to earn money and the availability of 
investment capital.  The alternative, he argued, was ‘inflation, socialism, and 
dictatorship.’277 
          Benson’s reluctance to engage with the interventionist debate was not 
derived from a lack of conviction, but from his ambition and pragmatism.  The 
Churches of Christ was divided on the matter, despite its longstanding position 
as a pacifist denomination.  On the eve of WWI, the Churches of Christ had 
the sixth largest number of ‘conscientious objectors’ of all religious traditions 
in the United States.278  This began to shift, however, during the intervening 
years of the Second World War when a commitment to pacifism weakened 
significantly.  An increasing number of members embraced the need to 
support the nation’s democratic system and private enterprise from foreign 
influence, despite reservations of ‘aiding’ Communist Russia.  Others were 
more reluctant, particularly faculty members at Harding where many remained 
stridently anti-interventionist.  It was perhaps in Benson’s best interest to 
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remain publicly neutral in this debate to avoid confrontation with opposing 
factions within his denomination and at Harding.  It was a similar situation with 
the business community, whose support Benson heavily relied upon.  
Opinions diverged depending on the nature of business, its size, location, and 
interest in foreign trade and munitions manufacturing.  Without the existence 
of a common ground, it was safer for Benson to refrain from entering the 
debate.  Consequently, information is scarce regarding his views on 
interventionism.  As always, Benson acted pragmatically in securing ongoing 
donations to support his endeavours in Christian and economic education.279   
          The motivation behind Benson’s fundraising campaigns with corporate 
conservatives is a contested issue.  Hicks argues that whether Benson’s 
actions were ‘sincere efforts to promote Americanism or merely ploys to reap 
the financial rewards from conservative businessmen cannot be determined 
from the available evidence.’280  However, Benson’s own words show that both 
of these areas were of great importance to his wider objective.  As he later 
recalled, ‘My chief concern . . . throughout all of these years has been in 
Christian education . . .  I have considered it worthy of my total dedication.’281  
From his early days as a Bible teacher for his local Methodist church, to his 
missionary work in China, and ultimately until the final days before his passing, 
Benson campaigned tirelessly for the sake of Christian education, and both 
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his ideology and the financial rewards from big business were essential.  In 
regard to his ideology, Benson’s fundamentals of Americanism were tightly 
intertwined: 
the people of this country must maintain a free America . . . 
where all men are free to think, free to work, free to spend 
their money as they please, free to engage in business at 
their own risk, free to own property, free to vote their 
convictions, and free to worship God in their own way.282 
 
To maintain a ‘free America’, the country required the freedom of private 
enterprise, as well the freedom to worship God, in order to build good 
character.  These two areas were at the core of Harding’s principles as he set 
out to protect the next generation, and the nation, from what he saw as the 
threat of an encroaching atheist dictatorship. 
Furthermore, the donations Benson received were vital in saving the 
college from bankruptcy.  The Depression had a significant effect on the 
nation’s educational institutions with an estimated 20,000 public school 
closures by 1934.  The South was hit particularly hard as serious financial 
strains meant children spent less time in classrooms with an average school 
year of six months.  Christian schools and colleges were also affected with 
those, including Cordell Christian College, Oklahoma, and Ozark Wesleyan 
College, Missouri, closing due to financial pressure.283  The economic context 
of America’s educational institutes during the Depression makes Benson’s 
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achievements still more impressive.  His ideology, and the passion and 
professionalism behind it, resonated with the leaders of industry during a time 
of a financial crisis.  As such, Benson was able to achieve two objectives by 
working with corporate conservatives; to disseminate his ideology to the nation 
and to raise enough money to clear the debts of Harding.  The campaign’s 
rate of success was remarkable.  It raised $92,000 in three years.284  On 
Thanksgiving, 1939, Benson declared that the college was free of its principle 
debt, the interest, and the expense of his campaign. 285   Of course, his 
fundraising efforts did not end here and the donations continued to pour in far 
into the postwar period. 
 
A Leader in Christian Education 
          Benson’s dedication to Christian education was evident through his use 
of the donations following the clearance of Harding’s debt.  In 1936, Benson 
created the National Education Program (NEP) which, after much financial 
backing, became the college’s flagship organisation.  From its humble 
beginnings to its domination of postwar Christian and economic education, the 
NEP’s purpose was  
to bring about a better public understanding of the American 
Way of Life.  Only an informed and dedicated citizenry active 
in the public affairs of their communities, their states, and 
their nation, can assure the continuation of the American 
system and the individual freedom and great economic 
opportunity it provides for all.286 
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The NEP’s beginnings can be traced back to Benson’s early speaking 
engagements.  He used the money he received for his public speeches to 
produce the weekly radio program, Behind the News, as well as the weekly 
newspaper column, Looking Ahead.  Although it is difficult to determine the 
popularity of the two, the Benson Papers provide numerous publications from 
both projects.  Many of these documents reiterate Benson’s standard rhetoric 
on the foundations of his own brand of Americanism, however, rather 
interestingly, they also contain arguments from guests on the benefits of 
government intervention.  An example of this is an undated Behind the News 
broadcast on ‘The Efficiency of private Management vs. Government 
Management of Industry.’  Here, Benson’s guest, Hershel Dyer of Lubbock, 
Texas, disagreed with his host, arguing that ‘the war has already 
demonstrated the superiority of government management of industry.’ 287  
Naturally, Benson disagreed, although the varied ideology on the show 
demonstrates either his acknowledgement of a fair debate, or another chance 
to argue directly against opposing views (or both).  Of course, it was the latter 
that inspired big business to continue donating funds that went straight into 
the pocket Harding College. 
More importantly, the NEP led to advances in Christian education outside 
of Arkansas.  Upon hearing of the success of Harding, members of the 
Churches of Christ in Oklahoma began discussing the possibility of building a 
Christian college in their state.  For guidance, they turned to Benson.  Although 
the opening of a college in Oklahoma would represent competition for Harding, 
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Benson used the best of his experience to make the institution a reality.  He 
firmly believed in the need for Christian education everywhere and did not 
worry about ‘competition.’288  Under his guidance as chancellor, Oklahoma 
Christian University flourished during the 1950s.  Benson continued to 
combine his passion for education with the promotion of the free enterprise 
system to produce a learning environment fuelled by postwar consumption 
and entertainment.  American Citizenship Training was held alongside 
Enterprise Square USA, a theme park of free-market capitalism.  Through this 
unusual technique, Christian students were found to be more reliably in favour 
of free enterprise than their secular peers.  It was yet another success story 
for Benson and his desire to promote religious teachings together with the free 
enterprise system.289 
Furthermore, through the NEP, Benson fulfilled his promise to George 
Pepperdine and the newly established Pepperdine University.  As with 
Oklahoma Christian University, Benson travelled to California to provide 
counsel to an old friend.  During the 1930s and 40s, the university prospered, 
having gained full accreditation by the Northwest Association of Colleges in 
April 1938.  However, by the mid-1950s, Pepperdine University was suffering 
from a financial crisis.  Pepperdine himself could not raise the funds needed 
to erase the debts, and the Churches of Christ were not in a strong enough 
position to provide support.  As such, its president, Norvel Young, contacted 
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Benson in 1957 for assistance. Benson, not wanting to witness the failure of a 
Christian college, offered his support by choosing Pepperdine University as 
the next venue for the NEP’s Freedom Forum in 1959 – an organisation that 
resembled Harding’s early Distinguished Speaker Series.   Arkansas Senator 
John McClellan was chosen as the keynote speaker for the Freedom Forum; 
an event labelled as ‘a seminar to prepare leadership for American resistance 
to the spread of Socialism and Communism.’290  It was, after all, Benson’s 
organisation and so it contained his standard rhetoric on faith in God, 
Constitutional government, and the free enterprise system.  According to 
Stevens, Pepperdine University maintained its annual budgets every year, 
without incurring any debt, following the Freedom Forum; providing yet 
another example of Benson’s dedication to Christian education.291 
          By exploring Benson’s pre-war activities, the path towards the Fun and 
Facts series becomes clear.  His passion for Christian education, alongside 
his firm belief in the free enterprise system, shaped Benson into a valuable 
advocate of right-wing causes and ideologies that deeply resonated with the 
business world.  As a result, Benson was presented with a wealth of 
opportunities to not only propagate his sincere support for private enterprise, 
but to also raise the funds needed to save Harding College and expand the 
realm of Christian education.  These two seemingly different spaces actually 
overlapped and became the defining feature of Benson’s activities.  His 
ideology produced an influx of donations that were invested back into the 
college to support further economic programs.  With the continuing increase 
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of these donations, as well as Benson’s climbing popularity, his venture into 
educational films in the postwar period is unsurprising.  By capitalising on the 
success of previous NEP programs, it was only natural for Benson to exploit 
the popular medium of film during a period of great prosperity and anti-
Communist sentiments for the sake of Christian education.  He was, after all, 
a man of God. 
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Chapter Three 
 
A New Era For The Non-Theatrical Film: Producing an 
Economic Cartoon Series in Postwar America 
 
 
On 27 September 1946, George Benson signed a contract with John 
Sutherland Productions, marking the beginning of production of the Fun and 
Facts series.  The timing could not have been better.  During the Second World 
War, attitudes towards propaganda and the use of film to disseminate ideas 
took a positive turn.  As Kirsten Ostherr emphasises, the social conditions 
instigated by the war ‘created a mass, civic-minded audience willing to view 
regularly the thousands of instructional ﬁlms that were produced in the postwar 
period.’292  Film propaganda achieved a newfound respectability in the US as 
a medium that facilitated the victory of the allies – both as a training tool for 
soldiers and for morale boosting on the home front.  Additionally, technological 
advances in the making of 16mm film equipment made productions more 
accessible to small venues such as schools, workplaces, and community 
centres.  The disgruntled anti-New Dealers of the 1930s capitalised on these 
conditions during this new golden age of nontheatrical films.  As Elizabeth 
Fones-Wolf argues, there was ‘a systematic campaign launched by American 
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business in the late thirties but pursued with even great vigour after the Second 
World War to shape the ideas and images that constituted America’s political 
culture.’293  Sloan and Benson’s project was a notable part of this postwar 
campaign. 
          The efforts of the business community benefitted from the revival of 
American conservatism and the return of a consumer culture that rivalled that 
of the 1920s.294  The prosperity of the Second World War brought an end to 
the Depression and, in the eyes of many conservatives, rendered the New 
Deal meaningless.  In the words of historian Godfrey Hodgson, ‘Dr Win-the-
War had succeeded where Dr New Deal had failed.’295  In this changing 
political climate, with unprecedented prosperity and a re-emergence of anti-
Communism, the fortunes of the business community greatly improved.  It is 
necessary to examine these contextual issues as the backdrop to the Fun and 
Facts series to understand why the long 1950s was the ideal time for its 
conception.  The consensus and conflicts behind the production process will 
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also be explored to determine the success of continuing corporate-evangelical 
alliances, as well as the project as a whole.  As the rise of the motion picture 
brought credibility to conservative propaganda campaigns during a time of 
political, economic, and social change, Sloan and Benson were set to 
accomplish their aim of spreading free enterprise ideology to the post-war 
American public.     
           
Propaganda and The Second World War 
          Before turning to the postwar period, it is important to examine the 
context of the Second World War to understand how the necessary climate for 
Fun and Facts came to fruition.  The Second World War marked the end of 
the Great Depression and sparked the major revival of American business.  It 
was a time of unity, when, as historian Michael C. C. Adams explains, the 
nation came alive ‘like a giant awakening from its sleep’, following the 
‘treacherous’ attack on Pearl Harbour. 296   The war years have become 
romanticised as America’s golden age, a peak in the life of society and one of 
the greatest eras of prosperity in human history. 297   For business, the 
emergence of a unified front, alongside an upward trajectory in the economy, 
presented new opportunities.  According to Kim Phillips-Fein, the war 
transformed the attitudes of businessmen towards Keynesian economics and 
the New Deal by giving them a chance to reposition themselves as the leaders 
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of the nation.298  Accounts of how this occurred tend to stress two overlapping 
explanations emphasising either patriotic duty or political and economic 
calculation. 
       The first of these categories highlights the patriotic contributions of 
American businessmen and their companies to the war effort.  Mark R. Wilson 
argues that there are large elements of truth behind these accounts given that 
private companies and large manufacturing corporations, such as General 
Motors, shouldered the burden of munitions productions by throwing 
themselves into work with impressive results.299  GM was the nation's largest 
defence contractor, delivering an estimated $12.3 billion in material to the war 
effort.300  According to William Pelfrey, GM’s retired Director of Executive 
Communications, the company’s shift in production has been hailed as ‘the 
greatest industrial transformation in history, with all of the General's 200-plus 
North American automotive plants shifting to production of airplanes, tanks, 
machine guns, amphibious transports and other military vehicles within a 
matter of months.’ 301   Furthermore, GM’s William Knudsen willingly 
abandoned his $300,000 salaried position as the company’s president to 
dedicate himself to the war effort from a governmental post.  In 1940, President 
Roosevelt appointed Knudsen as Chairman of the Office of Production 
Management and as a member of the National Defence Advisory Commission.  
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For one dollar a year, Knudsen’s role was to increase America’s war time 
production to meet the needs of the military.  When his family questioned his 
decision to leave GM, Knudsen replied, ‘This country has been good to me 
and I want to pay it back.’302  Knudsen’s dedication to his country is a perfect 
example of wartime patriotism amongst America’s business class. 
       However, the motivation of many in big business stretched beyond the 
realm of patriotism and mirrored the public relations campaigns of the 1930s.  
Accounts within this second category of economic gain portray a far more 
critical story of American industry during the Second World War, claiming that 
corporations exploited the war emergency to, as Mark Wilson puts it,  ‘regain 
political power and reap economic gains.’303  This was certainly the case for 
GM’s Alfred Sloan, showing that not all members of GM’s leadership fit into 
Wilson’s description of the automobile giant.  When Knudsen informed Sloan 
of his decision to accept Roosevelt’s offer, Sloan argued that ‘They’ll make a 
monkey out of you down there in Washington.’304  He then went on to warn 
Knudsen that if he intended to work for Roosevelt, he need not come back – 
his days at GM would be through.  Evidently, Sloan’s hostility towards the 
President had not changed since the onset of the New Deal. 
       Continuing disdain of Roosevelt had also shaped Sloan’s attitudes 
towards the war.  Initially, Sloan watched the coming of the war with dread, 
believing that war mobilisation would give the Roosevelt administration greater 
power to control the economy; New Dealers would have the legal authority to 
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rob GM of personnel, profit, and managerial authority.  He feared that federal 
wartime mandates, even if victory was achieved, could leave GM ill-prepared 
for the return to its core business of making and selling cars to the general 
public.   
          However, as the US prepared to enter the war, Sloan shifted his position.  
As David Farber explains, Sloan came to understand that the war would 
benefit GM in particular, and the free enterprise system in general.305  As 
victory would depend largely on which nation performed best in the industrial 
realm, politicians were, once again, dependent on men like Sloan and their 
manufacturing expertise.   
      With GM concentrating on wartime production, Sloan charged himself 
with preparing the company for the war’s end.  He created and chaired GM’s 
Post-War Planning Committee and studied all aspects of the company’s 
wartime conversion to plan for the reversion process.  More importantly, 
especially in regards to GM’s post-war reputation, Sloan threw himself into the 
company’s public relations campaigns.  Although the industrial PR campaigns 
of the 1930s were largely unsuccessful, the business world recognised that 
the key to their post-war success lay in the realm of advertising and public 
relations.  As Walter Weir, copy director of the advertising agency Lord & 
Thomas, described it:  
this is a war on the psychosocial front as well as the physical 
front, and the prime mover of public psychology in this 
country is advertising.  And if ever advertising had an 
opportunity to prove its worth, if ever advertising had a 
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chance to silence its critics, this is it.  And if advertising muffs 
this chance, it will never get another one.306 
 
Bruce Barton, America’s famous advertising executive and an old colleague 
of Sloan’s, whole-heartedly agreed.  In 1942, as the president of the 
Advertising Federation of America, Barton announced: 
The President [Roosevelt] has asked for a name for the war.  
So far as we in the industry are concerned, the name that we 
hold in our minds, whether we speak it out loud or not, should 
be the War that Business Helped to Win . . . If American 
business rises to its full opportunity in this crisis, makes the 
right kind of record and unfolds that record, in simple 
language, to the common man, we need have no fear of the 
verdict.  That common man and his wife, and their boy home 
from the wars, will register that verdict at the ballot box.307 
 
In this ‘War that Business Helped to Win,’ advertisers would sell victory to the 
American people in the defence of the free enterprise system and consumer 
culture.  As historian Chares McGovern argues, the assumption was that with 
a sufficiently vigorous advertising campaign to a public weary of wartime 
sacrifice, business would reap the reputational and financial benefits of its 
contributions to the war effort.308 
       At GM, the task of developing a successful PR campaign fell to Paul 
Garrett, the head of the public relations policy group.  His first priority, as he 
explained to members of the board, was ‘interpreting to the public what 
General Motors is doing in the war in ways that will build a strong public 
position in the future.’309  Consequently, the company released a wave of 
advertisements that showcased its accomplishments whilst pushing a political 
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message.  For example, the 1942 industrial production, Victory is Our 
Business, followed this plan.  Essentially, Victory is Our Business described 
the wartime conditions of a GM factory in Dayton, Ohio, and advertised the 
products produced for the war effort.310  The audience saw these products in 
action, emphasising the role of industry in frontline warfare.  The core message 
here was simple: ‘Men and women in the plants of General Motors are arming 
America.’  Without these men and women, and without the manufacturing 
power behind them, victory was unattainable.311  
       In ad after ad, GM proudly gave detailed accounts of its productive 
capabilities.  ‘Victory is our Business’ became the company’s new slogan and 
a celebration of  the free enterprise system lay at the heart of its advertising 
campaign.  A 1942 GM advertisement in the Indianapolis Star shed more light 
on how the business viewed its contributions to the nation:  
 “KNOW-HOW” SAVES MANPOWER, MATERIALS AND 
MONEY – AND GETS THE JOB DONE!  Fortunately for all 
of us, American Industry has this ‘Know-How.’ 
 They said that America was unprepared for war and 
could not arm in time.  But they overlooked our “secret 
weapon” – industrial “know-how.”  They forgot that in America 
free enterprise had for years been encouraging – stimulating 
– urging men to learn how to make things better and better – 
in greater volume – at constantly lower prices.  Now that the 
needs of peace have given way to the demands of war – now 
that ‘Victory is our business’ – our training in this mass 
production is making itself felt.312 
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Evidently, GM threw itself into an advertising campaign that, once again, 
placed the free enterprise system at its core.  Furthermore, this particular 
advertisement emphasised the importance of free enterprise prior to the 
outbreak of war, arguing that the US would not have been prepared without it.  
Such PR campaigns demonstrated the corporate drive to label the Second 
World War as the ‘War that Business Helped to Win.’ 
           It is not easy to determine the success of wartime industrial films, 
whether in terms of changing public opinion toward the business community, 
or simply alerting Americans to its role in the war. What is certain, however, is 
that the wider film industry enjoyed a boom in production due to its involvement 
in governmental propaganda campaigns.  To maintain a united front against 
the enemy and uphold morale during what was to become a long and brutal 
war, Washington recognised the need for an organised information effort to 
gain the attention and support of the public.  Soon after Pearl Harbour, FDR 
endorsed the motion picture as ‘one of our most effective media in informing 
and entertaining our citizens,’ declaring it could be ‘a very useful contribution 
to the war effort.’313  In 1942, the President established the Office of War 
Information (OWI) to monitor the American film industry throughout the conflict.  
However, the OWI rarely became directly involved in the production of 
commercial motion pictures and was often relegated to an advisory role.  It 
had six aims for the industry to consider when making films related to the war: 
1. The Issues: Why we fight.  What kind of peace will follow 
victory.  
2. The Enemy: Whom we fight. The nature of our adversary. 
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3. The United Nations and Peoples: With whom we are 
allied in fighting.  Our brothers-in-arms. 
4. Work and Production: How each of us can fight.  The war 
at home. 
5. The Home Front: What we must do.  What we must give 
up to win the fight. 
6. The Fighting Forces: The job of the fighting man on the 
Front.314 
 
Though these were only guidelines, the film industry responded by producing 
a great number of propaganda films that covered all six aims.  The public then 
viewed these films on a regular basis. 
          The production of war films was enabled by the so-called golden age of 
Hollywood which had survived the economic downturn of the 1930s and 
continued to flourish into 1940s.  By 1941, the US was already a nation of 
moviegoers with approximately 90 million Americans visiting the cinema each 
week to view the 400 to 500 films Hollywood was releasing each year.315  With 
propaganda pieces often shown before each feature, the culture of the cinema 
provided them with an almost guaranteed audience.  As one moviegoer 
reminisced, 
People of my generation lived, breathed, and ate movies.  
We would see our favourites ten, twelve, fifteen times or 
more.  We would rush to our neighbourhood theatres twice 
a week, whenever the program changed.  We saw the A 
feature and the B feature; cartoons, news, shorts . . . All for 
ten cents and later twenty-five cents.316 
 
With such enthusiasm for movies, FDR was right to predict its useful 
contribution to the war effort.  
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          The types of film produced for the war can be placed into two 
overarching categories: films produced for the military and propaganda pieces 
for the home front.  The 1940 Draft Act, combined with the attack on Pearl 
Harbour on December 7, 1941, aided in the production of such films. 
Specialists from the Hollywood community enthusiastically joined the war 
effort.  The numbers of volunteers is impressive, amounting to 1,500 members 
of the Screen Actors Guild, 48 executives and producers, 132 members of the 
Screen Directors Guild, 230 members of the Screen Writers Guild, 40 
cameramen, 75 electricians and sound technicians, 453 films technicians, and 
80 machinists. 317   By the end of the war, their efforts culminated in the 
production of more than 9,000 military training films alone.  The number of 
non-military films is also staggering, though the exact number is harder to 
pinpoint.318  
       Geoff Alexander argues that military training films stressed not only how 
to fight, but the desire to fight.319  This mirrored the view of Charles F. Hoban 
Jr, the Special Assistant of the Division of Visual Education.  In his 1946 
publication, Movies that Teach, Hoban argued that in order for its men to be 
brought to a mental state where they were willing to make sacrifices, the Army 
needed to produce a series of films that showed ‘the nobility of the cause in 
which they were engaged.’320  For this, the military enlisted the services of film 
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director Frank Capra.  As Thomas Bohn explains, Capra was tasked with 
‘maintaining morale and instilling loyalty and discipline into the civilian Army 
being assembled to make war on professional enemies.’321  To achieve this, 
soldiers needed to understand why they were fighting.  The result was a 
seven-part series on the causes of the Second World War, aptly titled Why We 
Fight (1942 – 1945).322  It covered a selection of important events from the rise 
of the Axis powers in Prelude to War, to the invasion of Norway and the 
conquest of France in Divide and Conquer and ending with America’s entry 
into the war in War Comes to America.  The cumulative attendance by military 
personnel topped 45 million by 1945, making it the most widely viewed 
documentary series of its time.323  It is a fine example of how nontheatrical 
films were used to train and inspire; to encourage patriotic feelings and provide 
a reason to fight. 
       Nontheatrical titles produced for the home front also had to encourage 
a will to fight and most commonly featured themes associated with points two, 
four, and five of the OWI’s Government Information Manual for the Motion 
Picture Industry.  Points four and five (Work Production: How each of us can 
fight and The Home Front: What we must do) were regularly combined, as 
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work and production on the home front was essential to the war effort.  Often 
when Americans contemplated the war, there was a tendency to magnify the 
nation’s industrial might.324  For many, the war effort represented unity.  When 
men willingly went off to fight, those that remained stepped up to fill their places.  
Women were the new factory workers and Rosie the Riveter became the 
symbol of the nation’s can-do attitude.  It was a ‘splendid community effort in 
the best war ever’, writes Michael Adams.325  Although in reality the situation 
was far more complex, this idea was born during the war itself.  In stressing 
the importance of industry to the war effort, propaganda films emphasised the 
high standards of American workers whilst displaying the unity of its workforce.  
An interesting example of these themes in action appeared in the 1943 
sponsored production All Out for Victory.326  The film shows a number of 
scenarios opening with a mother adding ‘a little extra care and a little extra 
hurry up’ to her factory work, whilst a picture of her enlisted son sat next to her.  
After all, the work she is doing is for his sake, to help him win the war.  The 
audience is then introduced to male workers transferring their agricultural skills 
to the production of tyres and tank tracks.  Again, viewers saw examples of 
workers contributing to the war effort for their sons abroad.  In this case, it was 
a father with four sons whose jobs require the products he is making.  Such 
scenes tried to connect to the emotional aspects of war to emphasise the 
importance of wartime production to the overall conflict and increase 
productivity.   
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          It is also worth noting that American propaganda films were not 
restricted to the confines of the United States.  As Allied forces liberated 
Western Europe, they were accompanied by an ambitious propaganda 
campaign.  Leading the campaign was the OWI’s Overseas Motion Picture 
Bureau with the Academy Award-winning Hollywood screenwriter, Robert 
Riskin, at the helm of the project.  Riskin was a distinguished professional and 
a close partner to Capra, having written many of his greatest films (It 
Happened One Night (1934) and Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936)).  Between 
1942 and 1945, he oversaw the Projections of America series; a collection of 
twenty-six short documentary films produced with the mission to introduce 
America to the world.  In discussing the purpose of the series, Riskin asked, 
‘With what kind of films shall we follow our troops to Berlin?  Shall we 
concentrate on the evils of Nazism or on the virtues of democracy?  What is 
the best way to get to the German people?’327  As historian Ian Scott argues, 
Riskin was keen to distance his operation from the propaganda material that 
Capra and other directors, like John Ford and John Huston, were producing 
for different agencies relating to the conflict.328  Instead, Riskin opted for a ‘soft 
sell’ approach that rejected typical Hollywood traits.  As the project’s 
production chief Philip Dunne explained, this involved ‘deliberately 
deglamourising Hollywood’s America of penthouses, swimming pools, 
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gangsters, straight-shooting cowboys, and under-clad bathing beauties to 
show the country as it really was. “We’re in truth very much like you,” we said 
to the rest of the world.  “In fact, we basically are you.”’329 
          With the work of a talented team of Hollywood filmmakers, Projections 
of America presented stories of ordinary Americans.  A cast of cowboys and 
oilmen, farmers and window washers, and immigrants and school children, 
sought to capture the essence of American democracy.  The films did much 
more than advertise the goodwill of the nation, however, crossing cultural 
boundaries at both national and international levels.  Swedes in America 
stressed the enormous contributions of Swedish immigrants to industrial and 
cultural growth, whilst Cowboy touched on the collaborative aspects of the war 
effort in showing how beef was transported to soldiers fighting overseas.330  
The series espoused international cooperation, as well as a racially and 
ethnically integrated America.  This form of propaganda proved successful in 
a number of countries across Europe.  In 1944, the New York Times 
announced that ‘American motion pictures have staged a triumphal comeback 
on Roman theatre screens’ and reported that films used ‘to instill democratic 
principles are being shown to enthusiastic throngs.’ 331   Additionally, the 
Hollywood Reporter spoke of a ‘film invasion of Europe’ in a 1944 article 
detailing Riskin’s achievements.332  The series proved to be widely popular 
across Western Europe and although it was not shown to US audiences, 
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Americans were reminded of the powerful influence of the nonfiction genre 
through the nation’s press.  The success of Projections of America was further 
evidence of how film could be used as a persuasive tool in which to reach the 
masses, even more so after the impact of American propaganda on foreign 
audiences had been discovered.    
          Assessing the effects of war films, Kirsten Ostherr believes they had a 
significant impact on both military personnel and the general public.  She 
argues that ‘While ﬁlm propaganda acquired negative connotations through its 
use in Nazi Germany, it simultaneously achieved a newfound respectability as 
a medium that facilitated the victory of the Allies, both as a training tool for 
soldiers and as a vehicle for news gathering and morale boosting on the home 
front.’ 333   This, in turn, gave non-theatrical films credible influence in the 
postwar era.  War propaganda had created ‘a mass, civic-minded audience 
willing to view regularly the thousands of instructional ﬁlms that were produced 
in the postwar period.’334  The 1948 publication ‘Let’s Make a Movie’ by the 
Visual Information Section of the Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), offers a valuable postwar perspective on the state of 
nontheatrical films.  The pamphlet states that: 
World War II demonstrated to the general public the ability of 
the motion picture to sell, train, inspire, teach and convince 
in the most eﬀective manner.  Eleven- odd million veterans, 
now returned to peacetime pursuits have great respect for 
the motion picture. They want to see more ﬁlms used in 
business and they expect their children to have the 
advantage of educational ﬁlms in school.335 
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Researcher Kenneth Kaye agreed with the USDA, observing that fifteen 
million 
men returned home after the war with a keen sense of what 
instructional films could do – and some of them had also 
been trained in their use.  Many of these veterans became 
teachers.  Others were active parents, school administrators, 
state legislators, even Congressmen.  They did not need to 
be convinced that films were a good way to learn . . . As these 
men grew to hold positions of responsibility in American 
education, the audio-visual movement gradually acquired 
permanence and acceptability everywhere.336 
 
Evidently, both veterans and the general public viewed the motion picture as 
a tool that assisted in the war effort and believed it would continue to benefit 
the nation in the postwar era. 
          The increase in the purchasing of film equipment following the war also 
supports these claims. In Sixty Years of 16mm Film, Paul A. Wagner boasts 
of the impressive statistics, claiming: 
In 1941 Detroit had only 16 projectors in its high schools; in 
1946 it purchased 300. Before the war the total number of 
general-interest films came to only 500; in the first seven 
years after the war over 25,000 were produced. The list of 
16mm film producers contains more than 600 names. Fifteen 
years ago there may have been 10,000 sound projectors in 
use; today, estimates of the number of 16mm projectors 
available in communities throughout the country range all the 
way from 250,000 to 400,000.337 
 
The increase in film production and distribution, together with the surge in the 
sale of projecting equipment is sufficient alone in demonstrating the positive 
effect of war films on visual education.  There was evidently a market for the 
medium in the postwar period.  Therefore, whilst evidence on the effectiveness 
                                                        
336 Kenneth Kaye cited in, Alexander, Academic Films for the Classroom, p. 20. 
337 Paul A. Wagner, Sixty Years of 16mm Film, 1923 – 1983: A Symposium (Des 
Plaines, IL: 1954), p. 12.  Further notable works on the rise of the nontheatrical film 
genre during the postwar period are outlined in footnote 1 of this chapter. 
 149 
of individual propaganda pieces remains scarce, films from the Second World 
War in general had a significant impact on the future of the nontheatrical 
motion picture.  That new popularity ended the long plateau of the 1930s and 
transformed visual education into the largest film genre in US history.  The 
post-war period, therefore, provided the perfect conditions for the production 
of the Fun and Facts series. 
 
The Rise of Corporate Conservatives 
          With the new popularity of film, the business community resumed its 
fight against the New Deal with vigour.  Although corporate reputations 
improved during the war, there still remained pressing national issues that 
threatened the position of businessmen and the role of the free enterprise 
system in the US economy post-1945.  As Fones-Wolf describes it, American 
society had yet to reach a consensus on three important matters: the 
relationship of the government to the economy; on the ‘proper size’ of the 
welfare state; and the scope of union power in the factory.338  Hence, the two 
most central actors in this debate, the business community and organised 
labour, each launched strenuous campaigns in an attempt to shape national 
politics and influence public opinion.  As sociologist Robert Lynd observed in 
1946, business, in particular, was willing to ‘spend unlimited money’ for its 
cause.339  He warned of their most ‘insidious’ tactic, the selling of the free 
enterprise, on the theory that ‘if you control public opinion you have the 
government in your hand and labour behind the eight ball.’340 
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       However, the situation for the business community in the immediate 
aftermath of the war was not overwhelmingly promising.  Irving Richter argues 
that at the end of the war, labour’s aggregate numbers suggested real 
power.341 Approximately 15 million Americans were members of a union by 
1947, with labour organisations boasting a 61 percent national approval 
rating.342  Experts at the time believed that the balance had shifted away from 
management to labour.  In a speech to a Princeton University conference in 
1946, labour economist Professor Sumner H. Slichter argued that there was a 
‘revolutionary shift in power from business to labour in the United States . . .  
a labouristic society is succeeding a capitalist one.’343  From 1945-6, the US 
witnessed a display of labour’s power when the nation suffered from the 
largest strike wave in American history.  The Congress of Industrial 
Organisations (CIO), a pro-New Deal labour group that was responsible for 
the sit-down strikes of the 1930s, regained its momentum in the postwar period 
and mobilised workers into action.  As Robert H. Zieger describes, ‘the war’s 
end brought familiar scenes of mass strike action, frantic and slap-dash efforts 
at governmental intervention, and jerry-built compromise solution.’ 344  
According to the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), the 4,985 work stoppages 
arising out of the labour-management controversies in 1946 exceeded the 
                                                        
341 Irving Richter, Labour’s Struggles, 1945 – 1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 1. 
342 For statistics on union membership see, United States Department of Labour & 
Bureau of Labour Statistics, ‘Directory of Labour Unions in the United States,’ 
Monthly Labour Review (1947), p. 1.  The approval rating for labour unions was 
produced by Gallup, see ‘Labour Unions,’ Gallup 
[https://news.gallup.com/poll/12751/labor-unions.aspx], accessed 9 July 2018. 
343 Professor Sumner H. Slichter cited in, Richter, Labour’s Struggles, p. 1. 
344 Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935 – 1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995), p. 213. 
 151 
previous year’s total of 4,750; it was also slightly higher than the former peak 
in 1944 when 4,956 stoppages were recorded.345   
          The patriotic ties that had bound the nation together so successfully in 
achieving phenomenal wartime production records were severed when labour 
and management faced off and fought over the economic realities of 
reconversion.  The BLS noted that workers grew concerned about losses in 
earning alongside the rise of prices, whilst employers worried about 
government controls, reconversion problems, and new markets for their 
products.346  Matters were made worse due to the inability of labour and 
management to resolve their differences without costly work stoppages.  With 
no sign of the strikes slowing down, the future of big business appeared 
uncertain. 
          Fortunately for the business community, the changing political climate 
of the post-war period provided a lifeline for corporate America.  According to 
Godfrey Hodgson, the fortunes of conservative America following the Second 
World War is a story of revival after the near collapse of the movement during 
the New Deal years.347  In 1946, the Republicans recaptured control of both 
houses of Congress during the midterm elections for the first time since 1930 
and proceeded to pass a solid portfolio of anti-New Deal legislation.  The most 
notable piece of legislation passed during this time was the Labour 
Management Relations Act of 1947, more commonly known as the Taft-
Hartley Act after its sponsors Senator Robert A. Taft and Representative Fred 
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A. Hartley Jr.348  This was a bold effort to weaken the pro-labour Wagner Act 
of 1935, which was a significant cause of corporate grievance during FDR’s 
New Deal era.  In the words of Taft himself, the Act intended to ‘restore justice 
and equality in labour-management relations.  It was not new law, but a 
revision of elaborate and existing laws such as the Wagner Act . . . which were 
so one sided.’ 349   Whilst the Act reserved the rights of labour unions to 
organize and bargain collectively, it introduced a range of measures that 
limited union power, including the outlawing of closed shops; a ban on 
secondary, sympathy, and jurisdictional strikes or boycotts; and an advanced 
notice of 60 days before the commencement of a strike.350 
       Predictably, the Taft-Hartley Act produced an array of responses from 
those on both sides of the argument.  The conservative business community, 
with the help of the NAM, threw its full strength behind the bill with an intense 
lobbying campaign alongside expanded PR activities to garner public support.  
According to Fones-Wolf, the NAM alone spent $3 million in a propaganda 
effort that included full page advertisements in 287 daily newspapers from 193 
key industrial centres.351  In 1950, Harry Millis and Emily Brown argued that 
the NAM used ‘typical propaganda methods of appealing slogans, half-truths, 
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misrepresentation, as well as failure to disclose real motives.’352  Its efforts 
were aided by a compliant right-wing press, such as the Quincy Record of 
Illinois which printed the bi-weekly talks of Henry J. Taylor, a GM -sponsored 
radio commentator.  Capitalising on public fears of radicalism as the Cold War 
heated up, Taylor labelled the opponents of the Act as ‘Communist fellow-
travellers’ who weakened America by ‘sponsoring false economic 
doctrines.’353  Once the battle had been won, the NAM and its supporters 
positioned themselves on the high-ground and reached out to labour, calling 
for a ‘good-will’ approach.354  This was undoubtedly a tactic to rally the support 
of workers in the aftermath of the Act by presenting management as having 
their best interests in mind. 
       In analysing the opposition from the left, Samuel Rosenberg claims that 
the viewpoints of organised labour did not receive the same exposure as those 
of the business community.  Unions did not have the financial resources to 
purchase extensive newspaper advertising, nor did their efforts contain the 
level of sophistication as those from big business. 355   Regardless, the 
concerns of labour were heard.  In an article in Time magazine, labour leaders 
branded the Taft-Hartley Act as the ‘slave labour bill.’356  This notion was 
adopted almost immediately and became the focus of cartoons and cover art 
in Communist party literature.  
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On the left: Pioneer Publishers, the publishing arm of the Socialist Workers 
Party, printed this pamphlet in July 1947.  On the right: The West Coast 
newspaper of the Communist Party (U.S.A.), Daily People's World, published 
this pamphlet in 1948.357 
 
Meanwhile, the CIO accused the sponsors of the Act of attempting to commit 
the ‘Perfect Crime’ whilst plotting to destroy labour unions.  CIO president, 
Phillip Murray, claimed the law constituted an ‘unprecedented challenge’ to 
American workers and called upon organised labour to pledge that it would do 
‘everything within our means to wipe the infamous Taft-Hartley Act from the 
statute books.’ 358   Their fight was supported by President Truman who 
attempted to veto the bill and by many local politicians such as the mayor of 
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New York City, William O’Dwyer.359  Despite its lack of funds, the support for 
labour, alongside its own propaganda campaign, indicated that the Left still 
possessed a powerful voice that potentially threatened the authority of 
management and the power of big business after the Second World War.  
Nevertheless, the political and legislative arms of the CIO proved inadequate 
in expanding the welfare state and preventing anti-labour legislation in the era 
of a Republican Congress.360   
          The passing of the Taft-Hartley Act was a success for the business 
community.  After a disastrous interwar period, the efforts of corporate 
propaganda were finally contributing to the rehabilitation of American business.  
This encouraged a continuation of PR campaigns in defence of the free 
enterprise system against the perceived threats of certain ‘isms’; most notably 
Communism.  On 9 October 1947, NAM president Earl Bunting declared war 
on ‘economic gold-brickers,’ claiming that he and the organisation’s 16,500 
members were ready to give ‘the fight of their lives to the travelling salesmen 
of the isms hawking their wares at the factory gates, the schoolhouse doors 
and every crossroad of civilisation.’361  Consequently, the New York Times 
announced a 17.98 per cent rise in automotive advertisements in all New York 
newspapers from November 1946 to November 1947.362  Later in December, 
the NAM announced that it would spend a further $900,000 to expand its PR 
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campaigns throughout 1948.  Its long-term program of presenting the business 
man’s ‘point of view’ was to continue, alongside developing themes that 
included ‘the size and significance of corporation profits and expositions on 
the free enterprise system.’363 
       The defence of the free enterprise system was not just restricted to the 
realm of corporate relations. This was very evident in the continuing 
cooperation between business and religion as well.  Whilst the public fight 
between management and labour was heating up around the Taft-Hartley Act, 
Sloan and Benson were conducting their own battle against the forces they 
felt threatened their economic freedoms.  During the war, Benson – like the 
business community – equated military victory with the triumph of 
Americanism.  Following Allied victory in 1945, however, Benson returned to 
his pre-war concerns regarding the threat of Communism.  This was not a 
difficult transition given the nation’s growing preoccupation with the Cold 
War.364  Amid the witch hunts of McCarthyism, aggressive anti-Communist 
propaganda campaigns, and the defence of the American way of life, Benson 
and his fellow fundamentalists initiated their own attacks against the ‘red 
menace.’  High profile figures such as Billy James Hargis and Carl McIntire 
echoed Benson’s anti-Communist rhetoric, arguing that the Godless ideology 
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of the left was a threat to conservative notions of Americanism.365  For Benson, 
the apathetic and war-weary public was easy ideological prey for what he 
believed to be ‘self-deceived liberals.’  These liberals were at best unknowingly 
introducing socialism into the government and, at worst, knowingly betraying 
the country to a worldwide Communist conspiracy.   
          As such, Benson developed a new mission for the NEP – to expose 
Americans to the potential dangers of Communism.  This ‘Godless’ ideology, 
he believed, stood as the greatest threat to the nation.  His ardent anti-
Communism characterised the fundamentalist view of un-Americanism and 
preoccupied his thoughts for much of the postwar period.  As was the case 
with China, Benson sought to save America from the clutches of the left and 
this time, it was the free enterprise system that was his Gospel and the motion 
picture his words.  Overt themes of anti-Communism were not always central 
to the Fun and Facts series, but the perceived threat from both domestic and 
international socialism was certainly amongst the main motives behind its 
production.  Not only would the series enlighten the American voter, but it 
would also reinforce the legitimacy of private property over a feared 
alternative; mirroring the efforts of the NAM.  By combining the positive 
attributes of the free enterprise system with anti-Communism, the NEP could 
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take advantage of the efforts, skills, and monetary support of big business and, 
in turn, educate their employees with Benson’s own brand of Americanism.366 
 
Producing the Fun and Facts Series 
          With the continued popularity of the motion picture, the most effective 
method for confronting the American public during the post-war period was 
through the use of film.  As such, Benson was eager to capitalise on the 
newfound respectability of the educational short film to disseminate his ideas 
to a wider audience.  His plans to do so materialised before the war had come 
to an end, echoing the level of preparedness seen within the business 
community.  On 19 March 1945, Benson’s close business associate Clinton 
Davies drafted a memorandum detailing the discussion between the two on 
the developments of post-war education.  Davies noted ‘the possibility of 
securing an instructor from the army who would develop the use of visual aids, 
cartoons, and other special methods of educating people with low intelligence 
that have been used so successfully by the army.’ 367   Davies had paid 
attention to the successful use of film as a training method for the armed forces 
and looked to apply the same techniques in educating the average American 
worker, who he evidently considered to be of ‘low intelligence’.  He continued, 
‘I thought we could train our students in the use of these methods for educating 
workers in their plants on the fundamental economic principles which 
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determine their ability to make a living.’368  However, Davies believed that 
promoting these ideas, alongside the development of educational business 
courses, would be difficult if Harding College was to remain in Searcy, 
Arkansas.  To him, Harding was more likely to succeed in the realm of 
business if it moved to a prime location in Little Rock. 
       The location of Harding, however, proved to be somewhat irrelevant.  
Benson’s reputation as a leading defender of the free enterprise system had 
provided him with a list of influential business contacts that would make his 
venture into educational films a success.  According to Hicks, Benson had 
consulted with Walt Disney during the war on the possibility of producing an 
economic cartoon series that advertised his agenda of Americanism.  This was 
not an area of interest to Disney at the time, even though he had his own fight 
with labour and the left, and so he steered Benson in the direction of his former 
studio executive, John Sutherland. 369   Sutherland had left his position at 
Disney in September 1940 and produced training films for the armed forces 
during the war.  In 1945, he opened his own animation company, John 
Sutherland Productions, and found immediate success producing the Daffy 
Ditties series for United Artists.  By the time Fun and Facts appeared on the 
big screen, Sutherland was producing approximately twenty films a year – a 
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rate he sustained for the next two decades.  His output was so impressive that 
at one time Disney considered buying Sutherland’s studio, but the deal was 
never made.  With so much experience, particularly during and after the war, 
Sutherland was the perfect producer for the Fun and Facts project.370 
          The employment of Sutherland also provided the project with a link, 
however distant it may have been, to Disney.  As one of Sloan and Benson’s 
greatest inspirations throughout the making of the series, Disney’s name 
makes a reoccurring appearance despite his lack of involvement in the making 
of Fun and Facts.  On an ideological level, Disney held many of the same 
views as Sloan and Benson following similar experiences during the 
Depression era.  In February 1941, Disney fell victim to the New Deal when 
George Bodle, an attorney for the Screen Cartoonist Guild (SCG), filed 
charges with the National Labour Relations Board accusing the studio of unfair 
labour practices.  After several months of legal and political negotiations 
between the union and the studio’s management, the SCG called for a strike.  
Starting on 28 May, the strike lasted four months ending on 15 September.  
According to Steven Watts, the dispute marked a turning point in the studio’s 
history.371  After a successful decade during the 1930s, an intense atmosphere 
fell upon the company as a result of continuing labour problems.  Disney later 
announced his belief that the strike involved ‘a Communist group trying to take 
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over my artists.’372  His anti-communist sentiment continued into the Cold War 
era, saving his company from the clutches of the House Un-American Activity 
Committee (HUAC).  This anti-Communist rhetoric would have appealed to 
Benson in particular, who would have been eager to employ Disney as the 
producer of a conservative, economic series such as Fun and Facts.  The 
animator also attracted the attention of the project’s team with his status as 
the industry’s leading pioneer.  Disney’s animation was considered among the 
best in the genre as it developed and utilised high-end techniques that 
advanced American animation for decades to come.373  If the Fun and Facts 
project could not recruit Disney himself, and ex-employee was the next best 
option. 
          The date on which Benson first made contact with Sutherland is 
unknown, though a contract was signed between the two men on 27 
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September 1946.  Several weeks later, Sutherland made a visit to Harding to 
explore the activities of the NEP and according to the college newspaper, 
Bison, he greeted Benson’s project with great enthusiasm.374  However, he 
was keen to reiterate the estimated cost of the series, which he projected to 
be $50,000 per cartoon.  This did not deter Benson, for he had already made 
contact with Sloan who had agreed to fund the series.  Hicks gave this brief 
account on the beginnings of Fun and Facts, though for a leading historian of 
Benson and the NEP with access to the Benson Papers at Harding, his work 
provides a limited and misleading interpretation.375   Discussions between 
Sloan, Benson, and Sutherland began long before the signing of the contract.  
On 18 September 1946, Benson wrote to Sutherland with his congratulations 
on ‘the fine job that you have done so far on this production.  If the finished 
product comes through as we now believe it will, in my opinion there is a great 
road before us for additional films to render a national service.’376  Additionally, 
a letter from Sloan to Benson dated 23 September describes how a script for 
the first cartoon, Make Mine Freedom, had already been developed and sent 
to Benson and the Sloan Foundation.377  The foundation provided the funds 
for the series and so all scripts were required to be approved by Sloan and his 
associates before they were put into production.  As Sloan gave Benson and 
Sutherland the green-light, Make Mine Freedom was in the process of being 
animated before the foundation received the contract in December 1946.  
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Evidently, all those involved in the making of the film were eager to have a 
finished product as quickly as possible. 
       These early correspondences reveal the ambitions of Sloan and Benson 
regarding educational films.  In Benson’s letter to Sutherland, it is clear that he 
was already thinking of the possibility of producing further films, before the first 
had even entered production.  Sloan was also interested in this matter.  In his 
23 September letter to Benson, Sloan described his interest in developing their 
ideas further: 
What I would like to inquire – and is much more important 
than this one film – is: - Do you think, or do the people who 
have the film, believe that this type of thing offers a pattern 
for the development of future economic problems, using the 
same instrumentality?  As you of course know, there are all 
kinds of problems that are generally recognised and 
accepted by people who are familiar with such matters which 
are entirely unknown and ignored by politicians and the 
people at large.378 
 
It was the duty of the Sloan Foundation to ‘use its resources . . . to tell the 
simple economic truths to the masses of the people.’  He had, of course, 
attempted to do so through his previous venture into educational films in the 
1930s, yet this time, he had allied himself to an educator who was interested 
in the same objective; to promote the workings of the free enterprise system, 
rather than to create ‘new academic studies involving economic philosophy’ 
and foster academic debate.379  In an era when the nontheatrical film had 
proved to be a powerful pedagogical tool, Sloan’s optimism about his second 
venture into economic films was high.   
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       From Benson’s response, it appears that all parties involved in the 
production of Make Mine Freedom possessed much of the same vision.  
According to Benson, he had spent two years trying to find a solution to the 
problem he shared with Sloan.  The public did not need new facts, he 
suggested, but an understanding of ‘the old fundamental facts to the degree 
that they may be publicly supported.’380  Benson wrote in 1946 that this was 
when he found Sutherland to be ‘very deeply interested in the same matter 
and willing to give his very best to the development of the proper technique.’381  
Although little is known of Sutherland’s background, his son, Eric Sutherland, 
described his father as being a strong supporter of the free enterprise 
system.382  His close relations with Disney supports this claim as Sutherland 
reminisced, ‘Walt complimented me on my work and said he would be glad to 
recommend me for a job or funding prospective animation or live-action films 
I would write or produce.’383  Given Disney’s staunch opposition to the left, it 
is unlikely that he would have upheld his promise if Sutherland’s ideology did 
not suit his own.  As such, Sutherland’s motives for working on Fun and Facts 
were likely more than just monetary.  Under Benson’s direction, he found a 
pattern for the entire series of cartoons in the form of recurring characters.  
These characters could be carried over into other pictures, just as Donald 
Duck had appeared in so many of Disney’s short subjects.  This solution 
satisfied Sloan’s desire to achieve a ‘Disney technique’ in a series that 
showcased the important characteristics of the free enterprise system.  From 
                                                        
380 Benson to Sloan, letter, 5 October 1946, box B-057, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1946, Benson Papers. 
381 Ibid. 
382 ‘Animating Ideas: The John Sutherland Story,’ Hogan’s Alley. 
383 John Sutherland cited in, Ibid. 
 165 
an ideological and thematic perspective, the production of Fun and Facts was 
off to a good start. 
       However, issues began to arise shortly after production on Make Mine 
Freedom commenced.  Whilst all parties agreed with the style and content of 
the cartoons, reinforcing their ideological consensus, priorities soon began to 
differ around the issue of where the boundary line between education and 
entertainment should be drawn.  The first hiccough arose in 1947 over the title 
screen for the first cartoon.  For the Sloan Foundation, having the name of an 
educational institution predominantly featured on the title screen posed a 
significant problem.  On 23 June, Arnold Zurcher (the Foundation’s executive 
director) wrote to Sutherland stating: 
It is our opinion that a statement should definitely be made of 
Harding College’s association with the enterprise.  At the 
same time, we also feel that this emphasis on the College, 
an emphasis which even obscures the title of the film, may 
prejudice distribution . . . If the name of the College appears 
too prominently at the very outset of the film, it will 
immediately label the thing as “educational”.384 
 
As Make Mine Freedom was intended to be an educational picture, Benson 
strongly disagreed with Zurcher.  In his response to Sutherland, Benson 
argued, ‘In my opinion, the fact that it is being produced by a college will give 
it better standing in the minds of the audience than if they didn’t know who was 
producing it and thought maybe it was just a plain commercial picture.’385  
                                                        
384 Zurcher to Sutherland, letter, 23 June 1947, box B-057, folder: John Sutherland 
correspondence 1947, Benson Papers. 
385 Benson to Sutherland, letter, 5 July 1947, box B-057 folder: John Sutherland 
correspondence 1947, Benson Papers.  Benson’s argument here relates to the 
issues of corporate propaganda in educational films prominent during the 1920s 
and 1930s.  Fears of the ideological content of corporate sponsored films, together 
with primary and secondary sources, are outlined in chapter one.  In the immediate 
postwar era, these fears subsided (with the aid of the Red Scare) only to resurface 
in the late 1950s; see chapters four and five. 
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Despite wanting the full address of Harding on the picture (as Harding College, 
Searcy, Arkansas), Benson claimed that he was not concerned about 
advertising the title screen provided for the college.  Rather, he believed that 
‘a small college has a fine a reputation for presenting an unbiased study as 
any organisation in the nation.’386  Benson, however, lost the battle and the 
name of Harding College was placed within a block of text on the opening 
screen.  The conversation swiftly moved on with no further objections from 
Benson showing that the issue did not have a damaging effect on production.  
Nevertheless, it served as a precursor for later conflicts and problems. 
 
                     The finalised title screen for Make Mine Freedom.387 
          Issues concerning distribution continued to cause friction throughout 
1947.  By October, Make Mine Freedom had been fully animated and was 
being shown to select audiences chosen by Benson and the Sloan Foundation.  
                                                        
386 Benson to Sutherland, letter, 5 July 1947. 
 
387 ‘Make Mine Freedom,’ The Internet Archive 
[https://archive.org/details/MakeMine1948], accessed 10 July 2018. 
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Sloan’s own opinion of the film was extremely high.  In a letter to Benson, he 
claimed ‘we have something here that is well worth while and a real 
contribution toward the objective that we have in mind.’388  However, whilst 
their overarching objective of spreading the positive aspects of the free 
enterprise system remained the same, their motives for doing so appeared to 
differ.  From early discussions regarding distribution, there was a consensus 
that the film should exploit channels of primary distribution first, before entering 
the secondary channels.389   There was an agreement that the film would have 
the widest impact if shown in the cinemas, where it could reach large 
audiences.  Yet once Make Mine Freedom was ready for release, cracks 
began to show in the partnership between Sloan and Benson.  On 11 
December, Sloan wrote to Benson arguing:  
There is very definitely a conflict here between the interests 
of Harding College and the interests of promoting the 
maximum distribution of this particular picture and others that 
we hope to follow. 
          We have in the theatrical audience an estimated 
coverage of 30-35 million people and I am sure that is 
something that has got to be recognised as a very valuable 
possibility in the big objective we have in mind of presenting, 
in a simplified form, a fundamental economic truth.390 
 
Sloan’s concern regarding distribution arose from Benson’s continuing 
emphasis on education.  In a previous letter to Sloan, Benson argued that ‘it 
is in the interest of the film program itself that it be kept as definitely an integral 
                                                        
388 Sloan to Benson, letter, 29 October 1947, box B-057, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1946, Benson Papers. 
389 Primary channels of distribution relate to the release of a film through the 
cinema.  Secondary channels are those exploited after, or instead of, theatrical 
release and involve the distribution of a film through classrooms, workplaces, civic 
centres, etc. 
390 Sloan to Benson, letter, 11 December 1947, box B-057, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1946, Benson Papers. 
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part of the Harding College program as possible.’391  However, this caused a 
direct conflict with earlier plans to have the film shown in cinemas; especially 
since a contract with MGM had already been finalised.  A film could not exploit 
both channels of distribution at the same time, meaning that Make Mine 
Freedom would be tied to MGM for two years.  Benson attempted to ease the 
tension almost immediately, assuring Sloan that their objectives remained the 
same.  On 24 December 1947, he wrote ‘I am unable to see any conflict at this 
point whatsoever.  The only objective Harding College had in mind is maximum 
distribution.  If maximum distribution is to be obtained through theatrical 
distribution, then that is our No. 1 ambition.’392  Despite this, Benson dedicated 
the last three paragraphs of his letter to his hope that MGM would release 
Make Mine Freedom for secondary distribution after one year.  Evidently, 
Benson’s key interest in Christian education remained strong, as he later 
reminisced to his successor Dr Ganus. 393   Though he recognised the 
significance of having the film released in the cinema, Benson’s main objective 
was to have it distributed through schools, workplaces, and spaces of 
communal gatherings.  This was typical of an educator, just as Sloan’s desire 
for nationwide, cinematic success was typical of America’s corporate 
conservatives.  
                                                        
391 Ibid. 
392 Benson to Sloan, letter, 24 December 1947, box B-057, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1946, Benson Papers. 
393 Benson’s devotion to Christian education was a top priority, as outlined in 
chapter two.  In Benson’s own words: ‘My chief concern . . . throughout all of these 
years has been in Christian education . . .  I have considered it worthy of my total 
dedication’, found in: Benson’s notes, undated, box B-001, folder: Autobiographies, 
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       Sutherland’s response to both issues was one of distant sympathy.  In a 
possible bid to keep the peace, he said he could see both sides of the 
argument.  His position changed, however, when production began on the 
second film of the series, Going Places.   In ‘Fun and Facts About American 
Business: Economic Education and Business Propaganda in an Early Cold 
War Series’, Caroline Jack argues that ‘over the course of the Fun and Facts 
project, Sutherland and the other parties involved in the films’ production 
struggled to craft a highly persuasive media product with wide popular appeal, 
one that balanced education and political indoctrination against entertainment 
and humour.’394  Her conclusion is derived from an issue concerning the 
balance of education and entertainment within the films that followed Make 
Mine Freedom.  Whilst MGM enthusiastically distributed Harding’s first film, 
the company was unimpressed with the script of Going Places and refused to 
showcase it in their theatres.  On 9 July 1948, Zurcher expressed his 
disappointment to Sutherland and discussed their plans moving forward, 
stating: 
Following Loew’s [MGM] decision . . . we held a rather 
extensive conference in this office on the future of the whole 
picture program.  We all feel that every effort should be made 
to insure theatrical distribution for the remaining films if that 
is at all possible.  Lowe’s have indicated that they have no 
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objection to exhibiting the films of this type provided there is 
sufficient entertainment value . . . By entertainment value 
they mean specifically humour. 
To improve prospects . . . the question has been raised 
whether it would be possible for you to develop some sort of 
liaison with MGM whereby they might have an opportunity to 
see the storyboard and sketches before they are ‘shot’.395  
 
For Sutherland, the suggestion of having another company interfere with his 
work was insulting.  He immediately fired off a response to Zurcher in which 
he argued that it was difficult to determine in what matter he could work with 
MGM, writing ‘I appreciate Loew’s offer of a cooperation to help me determine 
theatrical release quality or subject matter, but I do not think that the production 
of the finest cat and mouse cartoons [Tom & Jerry] necessarily means their 
boys would be of any help creatively or intellectually to our organisation.’396  
He would, however, be happy to show them two cartoons that were created 
by Disney for propaganda purposes – to provide them with knowledge on how 
propaganda pieces should work, which would help in their planning decisions.  
       His discussion with Benson on the matter was much more reserved.  It 
provides a window into Sutherland’s primary concern, which was closer to that 
of Benson than to that of the Sloan Foundation.  In his 16 July letter to Benson, 
Sutherland explained how they had previously discussed the complexities of 
maintaining a balance between entertainment and education.  In this instance 
Sutherland argued, ‘if humour over-balances education in the type of film we 
are producing the audience is apt to be confused and miss the educational 
                                                        
395 Zurcher to Sutherland, letter, 9 July 1948, box B-057 folder: John Sutherland 
correspondence 1948, Benson Papers. 
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point entirely.’  Furthermore, he reiterated that it was his job to ‘use my 
craftsmanship to help you attain your objective as to my knowledge you are 
the only capable man in the United Sates doing a completely unselfish job in 
educating the American people in the imperative necessity of maintaining 
political and economic freedom.’397  Sutherland’s response to this issue shows 
his desire to produce a film series in which the main objective was to educate, 
rather than entertain.  This was the only time throughout the production 
process that Sutherland appears to have taken a definite position in support 
of one or other side of the corporate-evangelical/educational alliance that 
underwrote Fun and Facts – and, in this case, he stood with Benson. 
       Although managing the relationship with MGM was a significant matter, 
since it potentially affected the main objective of the series, it was swiftly 
resolved.  Without much further discussions, the Sloan Foundation agreed to 
release Going Places through secondary distribution channels and provided 
the funds for Harding’s third cartoon, Meet King Joe.  Furthermore, Sutherland 
remained in charge of producing future scripts and storyboards without 
interference from MGM, who upheld their contract and released the rest of the 
Fun and Facts series through their cinemas.  Even the cartoons which 
contained very little humour, such as Albert in Blunderland, met with little 
resistance; which was a surprise to Sloan who claimed it was ‘supercharged’ 
with propaganda.398  
          Whilst the issue concerning a lack of humour in Going Places was a 
problem with the animation arm of MGM, it is possible that the propagandistic 
                                                        
397 Sutherland to Benson, letter, 16 July 1948. 
398 Sloan to Benson, letter, 2 December 1949, box B-058, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1949, Benson Papers. 
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and patriotic stance of the series as whole resonated with the top echelons of 
the studio.  Louis B. Mayer, the co-founder of MGM, was a staunch Republican 
who shifted the company evidently to the right throughout his period of 
management (1924 – 1951).  According to Steven J. Ross, Mayer turned MGM 
into a publicity wing of the GOP and provided a training ground for future 
conservative activists such as George Murphy, Robert Montgomery, and 
Robert Taylor.399  He was also the chairman of California’s Republican Party 
in 1932.  Mayer’s conservative ideology infiltrated MGM’s motion pictures, as 
did his Puritan values.  As Scott Eyman explains, under Mayer’s leadership, 
the studio’s productions were ‘clean and wholesome.’400  ‘I worship good 
women, honourable men, and saintly mothers,’ Mayer would intone.401  Both 
Sloan and Benson publicly shared Mayer’s strong adherence to conservative 
values and support for the Republic Party; positions that were highly visible in 
the series.   
          Mayer’s conservative influence over MGM culminated in the formation 
of the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals (MPA) 
in 1944.  Together with some of the studio’s most right-wing conservatives – 
directors Sam Wood and Clarence Brown, writer James McGuiness, and set 
designer Cedric Gibbons – the MPA announced its frustration with the 
‘growing impression that this industry is made up of, and dominated by, 
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Communists, radicals and crackpots’ and pledged to ‘fight Fascist or 
Communist control or any other non-American control of our unions, our guilds, 
our personnel, and our products.’402  Interestingly, the FBI found that 200 of 
the organisation’s initial 225 members worked at MGM.403  In the immediate 
postwar era, the MPA urged HUAC to investigate Communist infiltration in the 
film industry.  MGM, confident in its anti-Communist position, released a 
number of anti-Communist films throughout the latter half of the 1940s, 
including Conspirator  and Red Danube (both released in 1949).404  The 
combination of conservative values and staunch anti-Communism within MGM 
provided the Fun and Facts team with the perfect studio to distribute its 
cartoons.  If its support from MGM’s animation department was to dwindle, 
Sloan and Benson could have easily appealed to the ideological leanings of 
the studio’s management.  It is, perhaps, due to its conservative nature that 
the remainder of the series was accepted by MGM despite confrontations over 
its entertainment value.   
       The fact that these three potentially deal-breaking issues were resolved 
quickly shows that although cracks did appear in Sloan and Benson’s 
partnership, the desire to educate the public in the workings of the free 
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enterprise system was strong enough to keep this partnership together.  
However, the differing ambitions of Sloan and Benson represented their 
respective positions within the wider society.  On one hand, Sloan, a pioneer 
of the automobile industry, wished to target the wider public in order to 
showcase the positive attributes of the free enterprise system to an audience 
that had the power to shape the reputation – and with it the economic well-
being – of big business.  Benson, on the other hand, looked to concentrate on 
particular groups of society, especially students.  Advertising the free 
enterprise system was just one aspect in his larger plans in the development 
of Christian education.  Despite these differences, Sloan and Benson, together 
with Sutherland, achieved their objective of producing an economic, 
educational film series that celebrated the free enterprise system.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Selling Free Enterprise Through Animation 
 
 
In the spring of 1948, MGM orchestrated the theatrical debut of Make Mine 
Freedom, the first in the Fun and Facts series.  As a result, more Americans 
were exposed to Sloan and Benson’s ideological efforts than at any other 
stage in their careers.  They released the Fun and Facts cartoons one after 
another to the public through cinemas, workplaces, schools, and community 
centres.  The content of these ten-minute shorts, which have long been 
neglected by scholars, offered the audience an education in the basic 
economic facts of the free enterprise system, and instructed viewers in 
patriotism, consumerism, and anti-Communism in the midst of the Cold War.  
In analysing these themes, this chapter will move away from the political 
tensions of the postwar period to focus, instead, on the economic ideology of 
conservative America as portrayed in the Fun and Facts series.  Revealingly, 
the messages conveyed by the series are strikingly similar to other 
propaganda efforts, particularly those from the corporate world, and so the 
themes of the cartoons will also be addressed.  Through the use of high-end 
technicolour, Sutherland’s productions, argues Amid Amidi, were among the 
‘most visually satisfying industrial films produced during the 1950s.’405  As 
such, Fun and Facts offered a distinct interpretation of postwar economics 
through the use of animation, characterised by praise for the free enterprise 
system and ardent anti-Communism. 
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       The production of the Fun and Facts cartoons added to a growing 
multitude of economic propaganda produced during the postwar period.  Much 
of this reminded Americans of their fortunate position in the wake of the 
Second World War and ultimately called on them to protect it.  America’s 
wartime economy ushered in a new age of prosperity, ending the Great 
Depression and replacing it with unprecedented growth.  By 1947, the gross 
national income had risen to 202,598 million dollars following a steady climb 
during the war, whilst the gross national product, recorded between 1945 and 
1969, increased by a staggering 250 percent.406  This striking economic upturn 
was a blessing to the many businessmen, wage earners, white-collar workers, 
professionals, and farmers who feared and expected a postwar recession or 
depression.  The boom meant that things would mostly go well with regard to 
demobilisation of the armed forces and shutdowns in defence industries and 
prevent unemployment, deflation, and bankruptcy.407   
       After the economic fluctuations in the decades following the First World 
War, these fears were not wholly unjustified, nor did they immediately 
disappear in the wake of the postwar boom.  The postwar years were an 
uncertain period. The 1946 strike wave posed a risk to production output as 
two, albeit minor, recessions occurred in 1945 and 1949.  There was a swift 
contraction of government spending, equivalent to an estimated 30 percent of 
national income between 1945 and early 1946, and inflationary pressure 
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followed the termination of wage and price controls.408  Nevertheless, the 
feared slump never materialised.  Instead, Michael French argues that a 
‘virtuous cycle’ was established through ‘the revival of a pattern of high levels 
of investment, technological change, and productivity growth.’409  This cycle, 
alongside a newly skilled workforce (largely due to the GI Bill), underpinned a 
rise in real incomes between 1945 and 1969.  As a result, the majority of 
Americans prospered within a newfound ‘Consumers’ Republic’ that offered a 
rise in living standards and increased spending power.410 
       Sloan and Benson did not fear the possibility of a postwar economic 
downturn.  Unlike his counterparts at Ford Motor Company and the Chrysler 
Corporation, Sloan believed that the nation would witness a boom in the 
economy which, in turn, would revive the automobile industry and re-establish 
GM as one of America’s top corporations.411  Benson’s predictions were less 
clear.  However, both he and Sloan shared the same faith in the free enterprise 
system.  If a depression were to materialise, Sloan argued that the US ‘would 
still have more than any other people in the world because of the free 
enterprise system.’412  Benson agreed, claiming ‘Our private enterprise system 
even [in a depression] gives us more than other countries enjoy . . . even 
during the thirties which represented America at her worst, we still were living 
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better than the masses of the people in any other country of the world at their 
best.’413  Fortunately, attempts to convince the public of this proved to be less 
difficult than it had been in the 1930s and 40s given that morale was high and 
the economy strong.  
 
Depicting Free Enterprise  
       To educate the public about this newfound prosperity, Sloan and Benson 
agreed that they needed to present the basic economic ‘truths’ relating to the 
free enterprise system within the Fun and Facts series.  In the early days of 
the project, Benson wrote to Sloan and offered his full support, reiterating that 
it was not new facts the public needed, but an understanding of existing 
economic philosophy.  Consequently, a number of the Fun and Facts cartoons 
were solely related to the workings of the economy in which several aspects 
were to be explored.  The 1948 production, Going Places, was the first cartoon 
centred on the economy in the series (though the second to be released).414  
Originally titled, The Profit Motive, Going Places focuses on the industrial 
growth of protagonist Freddy Fudso; a young boy who wanted to spend his 
childhood having fun but is forced to help make soap to support his mother.  
When dreaming of how he would rather spend his time, Freddy stumbles 
across the idea of the profit motive.  The cartoon described this as the process 
of an increased work effort in a bid to maximise profits, giving Freddy more 
time to pursue his hobbies.  The fruits of Freddy’s hard work were shown 
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immediately.  Before long, the audience witness the rise of his business, titled 
Fudso Soap Co., and the direct influence his efforts had on the community.  
Here, Going Places resembles the NAM’s 1940 live action short, Your Town: 
A Story of America, which showcased the positive impact of industry on the 
development of a small town. 415   As Freddy’s business grows, it brings 
transportation, new companies, and more workers to the community.  The 
property taxes from these businesses feed money back into the local economy 
providing better schools and roads, as well as governmental services such as 
a police force.  As the narrator proudly announced, ‘when business is profitable, 
it benefits everyone.’ 
       As well as showcasing all the good that businesses did, Going Places 
also touches upon a negative aspect of industrial growth.  Once Freddy is an 
established businessman, he is approached by a competitor who encourages 
him to join forces and form a monopoly.  In doing so, Freddy and his new 
associate seek to control the market and fix the price of soap at a higher rate 
to increase profits.  Here, Fun and Facts introduces a long-standing issue that 
has been a source of conflict between the government and big business 
throughout the modern era. In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, or An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints 
and Monopolies. In outlawing practices considered harmful to consumers, the 
Act stated that 
Every person who shall monopolise, or attempt to 
monopolise, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolise any part of the trade or commerce 
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among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanour.416 
 
This enabled the federal government to curtail the power of business during 
periods of corporate concentration and inequality. 417   Anti-monopoly 
sentiments also provided the government with a line of attack against business 
during the Depression, aided by low public opinion of large corporations.  In 
his 1936 re-nomination acceptance speech, President Roosevelt devoted 
much of his time to addressing the problem of ‘industrial dictatorship.’418  He 
claimed that ‘throughout the nation, opportunity was limited by monopoly’ and 
that these new ‘economic dynasties, thirsting for power, reached out for control 
over Government itself.’  To combat this threat, Roosevelt placed Thurman 
Arnold at the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.  In 1938 
Arnold wrote ‘An Inquiry into the Monopoly Issue’ that employed the 
propaganda tactics of big business.  In connecting the division’s work directly 
with people’s lives, Thurman argued that corporate monopolies were ‘a tax on 
the public and a threat to democracy,’ illustrating his point with a drawing of a 
policeman keeping the road to opportunity clear from a stream of workers, 
farmers, and small businesspeople.419 
       With such intense attacks on monopolies occurring during the 
Depression era, it is unsurprising that the issue makes an appearance in Going 
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Places.  Fun and Facts attempts to use criticisms of monopolies to its 
advantage by agreeing with public values on the subject.  After Freddy enters 
a monopoly with a rival company, the fortunes of Fudso Soap Co. rapidly 
deteriorate.  Their attempt to fix prices fails after new competitors enter the 
market and sell their products at competitive rates.  Not only does the company 
suffer as a result, but Freddy and his associate find themselves at the mercy 
of the law.  The narrator chimes in, explaining that ’99 times out of 100, 
competition works!  When it doesn’t, government steps in to prevent 
monopolistic attempts.’  Following government intervention, Freddy learns 
from his mistake and returns to his reputable business practices.   
          Though this sequence made the final cut, not all parties agreed with it 
its inclusion.  On 29 June 1948, Zurcher wrote to Benson with the results of 
an early screening of the cartoon.  He argued that Going Places should show 
that competition is ‘self-regulating and protects against the abuses of 
monopolies’, however, this particular scene claims that ‘if competition does not 
do the job automatically, the government steps in and promotes fair 
competition.’420  This was criticised quite heavily for being, as Zurcher argued, 
‘dramatically weighted in favour of governmental policing’, highlighting the 
anti-governmental stance of the Sloan Foundation in matters concerning the 
economy.421  Sutherland disagreed, claiming that only one person criticised 
the sequence.  Furthermore, despite his conservative economic outlook, 
Sutherland argued that ‘free men must make laws to protect their freedom 
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from combinations of more powerful free men.’422  Benson also disagreed with 
Zurcher.  Though he admitted that he had always been a little uneasy about 
the scene, Benson argued that ‘it does picture a condition that actually exists 
in our country and that I believe the critics would feel [it] ought to be 
represented.’423  If it was not included, critics could rightly label Going Places 
as propaganda created to show nothing but the positive aspects of big 
business, rather than the fundamental facts. 
The disputed sequence showing government intervention in 
preventing monopolies (Going Places 1948).424 
 
       Despite internal disagreements over the need for government 
intervention, Going Places successfully provides a basic explanation of the 
profit motive to its viewers.  In clarifying the objective of the film to Sloan, 
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Sutherland argued that the aim was to ‘dramatise the profit motive in a manner 
which would leave the conclusion in the minds of the audience that the profit 
motive was a good motive, one which contributes to the welfare and the 
happiness of all the people in this country.’425  By emphasising the role of 
business in the wider community and the benefits it provided to its citizens, 
Going Places met the objectives set out by Sutherland and his production team. 
       Following the production of Going Places, the Fun and Facts team 
began preparations for similar films based on different aspects of the economy.  
The next purely economic feature to be released was the 1949 cartoon Why 
Play Leapfrog?426  Featuring one the series’ most recognisable characters, the 
often angry and disgruntled everyman labourer Joe, Why Play Leapfrog? 
explains the relationship between wages and prices.  This was a particularly 
significant area of interest in the postwar period. During the war, wages and 
prices were controlled by the federal government to prevent high levels of 
inflation.  When the cost of living rose by 11 percent in 1942, the government 
reduced it to 1.7 percent in 1944 and 2.3 percent in 1945.427  However, as 
companies converted to producing consumer goods in a peacetime economy, 
the business community was eager to scrap price controls whilst workers 
fought for higher wages.  The 1945-46 strike wave was a ‘wage offensive,’ 
Jack Metzgar argues, as the vast majority of strikes focused ‘purely and simply’ 
                                                        
425 Sutherland to Benson, letter, 3 November 1947, box B-057, folder: John 
Sutherland correspondence 1948, Benson Papers. 
426 ‘Why Play Leapfrog?,’ Internet Archive 
[https://archive.org/details/4050_Why_Play_Leap_Frog_01_37_44_23], accessed 
20 January 2018. 
427 Jack Metzgar, ‘The 1945 – 1946 Strike Wave,’ in The Encyclopedia of Strikes in 
American History, eds. Aaron Brenner, Benjamin Day, and Immanuel Ness 
(London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 218 – 219. 
 184 
on wage increases.428  Prices rose by 16 percent, though wages in durable-
goods-producing industries increased by only 7 percent.429  Consequently, the 
CIO and AFL demanded a rise in wages without an increase on the cost of 
consumer goods, yet companies insisted this could not be done.  For example, 
GM’s Auto Workers union leader Walter Reuther issued a strike demand for a 
30-cent wage increase without an increase in car prices.  He challenged GM 
to ‘open the books’ to prove it could not afford the raise, though the company 
declined to do so.430   As Metzgar argues, American unionists thoroughly 
understood how a pay increase could be eaten away by a rise in the cost of 
living.431 
       Interestingly, the simultaneous rise in wages and prices was also 
rejected by some in the business community.  After giving a speech to 
businessmen during the time of the 1945 GM sit-down strike, Benson was 
dismayed by the lack of understanding on the matter by those in the audience.  
In a letter to Sloan, dated 5 October 1946, he described how he had made the 
statement that if wages went up thirty percent, the price of an automobile 
would increase by the same amount.  Upon returning home, Benson received 
a letter from one of the businessmen arguing that his claim was ‘absurd and 
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that no informed person should make such a statement and that anyone 
should know that labour was only a part of the cost of an automobile.’432  In 
response, Benson stressed  
if wages went up thirty percent in the automobile industry 
they would go up a similar amount in other fields and coal, 
iron, steel, cloth and everything else that went into an 
automobile would go up until finally the cost of the automobile 
would be forced up as much as wages.433 
 
Sloan was taken aback by the incident, stating that it was ‘extraordinary to me 
how ill-informed representative businessmen are on these simple things.’434  
As such, Benson and Sloan were eager to educate both businessmen and 
members of the public in this matter, culminating in the idea for Why Play 
Leapfrog? 
       To tackle the issue, Why Play Leapfrog? explains how the relationship 
between wages and prices works from an industrial perspective.  Protagonist 
Joe is a dissatisfied labourer in a doll manufacturing plant.  In his appearances 
throughout the series, Joe is always drawn as a stereotypical white working 
class American wearing overalls.  His bright ginger hair, inherited from his 
grandfather, may reflect a possible Irish ancestry as hinted at later in Meet 
King Joe.  This would not be unusual as Benson himself was of Scottish-Irish 
descent and proud of his working class background.  In Why Play Leapfrog?, 
Joe’s unhappiness is a result of an increase in the cost of living that is making 
it difficult for him to make ends meet.  Joe’s luck appears to change when he 
is presented with a pay rise, just in time for his daughter’s birthday.  However, 
                                                        
432 Benson to Sloan, letter, 5 October 1946, box B-057, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1946, Benson Papers. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Sloan to Benson, letter, 9 October 1946, box B-057, folder: Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation correspondence 1946, Benson Papers. 
 186 
when he hurries to the store to buy his factory’s popular product, the Dilly Dolly, 
he discovers that the price has increased from $1.50 to $2.00.  Outraged, Joe 
cries ‘I work in the factory that makes this doll! Two bucks is too much.’  When 
the manager explains that the Dilly Dolly Company charged them extra for the 
shipment and so they had to raise the price of the product, Joe argues ‘We got 
a wage increase alright, but it couldn’t raise the price that much!’  He then goes 
on to list the cost of the doll’s raw materials in relation to the retail price before 
storming out of the store.435 
       From here, the narrator explains the situation to Joe.  He acknowledges 
that Joe is correct in his estimates on the cost of raw materials, but stresses 
that ‘raw materials in practically everything we buy are worth little until labour 
transforms them into finished products.’  In relating to Benson’s statement, the 
narrator uses the example of the automobile industry to explain how the 
production process influences a product’s final cost.  Although the raw 
materials amount to $22, they require the ‘accumulated labour of thousands 
of people in countless crafts to transform them into a finished automobile.’436   
       The following sequence then goes on to describe how the labour and 
wages in each industry involved in the production process affects the price of 
the product.  Automobile companies must take into account the miners who 
dig the coal and iron ore, railroad workers who transport the materials to the 
steel mill, the workers who convert the ore into finished steel, and so on.  When 
the factory receives the materials, the labour and the wages of those who 
make the car must also be taken into account.  To offer the audience accurate 
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statistics in this process, and to provide some authenticity to the cartoon, 
Benson hired a researcher to gather precise information on the making of an 
automobile which he then sent to Sutherland.437  In these calculations, the 
labour costs of an automobile amounted to 80 percent of selling price.  The 
remaining 20 percent covered the cost of raw materials and various industrial 
profits.  As a result, ‘a wage raise means a corresponding rise in prices.’ 
       This cycle could be broken, however, if productivity increased 
proportionately.  To achieve this, the narrator claims that labour and 
management must work together to produce new ideas and to advance 
technology.  Only then could a wage gain amount to a real change, allowing 
workers to buy more with what they earn.  The message that Sloan and 
Benson were eager to disseminate then, was that workers would benefit from 
increased productivity through cooperation with management.  In the absence 
of cooperation, wages and prices would continue to play leapfrog.  Such 
propaganda carried great weight during a time of growing labour/management 
hostilities and following one of the largest strike waves in American history. 
       Why Play Leapfrog? was not the only cartoon in the Fun and Facts 
series to cover this timely issue.  In 1951, Harding released its sixth film, Fresh 
Laid Plans, which focused on the broader topic of government intervention 
through the fixing of wages and prices, as well as the introduction of farming 
subsidies.438  Set in the charming village of Eggsville, the film features a 
professorial owl who attempts to solve an upcoming economic problem 
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amongst the population of chickens.  The whole village relies on the production 
of corn, both as a food source and as the main manufacturing product in the 
local factory.  Consequently, when the farmer’s crop fails, the shopkeeper is 
forced to raise the price of corn which has the potential to disrupt the whole 
village.  The owl then steps in with a ‘plan index’, claiming to be an expert in 
regulating the law of supply and demand.  By fixing the price of corn and 
reimbursing the farmer through subsidies collected from taxes, the village 
remains prosperous and the owl is placed in a government post where he has 
‘all the powers and stand-by controls needed to plan what was best for 
everybody.’439 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
The owl explains his plan to fix the shopkeeper’s price of corn and   
provide the farmer with subsidies (Fresh Laid Plans, 1951).440 
 
 
       However, the system begins to fall apart when the businessman finds it 
increasingly difficult to meet the tax demands of the government.  As a result, 
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the company raises the price of corn which causes a string of events to unfold; 
the sale of corn decreases; profits decline; workers are laid off; and local 
businesses suffer.  When the owl tightens government control by fixing prices 
and reducing workers’ wages to enable the factory to pay tax, the chickens 
are forced to buy produce from the black market.  After the townsfolk are 
imprisoned, the local policeman realises he will not be paid and opens the 
prison gates, allowing a mob to chase the owl out of town.  
          The use of a professorial owl offering advice on economic policy 
signifies the Fun and Facts team’s disdain for the New Deal through a 
representation of anti-intellectualism.  Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt 
was often ridiculed as a ‘Brain Trust ruled Dictator’ due to the involvement of 
intellectuals in the New Deal administration.441  In 1932, one of Roosevelt’s 
advisors, Samuel Rosenman, urged the would-be President not to rely, unlike 
his predecessors, on the nation’s industrialists, financiers, and political leaders 
who had ‘failed to produce anything constructive to solve the mess we’re in 
today.’442  Instead, he encouraged Roosevelt to turn to the universities.  In 
doing so, Roosevelt enlisted a group of Colombia Law professors to offer their 
advice on the continuing financial crisis.  Adolf Berle, Raymond Moley, and 
Rexford Tugwell formed the core of Roosevelt’s first brain trust and were 
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instrumental in shaping the policies of the Frist New Deal, including the 
regulation of bank and stock activity, large scale relief, and public works 
programs.  According to Aaron Lecklider, the brain trusters quickly became 
pop culture celebrities, ‘inflecting intelligence with a hint of glamour.’443  As one 
journalist wrote in 1933, ‘Bookstores are selling [brain trust professors’] books 
like hot cakes.’ 444   This popularity and visibility of the brain trust offered 
Americans a unique opportunity to evaluate their relationship with experts, 
their understanding of intelligence and its relation to labour, and their own 
relationship to government and intelligence.445 
          However, not all Americans supported the existence of Roosevelt’s 
brain trust.  Debates surrounding academic involvement in government policy 
were prominent throughout the decade with three themes appearing most 
frequently in the vigorous criticism of intellectuals: that they dominated the 
administration; they gave it a radical orientation; and they lacked the required 
governmental experience.446  At times, their brand of ‘radicalism’ was labelled 
Communistic or socialistic, adding to existing remarks concerning Roosevelt 
and the far-left.  As the New York Times reported, these attacks intensified 
after Tugwell released a book comparing Communistic and capitalistic schools 
of thought, based on the thesis that Russia had proved a planned economy to 
be possible.  ‘Critics of the administration,’ the article wrote, ‘leaped upon it 
with glee.’447  In 1934, Dr William A. Wirt, a well-known midwestern educator, 
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publicly accused the brain trust of plotting a Communist revolution in the 
United States.448  The group responded with an article in the New York Times, 
with Berle claiming that ‘President Roosevelt is not the kind of man who follows 
advice.  He is not the kind of man to let his advisers run the show.’  He also 
emphasised that Roosevelt, ‘called in men who are supposed to have special 
knowledge about particular subjects and asked them for plain statements of 
fact.’449  Berle’s words, however, were ignored by the New Deal’s staunch 
opponents, as was the public knowledge that Roosevelt sought advice from a 
variety of different individuals and organisations, including those within the 
business community.  Instead, critics chose to stir up anti-intellectual 
sentiment that grew substantially in the postwar period with fears surrounding 
McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare.  As Richard Hofstadter notes, anti-
intellectualism became a familiar part of the national vocabulary of self-
recrimination and intramural abuse. 450   Sloan and Benson’s respective 
positions as a corporate conservative and an anti-Communist, Christian 
educator would have made them the ideal anti-intellectual candidates during 
the New Deal era and the postwar period.  Individual comments on their 
opinions towards Roosevelt’s brain trust are undocumented, though their 
representation of intellectuals in Fresh Laid Plans speaks volumes.  
          When Fresh Laid Plans was in production, the Fun and Facts team did 
not anticipate the backlash their cartoon on government intervention would 
receive.  As Caroline Jack argues, the response from agricultural circles was 
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immediate and severe.451  The cartoon caused a particular controversy in the 
midwestern farm belt where one St. Paul, Minnesota, newspaper editor 
branded it a direct attack on the Brannan Plan and a ‘political weapon in farm 
issues.’452  Named after the Secretary of Agriculture, Charles F. Brannan, the 
plan was remarkably similar to the one implemented by the owl in Fresh Laid 
Plans.  In its proposal, the government sought to provide farmers with 
subsidies in order to keep the cost of produce at an affordable rate for 
consumers, without it affecting the agricultural community.453  As the cartoon 
was released only a year after the plan was defeated in Congress, it is 
understandable that many saw Fresh Laid Plans as a satirical piece that 
opposed the allocation of government funds to farmers in need of financial 
stability.  The backlash was so widespread that the New York Times covered 
the controversy in an article published on 18 March 1951.  The article quotes 
the St Paul Pioneer Press editor, Alfred D. Stedman, who labelled the cartoon 
as ‘a one-sided political editorial in pictures – a clever attempt to use the 
movies to sway public opinion on a hot political issue affecting farming.’454  
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Commenting on the controversy, Sutherland claimed that the cartoon was not 
aimed at the Brannan Plan, but was an ‘attempt to point out the impossibility 
of planning our lives from a central authority.’455  He continued, ‘we were 
advocating that people should control themselves, on an individual, local basis.  
The cartoon was not aimed specifically at the farm belt or the Brannan Plan.’  
In defending his actions, Sutherland offered a rare public statement of his 
conservative views concerning government intervention in the economy. 
       Despite heavy criticisms, the Fun and Facts team was unfazed by the 
response of Fresh Laid Plans.  Both Benson and Zurcher agreed that all 
parties handled the backlash well.  On 24 April, Zurcher wrote to Benson 
saying that they managed to pull it off, ‘partly because of your acumen and 
astuteness and partly because the other side did not have all the facts when 
they started “shooting.”’456  In addition, the New York Times article generated 
interest in the cartoon from companies that now wished to screen it for their 
workers.  Upon hearing this, Zurcher wrote of the shared attitude amongst the 
team in that ‘the publicity concerning this cartoon has been, on balance, 
beneficial.’457  Nevertheless, the negative press surrounding Fresh Laid Plans 
did highlight an important aspect of the series.  The May 1951 edition of 
Educational Screen warned educators to be wary of ‘free films’ such as those 
released by Harding.  In an attack on Fresh Laid Plans, the article echoed the 
fears of the 1920s and 30s by arguing that ‘You can be sure there is purpose 
behind every “free” film, and practically always that purpose is to the direct or 
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indirect advantage of the sponsor’. 458   Evidently, concerns surrounding 
propaganda in educational films resurfaced in the postwar period and in the 
case of Educational Screen, critics placed the blame on cartoons from the Fun 
and Facts series.459  
       The one-sided nature of the economic cartoons by Fun and Facts 
highlights the propaganda of the series.  Whilst this may have been subtle to 
viewers watching films such as Going Places and Why Play Leapfrog?, it 
became more pronounced in the anti-Communist features of Make Mine 
Freedom and Albert in Blunderland.  As Benson was a staunch anti-
Communist, having witnessed the violent power struggles in 1920s China and 
viewing the red menace as Godless, it is unsurprising that the subject makes 
an appearance in the series.  The timing was ideal, with the ideological battle 
of the Cold War providing the perfect opportunity for the Fun and Facts team 
to produce such propaganda.  Anti-Communist sentiment swept the US in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War when the alliance between the 
East and West disintegrated.  With the US unable to strike directly at the 
Russians, the most vigilant patriots focused their attention on the home 
front.460  Fears of domestic Communism heightened and as a result, American 
culture was politicised.  Under the watchful eye of the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities (HUAC), members of the entertainment industry faced 
particular pressures.  As Tony Shaw argues, in the battle for mass opinion in 
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the Cold War, there were few weapons more powerful than the cinema.461  The 
Second World War had demonstrated the power of the moving picture and its 
effectiveness in disseminating particular ideologies whilst criticising others.  
With this in mind, HUAC began a large-scale investigation into the political 
leanings of those within the film industry to prevent ‘subversive’ messages 
reaching the public.462  By imposing political standards upon its art, Stephen 
Whitfield claims that the United States ‘came to resemble, rather 
uncomfortably, the sort of society to which it wishes to be contrasted.’463 
       Therefore, whilst the postwar period marked a golden age of film 
production, it is simultaneously regarded as ‘its darkest hour’.464  During the 
late 1940s and into the early 1950s, scores of producers made dozens of ‘red 
baiting’ films to avoid the risk of having their careers ruined by accusations of 
Communist subversion.  As such, this period witnessed a tidal wave of anti-
Communist film releases with titles including The Red Menace (1949), I Was 
a Communist for the FBI (1951), Invasion U.S.A. (1952), and the later Invasion 
of the Body Snatchers (1956) and The Blob (1958).465  Of course, not all anti-
Communist films were produced out of fear of repercussions from HUAC.  The 
Fun and Facts series stands as a prime example of this, as do later films 
produced by John Sutherland Productions for companies such as the 
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American Petroleum Institute.  The 1957 film Destination Earth bares great 
resemblance to Harding’s anti-Communist cartoons in comparing the 
ideological differences between the US and USSR; using the example of a 
Martian race (the Russians) overthrowing its regime after witnessing the 
freedom of those living on Earth (the US).466   
       The US government also produced its own films such as the 1950 
feature titled Communism; an Armed Forces Information Film that provided a 
historical overview of Communism, whilst showing how communists operated 
inside the US.467  This was followed by the production of The Big Lie (1951) 
that likens the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union, China, and North 
Korea to Nazism.468  Interestingly, very few anti-Communist cartoons, if any, 
were released during the early 1950s outside of the Fun and Facts series, 
although the CIA were instrumental in the production of the British release of 
George Orwell’s Animal Farm. 469   Nevertheless, the production of anti-
Communist films was a serious business given the potential of the moving 
picture to shape public opinion during the Cold War.  Though many in number, 
each film shared a similar objective; to attack Communism in order to present 
the American way of life as superior in comparison to that of Eastern Europe. 
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As such, Fun and Facts’ anti-Communist cartoons fit comfortably into a 
culture consumed by fears of subversive influences and threats to civil liberties.  
Its first film, Make Mine Freedom (1948), introduces these themes by 
contrasting American society with the harsh realities of a Communist 
dictatorship.470  To begin, the narrator introduces the fundamental freedoms 
that are pertinent to the United States.  These include: the freedom to choose 
one’s own job; the freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble; to own 
property; the right to vote; and to worship God in one’s own way.  Despite 
these freedoms, the citizens of the US are disgruntled.  Here, Make Mine 
Freedom introduces a number of characters, all of whom represent groups 
that held particular grievances in the postwar period.  The labourer and 
businessman fight amongst themselves, just as management and trade 
unions clashed in the 1945-46 strike wave.  The politician claims to be neutral, 
whilst the farmer complains of the lack of aid from all parties alluding to a need 
for subsidies.  To solve these conflicts, a foreign salesman appears and offers 
the warring parties a new product, ISM, that will ‘cure any ailment of the body 
politic.’  The labourer would be given higher wages, shorter hours, and job 
security.  For the businessman, there would be increased profits and zero 
strikes.  Meanwhile the politician would be given full governmental control and 
the farmer, lower costs and even perfect weather all year round.  In exchange, 
the characters would be required to give up their freedom, as well as the 
freedom of future generations. 
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The contract for ISM, taken directly from a scene in Make Mine 
Freedom.471 
 
       In forgetting the importance of their freedom, all four parties eagerly line 
up to sign the contract.  They are stopped by John Q. Public, a character who 
has the best interests of the public in mind.  ‘Sure’, he says, ‘our system of 
free enterprise isn’t perfect, but before we throw it away . . . let’s turn the clock 
back a few years to see what it’s done for us.’  From here, the audience is 
shown a scene that is characteristic of the Fun and Facts series.  Similar to 
the story of Freddy Fudso and his soap company in Going Places, Make Mine 
Freedom describes the growth of an automobile business from a small 
establishment in John Doakes’ garage to a large-scale corporation.  This 
growth, the narrator claims, is made possible due to the freedoms bestowed 
upon US citizens thanks to the free enterprise system.  The views of Benson 
and Sloan are prominent here as the narrator continues, ‘even in the 
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Depression wages bought more food, clothing, travel, and entertainment than 
the wages of all the other people in the world.’472   
       After reminding the characters of the progress that freedom allows, 
Make Mine Freedom deviates from the other economic cartoons of the series 
by introducing overt themes of anti-Communism.  John Q. Public encourages 
the others to try ISM and in doing so, they witness the realities of a Communist 
state.  The labourer faces unfair working conditions and is unable to strike, 
whilst the businessman and farmer lose their property to the state.  Those who 
resist, such as the politician, are placed in state concentration camps.  Upon 
facing these grim scenarios, all five characters chase the salesman out of town 
and retain their freedom.  The Fun and Facts team wished to impart an 
important message here.  Although the free enterprise system was not perfect, 
its alternative was far worse. 
       The inclusion of anti-Communist themes in Make Mine Freedom did not 
guarantee its success, despite the hostile climate of Cold War America.  In 
fact, the propagandistic nature of the cartoon delayed its production with the 
Technicolour Motion Picture Corporation.  John Sutherland Productions 
required Technicolour to produce the 35mm prints for Make Mine Freedom, 
as well as all future cartoons.  However, George Cave, Technicolour’s sales 
manager, was reluctant to do so.  In writing to Benson, Sutherland stated that 
Cave ‘is not a very positive character and is afraid to give us a commitment for 
this work, as he feels we may be doing propaganda films rather than strictly 
                                                        
472 When the topic of the Depression appears in correspondence between Sloan 
and Benson, the two often speak of how America was still in a fortunate position 
compared to the rest of the world as a result of the free enterprise system. 
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public educational films.’473  He suggested that Benson contact the president 
of the corporation directly to alleviate these fears and discuss the objectives 
of the project.  Unfortunately, Benson’s letter to Technicolour is omitted from 
the archive, though contact from Sutherland on 25 January 1947 confirms the 
corporation’s assistance.474  Whilst this may have been a short delay, the anti-
Communist nature of Make Mine Freedom almost jeopardised the cartoon’s 
production with one of America’s largest film companies.  
       If Make Mine Freedom faced difficulties due to the issue of propaganda, 
the Fun and Facts team were certain the same would happen with the fifth film 
in the series, Albert in Blunderland.475  As the name suggests, the cartoon took 
inspiration from Lewis Carroll’s 1865 novel Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 
which Disney adapted into the 1951 film a year after the Fun and Facts release.  
It may also have been inspired by John Kendrick Bangs’ 1907 political parody 
novel, Alice in Blunderland: An Iridescent Dream, in which Alice enters 
‘Municipal Ownership Country’.476   As in Bangs’ novel, the protagonist of 
Albert in Blunderland finds himself in an overtly political world.  It begins with 
a radio presenter describing an economy in which ‘each person produces for 
the welfare of the other’, claiming it will provide workers with innumerable 
benefits.  He likens this system to that of a colony of ants. When the 
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Sutherland correspondence 1947, Benson Papers. 
475 ‘Albert in Blunderland,’ YouTube 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AgOM60BMo4s], accessed 3 February 2018. 
476 In Alice in Blunderland: An Iridescent Dream, Bangs makes light of a range of 
economic issues familiar to his readers. High taxes, corporate greed, bribery, 
institutional corruption, and governmental incompetence are amongst the themes of 
the book.  See, John Kendrick Bangs, Alice in Blunderland: An Iridescent Dream 
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automobile worker, Albert, wishes to see this system, he is hit over the head 
and enters the world of Antrolia.  
       Accompanied by a native ant, Albert begins to explore a world with full 
government control.  He immediately loses his freedom when the government 
provides him with an unsatisfactory job as a state labourer.  When Albert 
complains, the state police intervenes to silence him and his companion.  The 
uncooperative behaviour exhibited by Albert results in the police following the 
pair on their travels to a movie theatre.  Here, the theatre audience views a 
propaganda film that explains the workings of the colony’s system.  Whilst the 
‘planning board’ distributes the nation’s wealth amongst themselves, the lives 
of the everyday ants consist of media censorship, limited consumer goods, 
and forced voting.  When the ant explains to Albert that no one dares vote 
against the board, he is hit over the head by the lurking state police.  To remind 
him of his place.  Following the film, the two head to the state factory for work.  
In the film’s climax, Albert complains of the working conditions and stands his 
ground against the police.  As the cartoon emphasises Albert’s lack of freedom, 
he is taken to the board which sentence him to death by firing squad for 
disobeying the regime.  In panic, Albert awakens from his dream and interrupts 
the radio presenter as his experience in Antrolia leads him to explain to the 
US the dangers of a totalitarian regime. 
       The story of Albert in Blunderland makes this cartoon the most overt, 
propagandist feature in the Fun and Facts series.  As such, there was 
uncertainty as to whether MGM would agree to distribute the film in their 
theatres.  They had previously rejected the earlier production of Going Places, 
arguing that it contained little humour, and so the team held out little hope.  
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However, Albert in Blunderland was met with little resistance.  This was a 
surprise to Sloan who in December 1949 wrote to Benson, ‘I was gratified, as 
you were, to have our next picture received by MGM.  I rather feared they 
would turn it down as it certainly is supercharged with propaganda and shorter 
on comedy than some of our other pictures.’477  He continued, ‘I do not know 
just what their point of view was, but I rather think that even if it was 
supercharged with propaganda, the propaganda is along the lines of what we 
all believe in and, therefore, perhaps it is educational rather than 
propaganda.’ 478   Given the continuing anti-Communist sentiment of the 
postwar period, this certainly could have been the case.   
       By the time Albert in Blunderland was ready for release in 1950, the Red 
Scare had reached its peak.  The initial ‘witch hunts’ conducted by HUAC 
intensified during an era of McCarthyism, a period Richard Fried describes as 
‘the grimmest time in recent memory.’ 479   Obsessions with domestic 
Communism exceeded the actual threat, whilst the fight abroad resulted in 
armed conflict in Korea.  With tensions heightened, it is possible that MGM 
welcomed an anti-Communist propaganda film such as Albert in Blunderland 
with great enthusiasm – either willingly or as a means to avoid questioning 
from HUAC.  Benson, on the other hand, was not so sure.  In a letter to 
Sutherland dated June 1952, he argued that ‘while Albert in Blunderland and 
Fresh Laid Plans were accepted for theatrical distribution, it was my opinion 
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they were chiefly riding on the coat tails of the earlier pictures.’480  Regardless 
of the reason, MGM willingly distributed Albert in Blunderland despite its 
propagandist stance, making it Harding’s second anti-Communist feature to 
be released during a tense period of the Cold War. 
          The most famous Fun and Facts picture, Meet King Joe (1949), also 
contained themes of anti-Communism, however it constituted only a small 
proportion of the cartoon. 481   Instead, the audience was offered an 
amalgamation of all the themes pertinent to the series; the economy and 
freedom under the free enterprise system, consumerism, and anti-
Communism.  As such, Meet King Joe was an important cartoon to the project 
as it portrays every aspect that the Fun and Facts team believed made 
‘America the finest place in the world to live.’482  In this feature, the viewer is 
reintroduced to Joe – the protagonist previously seen in Why Play Leapfrog?  
As Joe rushes out of the factory to enjoy the leisure time his employment 
provides, the narrator introduces him as the ‘King of the Workers of the World.’  
This title is bestowed onto Joe as his wages allow him to buy more consumer 
goods than any other workers from around the globe.  What is it that makes it 
possible for Joe to earn a good living?  As the narrator explains, he is no 
smarter than workers in other countries, nor stronger than those in other lands.  
The disgruntled Joe claims that it must be because he is an American.  Whilst 
this is true, there is a deeper meaning that stretches beyond nationality.  The 
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narrator explains this to Joe, arguing: ‘Sure being an American is great, but 
how could you be superior to any foreigner when you or your folks might be 
any one of a dozen different races or religions?’  He continues, ‘So if you’re 
no Superman, it must be the American way of doing things that makes you the 
luckiest guy in the world.’  To the Fun and Facts team, being an American was 
simply not enough. It was the freedom of the free enterprise system that made 
Joe, and every other American, the luckiest worker in the world. 
       When the film explained ‘the American way of doing things,’ the 
audience is shown a familiar sequence that reappears, in one form or another, 
in the majority of Fun and Facts cartoons.  Again, we are taken back to the 
1800s, a turning point in industrial development, where Joe witnesses the work 
of his great-grandfather.  The narrator explains to Joe that his ancestor was 
required to work longer hours for little pay, due to the lack of technology.  When 
the American people invest capital into businesses, new tools are developed.  
Joe’s grandfather is then able to find another job in his industry that offers 
higher wages for fewer hours of work.  The cartoon then fast-forwards to the 
present where Joe himself is able to produce one thousand times more than 
his ancestor which, in turn, provides him with even greater wages and more 
leisure time.  This is made possible by the freedom granted in the United 
States by the free enterprise system. 
       The economic conditions of an American worker are then compared to 
that of a Chinese labourer, introducing themes of anti-Communism.  Whilst the 
minds of the everyday American were consumed by the Communist threat 
from the USSR, the conditions of China remained an important topic for 
Benson.  As a missionary, first and foremost, Benson’s attachment to the far 
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east remained strong throughout the remainder of his life.  Although he left 
China to take up the presidency of Harding, his desire to save the country from 
the ‘perils’ of Communism did not diminish.  The 1945 messages of Benson’s 
Looking Ahead! column reiterate his hopes to convert China to a democratic 
regime.  In one such piece he argued:  
Quashing Hirohito’s dream of a great empire will not finish 
the United States’ job in the Orient.  Chinese, 450 million of 
them, already are holding out imploring hands toward 
America.  Most of them don’t know what they need but this 
fact only tightens our obligation because we do know what’s 
good for them.  They need the diet on which America grew 
strong.483 
 
This essential ideological diet, described by Benson, consisted of Christianity, 
free enterprise, and protection for investments.  ‘Since the year one,’ he 
claimed, ‘China has had everything but a chance, so it had nothing.’484  These 
feelings towards China proved influential in the making of Meet King Joe.  In 
comparing the two workers, the narrator explains to Joe how a lack of 
investment in Chinese industry affects its people.  Without capital for new tools, 
the Chinese worker makes ten cents a day moving ten gallons of kerosene, 
one hundred miles over ten days.  An America railroad worker, however, is 
said to earn $10 a day by delivering 100,000 gallons of kerosene in two hours 
by train.  According to the narrator, ‘the average railroad worker has the benefit 
of a $20,000 investment in equipment. The Chinese “coolie’s” equipment is 
worth only ten cents.’  Therefore, it is investments that help to make American 
workers fortunate whilst a lack of capital hinders those in other countries.  
Benson hoped to remedy this situation in China by appealing to the good-will 
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of his country.  ‘Will China be a good place for Americans to invest money in 
the postwar years?’ he asked.  ‘Will it be a good frontier for adventurous young 
Americans to enter as industrial pioneers?  Both these questions have the 
same answer . . . We will prosper with China.’485  With this in mind, the 
comparative sequence within Meet King Joe was not only an attack on 
Chinese Communism, but also evidence of the harsh conditions placed upon 
Chinese workers without appropriate investments.  Americans, on the other 
hand, were once again reminded of their fortunate position, made possible by 
the freedom of private enterprise.  
A comparative scene involving a popular racial stereotype of a 
Chinese labourer and an American railroad worker, Meet King Joe.486 
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       The second half of Meet King Joe introduces themes of consumerism.  
As in Going Places, the cartoon highlights competition as a necessary 
component of the free enterprise system, providing consumers with the finest 
goods at a low price.  For Benson, emphasising the importance of competition 
was essential to the series as he argued that 'In high schools today, many 
students are being told that competition is bad, that it will force wages down 
and therefore, be detrimental to workers.’487  Meet King Joe set out to prove 
that this was not the case, claiming that industrial progress was largely the 
result of the competitive struggle between companies to conquer the market 
and increase profits.  According to the picture, a rise in profits meant workers 
received higher wages and increased spending power, allowing them to 
purchase more consumer goods.  This, in turn, enabled companies to spend 
vast sums of money in the production of new goods to be sold at lower prices.  
This was the cycle of America’s postwar consumer culture in which goods 
yielded a stream of satisfaction.  In Pursuing Happiness, Stanley Lebergott 
argues that some movies prove to be boring; books, dull; automobiles, 
unsatisfactory.  Yesterday’s purchase may be thrown into today’s trash, yet 
consumers continued to spend in ‘pursuit of happiness’.488  Knowing this, the 
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Fun and Facts team sought to educate the public in the reasons behind their 
newfound consumer spending and by extension, defend the free enterprise 
system.  Meet King Joe’s narrator proudly claims that the ‘American way of 
doing things’ allows more people to buy their own homes.  Whilst they formed 
only 7 per cent of the world’s population, Americans owned 50 per cent of the 
radios; 54 per cent of the telephones; 92 per cent of bathtubs; and practically 
all the refrigerators in existence.489  To maintain this consumer paradise, the 
narrator argues that capital must continue to invest in new tools and 
technology, whilst competition produces new products at lower prices.  Only 
then could Joe remain ‘the King of the Workers of the World.’ 
       Unlike Why Play Leapfrog?, research to support the consumer statistics 
within Meet King Joe are missing from the archives.  Consequently, these 
figures may have been exaggerated to convince Americans of the benefits the 
free enterprise system after the turbulent years of the Great Depression.  
Nevertheless, Meet King Joe does highlight the unprecedented growth of 
America’s postwar consumer culture.  According to Lebergott’s research, 95 
percent of homes owned a radio during the 1950s whilst the percentage of 
televisions increased exponentially from 9 per cent in 1950 to 87 percent in 
1960.490  In addition, 94 per cent of households contained electrical lighting in 
1950, an increase of 15 percent from the previous decade.491   
          Home ownership also rose as Americans left their rented urban 
properties to move to the suburbs.  In 1940, 43.6 per cent of American owned 
their own home.  This increased to 55 percent in 1950 and by a further 6.9 
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percent in 1960.492  The ability to own property was aided by the creation of 
the Veterans Administration (VA) mortgage insurance program as part of the 
GI Bill.  This program was intended to reward veterans by allowing them to 
obtain mortgages with low down payments, whilst simultaneously stimulating 
housing market construction. 493   However, figures within this programme 
reveal a startling aspect of American consumer culture and, by extension, the 
intended audience of Meet King Joe.  As a child of the Consumer Republic, 
Lizabeth Cohen recalls the absence of ethnic minorities in her suburban 
neighbourhoods, claiming there were only a handful of highly educated 
Taiwanese immigrants but no African Americans.494  Statistics on mortgage 
characteristics in the New York-north-eastern New Jersey Metropolitan Area 
in 1950 confirm this exclusion.  Of the 449,458 mortgaged properties where 
the race of the owner was reported, only 1.7 per cent belonged to ‘non-
whites’.495  African Americans could afford to buy their own homes, but finding 
mortgages and properties proved to be difficult.  As Cohen argues, the VA 
channelled resources through private banking and real estate interests 
meaning that African Americans were excluded from the promise of mass 
home ownership.496  Therefore, it is important to remember when watching 
these films that not all Americans benefitted from the free enterprise system 
the Fun and Facts series celebrates.   
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          It is likely that cartoons such as Meet King Joe were produced for, and 
made successful by, a specific group of people.  The white, middle-class men 
that dominated the postwar Consumer Republic.  Notably, the characters 
throughout the Fun and Facts series are distinctively white and 
overwhelmingly male.  When the narrator in Meet King Joe explains to the 
protagonist that being an American does not immediately make him superior 
to any ‘foreigner’, as he and his family may come from a dozen of different 
races or religions, the non-American characters that appear alongside Joe are, 
again (and rather astoundedly), all white.  Consequently, there is a very 
obvious lack of ethnic minorities in the series.  When a non-American, non-
European, character does appear – such as the Chinese worker – the 
animators employ the use of racially charged imagery to separate the 
protagonist from the foreign ‘otherness’ of Chinese ethnicity and the 
Communist regime.   
          The series also excludes the role of women in America’s postwar 
consumer culture.  The 1950s witnessed a rise in female consumer habits with 
an increase of 400 percent in targeted advertisements between 1945 and 
1960.497  Peacetime employment rates grew rapidly with 40 percent of all 
women over the age of sixteen holding a job by the end of the decade, 
providing an independent income and higher purchasing power.498   Even 
those that remined in domestic roles within the family enjoyed increased 
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participation in the growing consumer culture through a boom in household 
appliances aimed at the nation’s homemakers.  As Vice President Richard 
Nixon explained in the famous ‘kitchen debate’ in Moscow, ‘In America, we 
like to make life easier for women.’499  The products intended to do so brought 
women into America’s purchasing scene.  However, just as the series ignored 
the nation’s rich ethnic and cultural heritage, Fun and Facts glosses over the 
role of women in the free enterprise system.  In doing so, the series mirrors 
pervasive notions of normative whiteness in both American industry and 
Protestantism.  As members of these groups, Sloan and Benson used the 
series to emphasise their belief that it was the white, male American worker 
that possessed the ability to maintain the free enterprise system, excluding 
both ethnic minorities and women. 
 
Style and Substance 
       In regards to the content of the series, many would find the topic of the 
free enterprise system a potentially dull subject for a film series.  With ten-
minutes of economic explanations aimed at both adults and children, the Fun 
and Facts team required a means of presenting the economy in an interesting 
fashion.  Their solution was to use animation, a medium that witnessed an 
unprecedented growth during the war as a powerful propaganda tool that 
influenced the masses.  The defining features of animated shorts, the vibrant 
colours and slapstick comedy, offered producers an entertaining technique in 
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which they could disseminate important political messages.  Sloan and 
Benson witnessed the wartime success of large animation studios and sought 
to replicate their methods, particularly those of Disney, to produce a series that 
would attract attention of both adults and children alike. Their priority 
throughout the project was to educate as many Americans as possible and, 
as other artists had proved, animation provided a way to attract viewers from 
across a broad spectrum.  Furthermore, animation had a longstanding 
reputation of providing viewers with entertainment.  By utilising this medium, 
Sloan and Benson believed they would revolutionise economic education by 
making the process more ‘fun’, hence the name of the series.500 
          The date of the initial decision to use animation for the series is unknown, 
however it was a long-standing area of interest for Sloan who had intended to 
speak with Walt Disney about the matter for ‘many years.’501  GM itself had 
experimented with the use of stop motion animation in its 1939 production 
Round and Round, alluding to Sloan’s desire to move away from the traditional 
live-action motion picture that had failed to attract the public’s attention during 
the interwar years.  His attitude towards the series’ success, however, was 
rather tentative in its early stages.  Benson and Sutherland, on the other hand, 
were confident in the use of animation for Fun and Facts.  In speaking with 
Zurcher, Benson argued that ‘The fact it is technicolour and is of the Disney 
style cartoons will in my opinion immediately make it very popular.’ 502  
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Sutherland shared Benson’s optimism, believing they were ‘on the threshold 
of a new medium of education regarding the American way of life.’503  These 
attitudes continued to grow as each cartoon found success in either primary 
or secondary channels of distribution.  
       After being turned down by Walt Disney, Sloan and Benson approached 
John Sutherland Productions to produce the Fun and Facts series.  Sutherland 
Productions specialised in nontheatrical animation produced primarily for 
wealthy corporate conservatives.  In an interview with Disney historian Jim 
Korkis, Bill Scott, a former voice actor, writer, and producer at the company, 
described his employment under Sutherland: 
I wrote institutional, educational, and just plain propaganda 
films for big businesses like GM, DuPont, AT&T, Union 
Carbide, and the American Petroleum Institute.  I wrote 
apologies, excuses, descriptions.  We did TV commercials 
and industrials.  These were in essence didactic films: films 
to persuade, films to impress.504 
 
Scott’s experiences here represent the company during its golden era of the 
1950s.  In its humble beginnings, the studio partnered with ex-Disney lyricist 
and screenwriter Larry Morey for a six-part series of entertainment shorts.  
Titled the Daffy Ditties, these films were inspired by George Pal’s Puppetoons 
series by its use of puppet animation alongside Technicolour.  The series 
proved to be unpopular, forcing its distributor United Artist to cancel the project 
after only six films.  From here, Sutherland and Morey parted ways; Morey 
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returned to Disney and Sutherland focused his attention on industrial films.505  
The Fun and Facts cartoons marked the next series to follow Daffy Ditties, 
steering Sutherland Productions down the path described by Scott.  Later 
propaganda titles included those such as A Is for Atom (1956), sponsored by 
General Electric; Destination Earth (1957), for the American Petroleum 
Institute; and Rhapsody of Steel (1959), for U.S. Steel.506 
       Although Sutherland’s films shared similarities in both their sponsors 
and their messages, the style of the cartoons varied widely.  According to Amid 
Amidi, Sutherland generally kept his distance from the design and animation 
process, preferring to focus his attention on the story and script.507  This 
provided his animators with unlimited creative freedom.  As former employee 
Eyvind Earle recalled, ‘I was the absolute boss.  I never had to check with 
anybody or show what I had done to get it approved.’508  As a result, each of 
Sutherland’s stand-alone films have their own distinctive look depending on 
the artist.  This was not the case, however, for a series such as Fun and Facts.  
For these cartoons, the style remained similar with little changes to character 
design.  In keeping in line with Sloan’s request for a ‘Disney technique’ in which 
characters would reappear throughout the series, several figures showed up 
in more than one cartoon.  This seemed to satisfy the demands of Sloan and 
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Benson who, when criticising storyboards, focused more on the script rather 
than the sketches or animation. 
          To enhance his animation with the use of colour, Sutherland relied on 
the methods of the Technicolour Corporation.  The bright, bold colours of the 
Technicolour process became a hallmark for both live-action and animated 
films during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s.  When this technology was first made 
available in 1916, it was limited to a two-colour system of red and green.  As 
a result, early Technicolour films carried a washed-out, dull coloured effect 
that was, nevertheless, impressive for its time.  The turning point in 
Technicolour’s colour system came in the early 1930s with animation pioneer 
Walt Disney.  The company had been experimenting with the use of a full-
colour system and required an animation studio to ‘prove the process beyond 
any doubt’.509  It was first used in Disney’s Silly Symphonies series for the 
1932 production of Flowers and Trees.  Both Disney and its distribution 
company United Artists approached the use of colour cautiously, fearing it 
would incur unreasonable costs during a time of economic hardship.  The film, 
however, was a success and became the first animated production to win an 
Oscar later that year.  The positive reaction to it changed the course of the film 
industry as Roy Disney argued, ‘we feel that colour has added so much to the 
Symphonies that we are convinced it would be wrong to consider any other 
course.’ 510   After Disney’s success, Technicolour’s new system extended 
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throughout Hollywood and was used in both live-action and animated features 
from studios such as RKO, Warner Bros., and MGM.511 
       By the late 1940s, Technicolour’s full-colour system was heralded as the 
finest colour technology in the film industry.  As a result, Sutherland grew 
concerned when Cave refused to commit to the Fun and Facts series due to 
issues regarding the propagandist nature of the cartoons.  Although this 
situation was remedied by Benson’s appeal to Technicolour President Herbert 
Kalmus, the series faced a string of delays as a result of the company’s 
popularity.   Nevertheless, Sutherland continued to defend its use: 
Technicolour is still far behind schedule in processing and we 
do not anticipate an answer print on the first Harding College 
picture until June 15th at the earliest, and we may not get a 
delivery until July 15th.  However, after seeing the other 
16mm colour processing that is on the market today I believe 
it is wise to wait to get the best, which today is 
Technicolour.512  
 
If the Fun and Facts cartoons were to stand out amongst a growing market of 
animation, the project had to meet the picture quality of the industry.  As such, 
Sloan, Benson, and Sutherland patiently awaited the finished prints from 
Technicolour to ensure their animation received the best, bold colours the 
industry had to have offer. 
       Alongside the brightly coloured animation, humour was also a staple of 
twentieth century American cartoons.  In the early days of animation, 
emphasis was largely placed on physical comedy, or ‘slapstick’ gags, given 
                                                        
511 For further information on the history and use of Technicolour, see Steve Neale 
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512 Sutherland to Benson, letter, 21 April 1947, box B-057, folder: John Sutherland 
correspondence 1947, Benson Papers. 
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that most films were silent until the late 1920s.  As prevalent features of 
comedic animation, these gags had the potential to become dull and repetitive.   
In response, writer and producer Dave Fleischer introduced gags with a focus 
on anthropomorphism.513  In the cartoons produced by Fleischer Studios in 
the 1920s and 30s, automobiles, aircraft, flowers, and even milk bottles came 
to life.  During the 1940s, slapstick gags were often incorporated into ‘chase’ 
comedy made famous by series such as MGM’s Tom & Jerry (1940) and 
Warner Bros. Wile E. Coyote and the Road Runner (1948).  As cartoons grew 
in popularity, these comedic aspects continued to evolve in order to attract 
larger audiences.  Between 1941 and 1954, MGM’s animation unit was led by 
the pioneer animator and director Tex Avery.  Though Avery’s work was aimed 
at a family audience, his humour was often directed at adults with cartoons 
such as Red Hot Riding Hood full of sexual innuendos.514  As the evolution of 
comedy had proved, animation was no longer a genre exclusively for children. 
       With the prevalence of humour in animated films, it is understandable 
that MGM expected a certain degree of comedy from the Fun and Facts series.  
This was more so with Avery at the helm.  However, whilst the Harding 
cartoons do contain humour, they were first and foremost educational pieces.  
As such, the Fun and Facts team once again looked to Disney for inspiration.  
In the mid-1930s, Disney employed specialist gag-men who produced a total 
of 1.5 million jokes by the end of the decade.  Although these gags were 
important to the studio, Disney was more concerned with dignified comedy 
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that would not distract viewers from the overarching story.  As John Mundy 
and Glyn White argue, slapstick gags increasingly gave way to, or were 
contained within stronger story lines and narratives that were designed to ‘elicit 
emotional responses.’515  A similar technique appeared in the Fun and Facts 
cartoons, where the message outweighed the comedic value in importance.   
Very few scenes contain humour.  Those that do focus almost entirely on the 
slapstick genre, for example the golfer in Make Mine Freedom who swings his 
club wildly in frustration, hitting a tree and hurting himself in the process.  Meet 
King Joe uses a number of slapstick gags in its sequence on consumerism, 
making light of how products can be desirable but also frustrating.  For 
example, a snoozing father is rudely awakened by his son playing a loud radio.  
After falling back asleep, he is disturbed by the telephone and throws it out of 
the window only to have it bounce back inside and hit him on the head.  The 
refrigerator is his next attacker, throwing ice at him from the newly installed 
iced compartment.  Though few in number, these scenes were representative 
of the comedy used in mid-twentieth century animation.  Producing cartoons 
that excluded humour entirely was a risk, as evident by the conflict between 
Sutherland Productions and MGM.  Consequently, Fun and Facts was forced 
to inject humour, if only a little, into a series designed to educate, first and 
foremost. 
       As an educational films series that focused on economic and ideological 
matters, Fun and Facts successfully incorporated a range of topics pertinent 
to the free enterprise system.  Its cartoons were diverse, focusing on a 
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particular aspect of the economy or the wider issues of private enterprise and 
the threats against it.  The introductory cartoon, Make Mine Freedom, provided 
the viewer with a glimpse of what was to come by presenting the main themes 
of the series.  Freedom in the economy, consumerism, and anti-Communism 
formed the foundation of the series and provide a backdrop for specific themes 
concerning wages and prices, competition, and government control.  
Interestingly, the cartoons did not shy away from particular forms of 
government intervention, despite protest, in scenes such as those found in 
Going Places.  Although the Fun and Facts team were against government 
intervention, they remained true to the economic system they were trying to 
defend which, on occasion, required outside influences.  This may have also 
been one of many attempts to silence critics who denounced the series as 
propaganda.  As a project that portrayed unwavering support for a particular 
economic model, cries of propaganda were unavoidable and even 
exacerbated by the anti-Communist pictures of Make Mine Freedom and 
Albert in Blunderland.  In addition, the anti-government intervention cartoon 
Fresh Laid Plans produced a nationwide backlash against the series, 
furthering criticisms of producer bias.  Nevertheless, the series continued to 
produce additional cartoons in a style that closely resembled the Disney model.  
Whilst the Fun and Facts cartoons may appear different to those from Disney, 
the use of animation, reoccurring characters, and controlled humour were 
inspired by America’s leading studio and pioneer animators; culminating in a 
ten-part economic film series that persevered through rising costs and 
negative publicity and continued to be shown for decades to come.  The 
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success of the Fun and Facts series is yet to be determined, though its triumph 
has already been suggested.   
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Chapter Five 
 
‘The Sort of Propaganda That Parents Should Take Their 
Children to See’ 
 
 
The content and style of the Fun and Facts series represented a shift in the 
production of twentieth century animated propaganda that largely contributed 
to the reception of the cartoons.  The rise in the quality of educational films 
allowed Sloan, Benson, and Sutherland to embark on an ambitious project 
influenced by conservative economic thinking.  In the past, such efforts had 
failed to capture public interest.  In a postwar era dominated by motion pictures, 
the success of Fun and Facts had the potential to be far greater than the 
corporate sponsored films of the 1930s and 40s.  The initial viewer reception 
gathered from early screen tests hinted at this success, particularly within the 
world of right-wing business.  In this arena, Fun and Facts was in high demand.  
But could the series influence the general population?  The Fun and Facts 
team fought to place the cartoons in theatres, classrooms, workplaces, and, 
in time, the television sets of the average American home.  To reach a larger 
audience, Harding’s cartoons faced numerous hurdles.  Each production was 
put through a rigorous test in order to appeal to an array of viewers from the 
Sloan Foundation, MGM, and test audiences.  If successful, only then would 
a cartoon reach the wider public where the films were often met with mixed 
responses that included high praise from the right and withering criticism from 
the left.  With such a varied viewership, the Fun and Facts series thrived in 
certain areas whilst it simultaneously failed to win public interest in others.  An 
examination of regional and national responses, together with further analysis 
on the process of distribution and debates over ideological content, will help 
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to determine where the Fun and Facts cartoons succeeded in disseminating 
the conservative economic ideology of Sloan and Benson’s corporate-
evangelical alliance. 
          Before Fun and Facts could be released for public viewing, each of the 
cartoons within the series first needed the approval of the Sloan Foundation.  
Whilst the Foundation’s name did not appear on the credits, its board of 
directors was the dominant force behind the project and could withdraw its 
financial support without hesitation.  The example of New York University’s 
1939 Educational Film Institute stood as a stark reminder of how quickly this 
could happen if the films failed to reach the standards of Sloan and his 
associates.  The EFI closed in 1940 after the completion of only three films.  
Unfortunately for NYU, these films failed to meet the ideological benchmark 
set by foundation director Dr Harold S. Sloan who hoped to bombard ‘the 
American mind with elementary economic principles.’ Naturally, these 
‘elementary economic principles’ were a direct reference to the free enterprise 
system and films that encouraged more nuanced debate, such as those 
produced by the EFI, were swiftly rejected.516 
          Although Harold Sloan’s reign over the foundation came to an end in 
1945, the organisation’s firm stance on economic propaganda did not falter in 
the post-war period.  In 1949, Sloan co-authored A Dictionary of Economics 
with his successor and political science professor Arnold Zurcher.517  Even 
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though this publication was first and foremost a dictionary of economic terms, 
the collaboration between the two signified a shared ideological commitment.  
From the beginning of the Fun and Facts project, Zurcher adopted an 
uncompromising approach to the production process that mirrored his 
predecessor’s handling of the EFI.  On 29 November 1946, shortly after Make 
Mine Freedom entered production, Zurcher contacted Benson to outline the 
foundation’s grievances concerning the proposed contract for the next three 
films.  The contract gave the foundation and Harding College one month to 
discuss the content of the script for Make Mine Freedom before deciding if it 
would be produced.  Zurcher disagreed with this process and raised the issue 
with Benson: 
In the case of these three scripts I think Mr Sutherland should 
agree to give you and us an indefinite amount of time to make 
up our minds . . . We do not believe we should be held down 
to some specific period of a month or two to make up our 
minds to go ahead with production, our opportunity in that 
respect lapsing after that period.  It is my belief that if Mr 
Sutherland does not want to give you an indefinite period for 
making a decision as to actual production of approved scripts, 
or at least a reasonably long period, the contract for writing 
the scripts should not be signed.518 
 
In order to ensure that each cartoon met the ideological standards of the Sloan 
Foundation, Zurcher remained firm with his demands to have an indefinite time 
period in which the scripts could be fully scrutinised and edited if required.  
Sutherland obliged, knowing that the content of the cartoons, and the future of 
the series, was ultimately under the control of the foundation.519 
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          The agreement between Sutherland and the Sloan Foundation enabled 
Zurcher to ensure the quality of the work met his expectations.  It did not 
guarantee the financial stability of the project, nor the release of the cartoons.  
Following a showing of Make Mine Freedom at the foundation’s headquarters, 
Sloan concluded that the Fun and Facts team had ‘developed an interesting 
experiment that looks good’ but emphasised the need to ‘thoroughly test out 
the reaction of others.’  He continued, ‘we must not let our enthusiasm, or 
interest, in the matter prejudice the fact that it is the great mass of people that 
must be satisfied and find the film interesting and instructive, rather than we 
ourselves.’520  Pleasing the Sloan Foundation appeared to be only half the 
battle.  The opinion of the board of directors was paramount for having the 
films released to test audiences.  However, if they failed to grab the public’s 
interest, the project could still be terminated.   
       To measure public opinion, initial screen tests were conducted by 
Benson almost immediately after the completion of a cartoon.  Benson was 
eager to release Make Mine Freedom through both primary and secondary 
channels of distribution as soon as possible, discussing the arrangements of 
test audiences with Sloan shortly after the private screening.  For post-war 
industrial films, such as those within the Fun and Facts series, Elizabeth 
Fones-Wolf argues that businesses were keen to exploit audiences composed 
of a variety of groups and organisations.521  Though the workplace may have 
been the initial target, where millions of workers were exposed to corporate 
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sponsored propaganda, the business community orchestrated economic 
education programs that extended beyond the confines of the factory.  Schools, 
churches, and civic organisations faced a barrage of free enterprise 
propaganda, as whole communities, such as Weirton, West Virginia, 
participated in industrial led ‘Americanism Weeks’ that focused on the 
economy.522  Regardless of the sponsor, the aim of these efforts remained the 
same; to construct a vision of Americanism that emphasised free enterprise, 
individual rights, and abundance. 
          The Fun and Facts team contributed to the targeting of numerous 
groups by organising a varied viewership for their initial test screenings.  On 
23 June 1947, Benson outlined his plan for the series’ first cartoon in a letter 
addressed to Sloan.  After obtaining five or more 35mm prints, he planned to 
supervise a number of showings in order ‘to test public acceptance and to 
obtain constructive criticism.’ The viewers Benson had chosen for the test 
were composed of ‘labour groups, high school groups, college groups, civic 
groups, theatrical groups and theatrical men of influence.’523  His selection 
process, however, does not appear in his correspondence with Sloan and is 
not discussed in other letters with either Zurcher or Sutherland.  The size of 
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the test groups, as well as their locations and gender ratios, are also unknown.  
Nevertheless, the comments gathered reflect a variety of opinions that suggest 
the selection of viewers was an objective process, rather than a subjective one. 
          The initial reaction to the series’ first cartoon, Make Mine Freedom, was 
overwhelmingly positive.  As viewers watched, Benson encouraged them to 
complete a simple questionnaire in order to share their opinions with the Fun 
and Facts team.  These questionnaires outlined the significance of the screen 
tests and informed the participants that their reactions would ‘have 
considerable bearing on the planning of future films.’  The first question, and 
perhaps the most important one, asked viewers if the film helped to explain 
the ‘fundamental pattern of our American economy.’  This was the first of three 
‘yes or no’ questions.  The remaining five questions provided viewers with the 
opportunity to discuss the film in their own words and included prompts such 
as: ‘What is the most definite impression the film leaves with you?’; ‘What 
section of the film did you like best?’; ‘What section did you like least?’; and 
‘Do you think this film and similar ones should have a wide showing?’524  
Unfortunately, the completed questionnaires appear to have been destroyed 
given their absence from the Benson Papers at Harding.  However, individual 
comment cards from these test screenings are accessible.  Those who 
commented ‘very good’, ‘a wonderful idea’, and ‘keep this up’, responded with 
opinions such as ‘very fine and the kind of pictures we need in these trying 
times’ and ‘Great picture.  Should show more of the same thing.  Stop this 
Communism.’  Others remarked on the use of the motion picture directly, 
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arguing ‘I believe you took a simple, sensible way to dramatise a serious 
subject’ and ‘I think this type of film is the greatest force that can be used to 
show the American people what a blessing it is to live in this country.’525  For 
these viewers, the use of film was successful in showcasing the complexities 
of the economy. 
          However, not all viewers agreed that the use of animation was suitable 
for a serious economic educational series.  One participant raised this issue 
on their comment card, writing: ‘The short was very well presented but do you 
think it is a wise subject to put up for entertainment?’526  Attitudes such as this 
highlight a significant hurdle the Fun and Facts team faced in producing 
animation on a serious topic.  Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, theatrical 
cartoons were made, first and foremost, for the entertainment of general 
audiences in movie theatres.527  Although studios such as Warner Bros. and 
MGM produced an array of propaganda films between 1941 and 1945, these 
cartoons were designed to entertain as well as instruct, inform, or persuade.  
For example, the Warner Bros. cartoon Tokio Jokio (1943) is littered with 
exaggerated anti-Japanese racial stereotypes and slapstick humour to appeal 
to wartime audiences and exploit deep-seated prejudice.528  Even Disney, who 
previously limited humour within their cartoons, released an anti-tank rifle 
training film in which they portrayed Adolf Hitler as an idiotic, child-like 
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figure. 529   Consequently, American theatre goers expected high levels of 
entertainment in animated pictures.  Whilst Make Mine Freedom did include 
humour, it was not to the extent to which audiences were accustomed. 
          The age group for audiences of animated shorts was also an issue for 
some viewers who participated in the early screen tests.  Several comment 
cards suggested that Make Mine Freedom was best suited for younger 
audiences, rather than adults.  Such comments included: ‘A splendid subject.  
Should be shown to all school children’; ‘Things of this type are splendid for 
the younger generation’; and ‘As propaganda, it was pretty crude for adults, 
but as an approach – aimed at about age 12 – it was OK.’530  Though slightly 
older, the film did seem to appeal to high school students.  The superintendent 
of Jonesboro High School, Arkansas, praised the feature in a letter to Benson 
in which he described his belief that ‘the picture should be shown to students 
throughout the nation.’531  Although cartoons largely attracted the attention of 
younger viewers, who were also one of the target audiences for the Fun and 
Facts series, the genre was far from a child-only category of entertainment by 
the late 1940s.  As Michael Shull and David Wilt argue, the animation industry 
could not afford to make only ‘kiddie’ cartoons during the height of film 
production as this would have severely restricted the genre’s appeal: to 
Saturday morning matinees in neighbourhood movie houses.532  Cartoons 
were an integral part of virtually all motion picture theatre programs for more 
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than 30 years (until the demise of the double feature system in the 1960s and 
the broadcasting of cartoons on television) and so animation relied on wider 
audiences that included older generations of viewers.  The Tex Avery cartoons 
produced for MGM are a fine example of how the industry evolved, displaying 
a mix of slapstick comedy that appealed to children and humour concerning 
adult themes that included sex, status, and survival.533  Therefore, it was likely 
that the style of Make Mine Freedom led some viewers to believe that the film 
was most appropriate for younger viewers.  The issue was possibly rooted, 
once again, in the realm of entertainment.  Warner Bros’ animation editor 
Chuck Jones argued that the ‘basic goal in these films [adult cartoons] was to 
make people laugh . . . and we certainly didn’t have children in mind.’534  As 
Make Mine Freedom focussed on a serious topic and contained little humour, 
it deviated from existing themes within adult animation.  Instead, the film 
mirrored educational pieces that were often restricted to the confines of the 
classroom. 
          Questions surrounding the decision to use animation arose directly with 
the Fun and Facts team shortly after the screen tests began.   In a letter to 
Sutherland dated 29 September 1947, Benson shared the preliminary results 
of the screenings: 
The beginning of the results imply that perhaps live action is 
better than cartoons for the message that we are trying to 
impart.  We have checked adult groups, particularly 
educational leaders and leading businessmen nearly all of 
whom seem to think that the cartoons have always been 
used as a means of putting over something funny and that 
they fail to put over a serious subject to the best interest. 
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Though he was keen to point out that these were early comments on the series 
and that ‘the result may look different later’, Benson also noted that it ‘may be 
advisable then to sprinkle in one or two live action pictures and see what the 
result is.’535  Concerned with these comments, as well as the idea of using live 
action films for the purpose of economic education, Sutherland asked Benson 
if the viewers reached this conclusion of their own volition rather than through 
the result of a leading question.536  ‘In every case’, Benson assured him, ‘it 
was volunteered by them . . . Men simply got up and raised the question 
themselves and presented their own ideas to the effect that to them the 
cartoon was always used for comical stuff and therefore, people expected 
something funny when they saw a cartoon and were not prepared for 
considering something serious.’537  With so many comments suggesting a 
failure to educate adults through the use of animation, it is surprising that the 
second cartoon of the series, Going Places, entered production as planned 
and was not pulled by the Sloan Foundation. 
          The survival of Make Mine Freedom, and indeed the rest of the series, 
may be largely attributed to the positive reception received from the oil 
community in Oklahoma City.  In his correspondence with Sutherland, Benson 
explained that none of the 600 oil men who had viewed the film had reached 
the same conclusion as earlier audiences.  Even when this issue was raised 
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with them directly, ‘none of them seemed to think so.’538  Although the overall 
size of the test screenings is unclear, the audience in Oklahoma appears to 
have been one of the largest to witness an early showing of Make Mine 
Freedom.   
          The significance of Oklahoma City to the business community was 
immeasurable, particularly in the realm of oil and mineral resources.  In the 
first half of the twentieth century, Oklahoma was the largest producer of US oil 
alongside the state of California.  Major oil discoveries resulted in an influx of 
workers and the creation of ‘boomtown’ communities that changed the 
economic and social landscape of the area.  It was a phenomenon that 
reached the studios of Hollywood, culminating in the production of films such 
as MGM’s Boomtown (1940) and Walter Wagner Productions’ Tulsa (1949).539  
As Oklahoma was a key industrial region, the reaction from oil workers would 
have provided a much-needed boost for the Fun and Facts team who, despite 
receiving innumerable positive comments on their first feature, continued to 
focus on the issue of animation.  Although individual feedback is unavailable, 
the overall response satisfied the Sloan Foundation.  In a letter to Benson, 
Sloan announced, ‘I am glad to note the favourable reaction . . . it appears 
clear to me that we have something here that is well worth while and a real 
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contribution toward the objective that we have in mind.  I am very well satisfied 
with what has been accomplished.’540  Positive reviews from the Oklahoma 
test screening pleased Sloan and prevented the foundation from reconsidering 
their contributions to the Fun and Facts project.   
          The news that Harding College had produced a pro-free enterprise 
animated short spread quickly from those who had participated in the screen 
tests in Oklahoma and elsewhere.  Almost immediately, the Fun and Facts 
team were bombarded with a string of requests from major US companies 
hoping to screen the film to their workers.  On 12 May 1947, Sutherland 
contacted Benson to inform him that Hal Curtis, vice-president of the Public 
Relations Department at the Shell Oil Company, and Howard Chase, 
executive of General Foods, were keen to attend a showing of Make Mine 
Freedom and make financial contributions to the project if they approved of its 
message.541  General Foods, in particular, was a potentially strong ally for 
Harding College, especially given their shared ideological stance.  The 
company’s top management was extremely active in the NAM and participated 
in nationwide anti-New Deal and anti-labour propaganda.542  Its vice-president, 
Thomas Spates, fought to keep unions out of the business whilst trying to 
improve labour-management relations through PR campaigns.  Like Benson, 
he was a fierce anti-Communist and believed that it was up to management to 
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save the US from the grips of socialism.543  Shell Oil’s and General Foods’ 
reaction to Make Mine Freedom is undocumented but nevertheless, the 
interest these companies had shown was a positive sign for the project.  The 
film attracted the attention of those who shared the same interests and 
economic principles as the architects of the series.  Other companies who 
wished to see the film in its early stages included the American Iron and Steel 
Institute, the Advertising Society, and Sears, Roebuck and Company.544 
 
Primary Distribution Channels 
          Make Mine Freedom appears to be the only film in the Fun and Facts 
series that was subjected to rigorous test screenings.  Whilst there are no 
explanations for this, it is likely that the decision to abandon audience screen 
tests for the remainder of the series was linked to the process of primary 
distribution.  On 7 November 1947, Sloan informed Benson that he had 
contacted MGM regarding the matter and provided the company with a 35mm 
version of the film.545  Although Sloan had continuously utilised the ‘Disney-
technique’ throughout the series, he did not approach Disney Studios to 
enquire of the possibility of releasing the film through its distribution channels.  
During the postwar period, Disney lost its superiority within the animated film 
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genre due to the emerging success of studios such as MGM and Warner Bros.  
Whilst Disney dominated the Academy Awards in the 1930s, MGM swept the 
awards from 1943 to 1946 and again in 1948 (interrupted only by the debut of 
Warner’s Sylvester and Tweetie in 1947).  By the time Make Mine Freedom 
was completed, MGM was the leading animation studio in the US.546   
       After choosing MGM as a potential distributor, Sloan personally 
contacted MGM President Nicholas M. Schenck.  Like Sloan, Schenck was an 
incredibly active president within his company.  According to one of his chief 
assistants, there was ‘no branch of this business he doesn’t know.  He keeps 
tabs on every little thing.  The minute a picture is released, there he is on the 
telephone, the reviews in hand.’547  With such hands-on experience, it was 
said that Schenck could determine immediately whether or not a film would 
‘go over with the public.’548  As such, it is likely that Sloan thought it best to 
contact Schenck directly, rather than approaching the executive of MGM’s 
animation division, Fred Quimby.  The decision to do so was the right call for 
Sloan who was contacted by Schenck himself, only a few days after submitting 
Make Mine Freedom to the studio.  Schenck greatly enjoyed the film, believing 
it was ‘excellent’, and agreed to distribute it throughout its ‘10,000 or so’ 
theatres across the country.549  From here, the Fun and Facts team relied upon 
the favourable reaction of MGM towards all future films, eliminating the need 
for initial screen tests. 
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       Although MGM enthusiastically accepted Make Mine Freedom into their 
distribution channels, all future Fun and Facts films were subjected to intense 
scrutiny to ensure they met the standards of the studio prior to release.  Those 
that did not satisfy the company were discarded and sent to secondary 
distribution, as was the case for Going Places.  Interestingly, Going Places 
was ‘well-received’ by the Sloan Foundation despite fears that it would be 
rejected by MGM.550  According to Sutherland, the foundation’s comments 
following a private screening of the film included: ‘1 – That the animation and 
production were superior to the first picture; 2 – That this picture is a much 
better educational picture than the first one; 3 – That the first picture contained 
more entertainment than the second.’551  Whilst these comments show that 
the film met the requirements of the Fun and Facts team, the same could not 
be said for MGM.   
          The 1940s represented a watershed moment for the company, following 
the employment of Quimby in the late 1930s.  After securing the services of 
animators such as Joseph Hanna, William Barbera, and Tex Avery, all of 
whom produced award winning comedic features for MGM, Quimby had raised 
the expectations of the company to a high standard.552  Audiences expected 
to be entertained when viewing an MGM production, not educated.  The 
company, therefore, rejected Going Places and ‘indicated that they have no 
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objection to exhibiting films of this type provided there is sufficient 
entertainment value in them to warrant their being sold alongside regular 
entertainment films.’  According to Zurcher, this ‘entertainment value’ had to 
do with the humour of the film.553 
          This setback did not deter MGM from distributing any future films, 
providing they met the entertainment standards of the company.  Expectations 
amongst the Fun and Facts team were high after the production of Meet King 
Joe in 1948.  In writing to Sutherland on 11 October, Benson shared his 
thoughts that ‘Meet King Joe is the best picture we have exhibited so far.  I 
think it is better than the first one, Make Mine Freedom.’554  Shortly after, MGM 
agreed to distribute the film in its theatres.  Details of MGM’s private screening 
of Meet King Joe are undocumented.  However, the company did indicate their 
deep interest in encouraging more workers to see the moving picture after it 
exceeded expectations.555  It is likely that the enthusiasm Meet King Joe 
generated amongst the executive committee at MGM secured the release of 
the series’ upcoming cartoons, including Albert in Blunderland and Fresh Laid 
Plans, despite the heavy presence of propaganda.  Unfortunately, MGM’s 
response to these films, as well as the rest of the series, is unknown.  As such, 
the decision to distribute the remainder of the Fun and Facts series is based 
on speculation from the positive reception of both Make Mine Freedom and 
Meet King Joe. 
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       Following the release of a Fun and Facts cartoon, MGM distributed 
comment cards to measure public opinion, much like Benson had done on a 
smaller scale before.  These cards allowed viewers to provide detailed 
responses to the film without having to answer the ‘yes or no’ questions in the 
Fun and Facts forms.  They did, however, remain anonymous and so these 
cards provide very little information on the type of audiences that witnessed 
these films.  If any details were given, they contained only names or initials.   
          Fortunately, statistics on cinema attendance provided by Gallup offer an 
insight into the average American movie-goer of the 1940s.  Reports found 
that the cinema was popular amongst the younger generation with a decline 
in attendance in those above the age of 19.  Despite this, young adults still 
visited the cinema in large numbers with 57 per cent of the US population 
under 30 viewing at least one picture a week.  In regards to class, traditionally 
lower and middle class Americans frequented movie theatres more than the 
upper class did, accounting for 83 per cent of ticket sales.556  With this in mind, 
the Fun and Facts cartoons likely reached their target audiences through the 
cinema as Sloan and Benson aimed to disseminate their ideology to high 
school students and young workers.  Furthermore, since MGM distributed 
comment cards to the general public, rather than hand-picked screen testers, 
the opinions of these viewers tended to be more direct and, in some cases, 
critical.  As such, the comments provided by cinema attendees offer a more 
representative response to the Fun and Facts cartoons. 
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       The response of cinema-goers to Make Mine Freedom continued the 
momentum from the initial screen tests and remained overwhelmingly positive.  
Viewers specifically referred to the use of animation, commenting ‘This way 
this was presented, in cartoon form, will make a greater impression’; ‘Swell.  
More of this in cartoon form’; and ‘The cartoon idea puts the point over much 
better.’557  Very few disagreed with the decision to use animation for the 
purpose of economic propaganda, suggesting that movie-goers were more 
receptive to animated shorts than those who participated in the screen tests – 
specifically in MGM theatres.  Viewers also praised the ideological leanings of 
the film.  MGM received an abundance of comments including: ‘I considered 
the picture excellent in as much as it might help us all to ward off dissension 
in our present government’ and ‘Very fine.  Should be shown behind the iron 
curtain.’558  Theatre managers also raised this issue, claiming that Make Mine 
Freedom was ‘a very good anti-Red short’ and ‘one of the finest pieces of 
propaganda to come out of Hollywood about our way of living.’559  The fact that 
the film was blatant propaganda did not appear to deter these viewers who, 
perhaps due to the postwar climate, believed that more of the same was 
needed. 
       There were, however, more negative comments on the film in general 
compared to those received in the test screenings.  For example, some 
viewers complained that Make Mine Freedom was ‘Lousy’, ‘Hogwash’, and 
                                                        
557 Viewer comments for Make Mine Freedom (theatre), comments, undated, box B-
061, folder: Make Mine Freedom, Benson Papers, pp. 3 – 4.  
558 Ibid, p. 5. 
559 ‘Comments regarding Make Mine Freedom from MGM Theatre Managers’, 
comments, undated, box B-061, folder: Make Mine Freedom, Benson Papers. 
 239 
‘Rather corny and insults the intelligence of the average theatre patron.’560  As 
Avery produced many of MGM’s adult cartoons that featured an abundance of 
mature humour, it was likely that the Fun and Facts series was overtly juvenile 
for some viewers.  This, again, raises the issue of the importance of 
entertainment in theatrical animated shorts, particularly those aimed at adult 
audiences.  As one patron commented, ‘It is a shame that the theatres are 
becoming a method of propaganda instead of entertainment as they originally 
were designed to be.’561  Evidently, audiences remained divided on the use of 
animation for serious subjects such as the economy.  Educational pieces that 
contained little humour were more likely to be found in the classroom, not the 
movie theatre. 
          As was the case with the initial screen tests, viewer comments on the 
remainder of the series are undocumented.  Again, the success of Make Mine 
Freedom may have made any future surveys unnecessary, though it is 
surprising that MGM did not gather data on additional films after the rejection 
of Going Places.  The general release of the series, however, attracted 
attention from larger circles.  Opinions were no longer restricted to the 
comment cards supplied to movie patrons after a showing, but could be found 
in advertisements, magazines, and national newspapers.  The first of these 
appeared in an article published in the Los Angeles Herald & Express on 8 
May 1948 regarding the release of Make Mine Freedom.  The article itself was 
written by George E. Sokolsky, a right-wing radio broadcaster and long-
standing supporter of the NAM.  During his career, Sokolsky was involved in 
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an array of propaganda activities that included consultant services, the drafting 
of booklets or statements, radio broadcasts and transcriptions, and lecturers.  
For the NAM, he delivered a weekly commentary on current economic affairs, 
largely relating to the free enterprise system, that was distributed to 186 radio 
stations during the 1930s.  His efforts greatly supported the NAM’s anti-New 
Deal rhetoric and its vision of the ‘American Way of Life’.562  As such, Sokolsky 
offered nothing but praise for Make Mine Freedom in his 1948 article, arguing 
that it was ‘humorous, colourful, bright, and yet explains why the United States 
is an excellent place to live – in fact a better place than those proletarian 
heavens that are so widely advertised by the seekers of utopias.’  He 
continued, ‘It is propaganda, sure! . . . but it is the sort of propaganda that 
parents should take their children to see, because our children need to know 
beyond doubt that just being an American is a blessing.’ 563   Evidently, 
Sokolsky was the perfect anti-New Deal conservative to endorse Make Mine 
Freedom. 
          The popularity of Make Mine Freedom gained momentum throughout its 
first year of release.  The Motion Picture Herald advertised the contract signed 
between Harding College and MGM during the same week the information 
was made available to the public.  In their February edition, the magazine 
informed its readers of the release date, the timescale for secondary 
distribution, and the plans for further productions.564  Look Magazine also 
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reported on the film, claiming it to be ‘a witty and convincing attack on political 
“isms.”’565  Its founder, Gardner Cowles Jr., shared Benson’s anti-Communist 
sentiments and served as a corporate member of both the Farfield Foundation 
and the Crusade for Freedom.  The aims of these organisations mirrored those 
of the Fun and Facts series: to ‘win the hearts and minds of Americans in the 
ideological struggle against Communism.’566  Similarly, the American Legion 
Magazine claimed that Make Mine Freedom was ‘about the serious world 
problems, Communism vs. Freedom.’567  The popularity the film acquired 
within anti-Communist circles culminated in the Freedoms Foundation award 
that was presented to Benson at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, in 1949.  As a 
right-wing religious organisation, the Freedoms Foundation believed Make 
Mine Freedom delivered ‘a better understanding of the American Way of 
Life.’568  This award, alongside the positive press, proved to the Fun and Facts 
team that their first animated short was a success amongst viewers who 
shared their own political and economic beliefs. 
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          As the first cartoon in the series, Make Mine Freedom received plenty 
of praise from conservative circles.  However, in 1949 the film began to be 
overshadowed by Harding’s third, and most popular, production Meet King Joe. 
For its release, the Fun and Facts team capitalised on the success of Make 
Mine Freedom by hosting a premiere of the film in Searcy, Arkansas, before 
its debut in New York’s Broadway district.  William J. Fox of United Press 
covered the event for the Memphis newspaper, The Commercial Appeal, in 
his 1949 article ‘Searcy Sees World Premiere of Film on US Way of Life.’  
According to Fox, ‘celebrities and newsmen’ were amongst the 6,000 
attendees eager to be the first to see Meet King Joe.  Celebrations followed 
the screening as Fox reported, ‘the high school band played in the streets, the 
town square was dappled with fluttering flags, and a local “King Joe” was 
crowned.’  For this, the town of Searcy ‘did itself proud.’569  The event was also 
covered in another Memphis-based newspaper, The Memphis Press-Scimitar.  
With growing popularity, the article claimed that Benson’s ‘fact-backed 
answers to the threats of Communism and other political and economic 
systems alien to our own will reach a greater audience than ever before.’  On 
28 May, Meet King Joe was released to national audiences, appearing in over 
11,000 theatres in both the US and Canada.  According to the article, the film 
offered viewers a production ‘as full of laughs as any cartoon you ever cackled 
at’ with ‘thick cuts of cold fact.’570  Such coverage provided the film and the 
college with the publicity that Benson had long hoped for. 
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          On 7 July, Benson informed Zurcher of an MGM report that claimed 
Meet King Joe had garnered a much greater response than that of Make Mine 
Freedom. 571   Sloan was surprised to hear this, based on his previous 
assumption that the ‘abstract problems’ within the film would not be suited for 
theatrical distribution.572  Make Mine Freedom, on the other hand, was a 
straightforward anti-Communist feature that viewers were more accustomed 
to seeing after the propaganda bombardment of the Second World War.  
Business Week argued that the success of Meet King Joe was due to the 
perfect balance of education and humour.  In its 16 December 1950 article, 
the publication claimed ‘The reason for this success is simple: The pictures 
are as entertaining as they are educational.  Instead of a drum-beating 
approach to the American free-enterprise system, they take a light-hearted, 
good-humoured view.’  ‘The pictures are frankly propaganda’, the article 
continued, ‘Yet their detractors have been few.’  This was certainly the case 
for both Make Mine Freedom and Meet King Joe.  Positive comments were in 
abundance, yet negative press was scarce.  Business Week argued that there 
were two main reasons for this, ‘1) The pictures deal with facts rather than with 
ideals; and (2) they frankly point out the imperfections in the system without 
trying to justify them.  All parties involved feel that this kind of honesty is the 
only effective way to sell an idea.’573  Benson’s objection to removing scenes 
that did not conform to their ideals, for example that of government intervention 
in the case of monopolies (as seen in Going Places), was the right move.  
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Though there is no evidence to suggest this, it is possible that both Make Mine 
Freedom and Meet King Joe avoided criticism due to the inclusion of scenes 
that highlighted the negative aspects of the free enterprise system.  
          The absence of negative press concerning these two theatrical features 
is unusual.  The Fun and Facts team routinely gathered comments, 
advertisements, and articles featuring their productions, yet there is no 
evidence of public criticism of Make Mine Freedom or Meet King Joe.  There 
was, however, growing disapproval with future releases.  For example, 
Harding’s third theatrical release, Why Play Leap Frog?, was met with mixed 
reactions.  Like the first two pictures, Why Play Leap Frog? was widely 
accepted by those who shared the team’s ideological commitments.  In 1949, 
Benson showcased the existing films at Harding’s Freedom Forum to an 
audience of ’11 men from 21 different states and representing about 50 
different businesses.’574  According to L. Edward Hicks, the Freedom Forums 
were open to a cross-section of American society; but, from the outset, they 
were aimed at, and attended primarily by, middle-management executives 
who came as guests of Harding. 575   Unsurprisingly, these guests were 
representatives of some of America’s largest conservative industries, including 
Republic Steel and General Electric, and so they were ‘very much delighted 
with the pictures.’576  In the postwar period, the Fun and Facts series was an 
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ideal programme for managers to show to their workers, especially as they 
took on the new role of economic education.577  
          Why Play Leapfrog? also appealed to theatre patrons as shown by 
surveys conducted by the Psychological Corporation’s Marketing and Social 
Research Division.  Hired by John Sutherland Productions, the Psychological 
Corporation was a company that ‘rented out’ academics to solve problems 
relating to industry, largely by conducting personal tests.  In 1930, Yale 
psychologist Henry C. Link developed the Marketing and Social Research 
Division to assess public views of corporate clients such as major US steel 
companies, General Electric, Ford, Standard Oil, and AT&T.  Whilst these 
tests appear to be unbiased in their execution, the aim of Link’s work was to 
monitor public opinion and determine the effectiveness of corporate 
propaganda, advising on which tactics to adopt.578  His involvement in the Fun 
and Facts project was minor, with the corporation conducting only one survey.  
Nevertheless, the involvement of an academic with psychological credentials 
offers the report a large degree of credibility. In April 1950, he initiated 
interviews with 200 men and women in the Strand Theatre in Reading, 
Pennsylvania, following a screening of Why Play Leap Frog?  This study was 
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somewhat different from those usually conducted by the Marketing and Social 
Research Division in that Sutherland developed the questions, not the 
corporation.  As was the case with MGM’s testing, the majority of those 
questioned stated that they would like to see more of the same (87 percent).  
Only 16 percent found the film unfavourable.579  Overall, Why Play Leap Frog? 
received the same kind of audience reaction that Harding’s past films, Make 
Mine Freedom and Meet King Joe, did. 
          However, criticisms began to arise shortly after its release .  On 29 April 
1950, a letter to the editor was posted in the Motion Picture Herald, criticising 
Why Play Leap Frog?  Titled ‘No Propaganda’, this complaint accused the film 
of presenting untruthful facts regarding the breakdown of automobile costs.  ‘It 
made me plenty mad’, the writer claimed, ‘to see that there was no reference 
whatsoever to taxes.  Anyone who has ever heard of our $42,000,000,000 
budget knows that taxes, not labour, are the controlling factor in the price of 
everything we buy, including admission tickets.’  Seeing Why Play Leap Frog? 
as anti-labour propaganda, this theatre patron argued that MGM should ‘stick 
to entertainment and leave the propaganda to more selfish interests.’ 580  
MGM’s Fred Quimby was made aware of this article two months after its 
release and immediately informed Benson of its existence.  Quimby argued 
that it was ‘something that I do not think should go unanswered’ and asked 
Benson to provide the statistics used in the film to enable him to provide a 
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response to the article.581  Benson obliged, sending Quimby a letter provided 
by his researcher at Harding College.  In this, Bud Green defended the film, 
arguing that ‘A mention of taxes was obviously withheld because it would have 
confused the lesson of the film which was the inseparable relationship 
between wages and prices.’  He then claimed that although the statistics 
provided for the breakdown of the cost of an automobile were not ‘strictly 
correct’, having been miscalculated by about $60, the author’s arguments 
were without merit.  For example, the author argued that ‘the picture tries to 
show that in the case of a $1,500 automobile, 85 percent of the cost was in 
labour.’  That statistic quoted in the film was in fact 80 per cent, not 85.  As 
such, both Benson and Green were reluctant to take the complaint seriously 
as the viewer ‘misunderstood’ the film.582  Upon receiving this letter, Quimby 
decided not to respond to the article.  This was the right decision according to 
Benson, who argued that ‘We have men who naturally are set upon creating 
friction between employers and employees . . . That is one of the reasons we 
have built this series of pictures to help create a better understanding of the 
facts in order that there might be a greater degree of good will existing between 
employers and employees.’  The critics would continue to find fault, Benson 
wrote, but the series was receiving positive reactions from the right people that 
outweighed the negative reviews.583 
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       From here, the momentum that began with the release of Make Mine 
Freedom, and intensified following screenings of Meet King Joe, began to 
wane.  Viewer reception for Albert in Blunderland, the fourth film to be released 
through primary distribution, is undocumented.  It cannot be found within the 
Benson Papers and advertisements within local and national newspapers are 
scarce; almost non-existent.  This is surprising given that Albert in Blunderland 
was the series’ most anti-Communist feature and open to criticism from the 
left.  It was not until the release of Fresh Laid Plans, and the aforementioned 
controversy surrounding the film, that public opinion resurfaced.  The negative 
press the film produced, however, provided national advertising.  On 13 April 
1951, the International Baby Chick Association contacted Benson after 
reading the article published in the New York Times.  Rather than provide 
further criticism, the association requested a copy of the film to show to the 
6,000 commercial poultry hatchery-men and breeders that would be attending 
an annual convention.  The executive secretary, Don Turnbull, believed its 
members would thoroughly enjoy the film after going on record in ‘opposition 
to government price supports for poultry and eggs.’584  Benson used this 
request to argue that the negative press in the New York Times was valuable, 
rather than harmful, however it did not refuel the momentum needed to carry 
the rest of the series.   
          In the following year, the popularity of the Fun and Facts series had 
declined rapidly.  Primary distribution channels featured it far less.  The 
situation was so bleak that Sutherland suggested the termination of work on 
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the storyboards for a further two films, tentatively titled ‘Leadership’ and 
‘Competition’.  This came after the news that MGM had rejected the release 
of a further two films, The Devil and John Q and Dear Uncle.  To remedy the 
situation, Sutherland argued that it would be best if two new films were created 
along the lines of Meet King Joe – the series most successful, and its last 
popular, production.585  Benson agreed, believing that the first four pictures 
‘had a considerable educational value which in my opinion was not 
characteristic of the latter ones.  While Albert in Blunderland and Fresh Laid 
Plans were accepted for theatrical distribution, it was my opinion they were 
chiefly riding on the coat tails of the earlier pictures.’  To be successful, the 
Fun and Facts team had to return to the roots of the series.  Benson had been 
arguing for the past two years that the series needed to make a stronger effort 
to incorporate educational themes into the cartoons.  If this was not achieved, 
he was unwilling to continue to have the series made under the name of 
Harding College.  He also argued that if more robust educational content was 
inserted into the series, MGM would be more likely to accept future films.586  
This was a risky plan, however, given that MGM rejected Going Places on the 
grounds that studio critics deemed it too educational.  Correspondence 
relating to the developments of this issue are scarce, though the conclusion 
speaks volumes.  A contract signed between Harding and MGM shows that 
the series’ future film, Inside Cackle Corners, was accepted for theatrical 
distribution yet there is little information regarding its release, reception, and 
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advertisements.  It appears that after the disappointing reception of Albert in 
Blunderland and Fresh Laid Plans, and the consequent rejection of The Devil 
and John Q and Dear Uncle, the series was unable to regain momentum.  
Meet King Joe represented the peak of the popularity and influence of the 
series and in the years following its release, the Harding cartoons slowly 
disappeared from national theatres. 
 
Secondary Distribution Channels  
          A similar pattern also occurred in secondary distribution channels.  From 
the outset, Benson was keen to capitalise on the growing popularity of 
educational films in the classroom.  In 1947, he enlisted the help of Carl Nater, 
an ex-Disney employee who left the studio to aid Benson in the secondary 
distribution of the Fun and Facts series.587  On Nater’s recommendation, the 
distribution house was created within the NEP, rather than through an external 
company.  In a letter to Zurcher on 23 May 1947, Benson argued ‘These 
special educational films which we are making are calculated for a very special 
purpose.  Into them has gone a lot of careful thought, and a lot of careful 
work . . . This we believe merits special distribution methods.’588  The decision 
to distribute the films through Harding College resulted in a wealth of 
information being stored in the Benson Papers.  However, the sources here 
are somewhat repetitive, painting a similar picture to what had occurred with 
the series through primary distribution.  At first, the Fun and Facts team was 
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optimistic, if a little impatient.  As stated in the contract with MGM, a film was 
to be in primary distribution for at least two years before being released back 
to Harding.  Therefore, when Going Places was rejected, Benson eagerly 
advertised the film through educational channels where he believed it would 
be widely received.  ‘This picture’ he argued, ‘is far above the average picture 
being used in the educational field and that accordingly, we could obtain for it 
good distribution in educational channels.’589 
          In the immediate aftermath of the film’s release, the Fun and Facts team 
received an abundance of correspondence from third parties interested in 
Going Places.  In January 1949, Sutherland showcased the film to Alfred 
Rosenberg, manager of the Text Film Department at McGraw-Hill Book 
Company.590  Rosenberg was highly impressed and showed an interest in 
working with Harding on the distribution of Going Places and all future films.  
According to Sutherland, McGraw-Hill spent a good deal of money in 
advertising and promoting the pictures they distribute, making it a perfect 
opportunity for the Fun and Facts series.  The film also received interest from 
the Modern Talking Picture Service.  Like McGraw-Hill, the company reached 
out to the team and offered their support in distributing Going Places through 
educational channels.  Benson was delighted by these offers, writing to the 
Sloan Foundation that Harding had ‘no objection’ in accepting the services of 
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any professional distributions.  After all, his objective was to achieve ‘the 
widest possible distribution of these films.’591 
          Interestingly, the Sloan Foundation shelved these offers from McGraw-
Hill and the Modern Talking Picture Service, which had full authority over the 
series.  Nevertheless, the interest Going Places had received in its early 
stages was a good indication of the success of the film.  On 14 April 1949, 
Benson informed Zurcher of the progress of the film stating, ‘the demand for 
the 200 prints we now have of Going Places is so great that any requests now 
have to be held up at least 30 days before they can be fulfilled.  This means 
that we are getting the maximum circulation from these 200 prints.’ 592  
Unfortunately, individual comments on Going Places are scare; though those 
that do exist are overwhelmingly positive.  Unnamed industrial firms in Chicago 
and Cleveland praised the film, saying ‘This is just what we have been looking 
for, how can we get a print?’ and ‘A remarkably fine job.  This will do a lot in 
improving the understanding of our American Way of Life.’593  Additionally, F. 
V. Roberts, manager of the Industrial Relations Department at the Ford Motor 
Company, claimed Going Places was ‘Truly an effective short course in the 
economics of our life.’594  It is important to note, however, that such comments 
were provided by audiences who were likely to share the ideological leanings 
of the Fun and Facts team and offer praise to the picture.  The lack of criticism 
from more liberal industrialists is striking.  
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          There was also a lack of individual comments within educational circles.  
This is surprising given that high school students were the target audience for 
the Fun and Facts cartoons in secondary distribution channels.  Nevertheless, 
those who viewed the film provided positive feedback that surpassed that of 
Make Mine Freedom.  According to Benson, students seemed to understand 
Going Places more readily and raised numerous questions after the 
showing.595  The team considered this a huge success.  They hoped it would 
provoke classroom discussion on issues regarding the free enterprise system.  
Zurcher was particularly impressed and hoped to achieve the same results 
with Make Mine Freedom following its contractual release from MGM.  After 
the unpredictable success of Going Places, the Sloan Foundation was more 
receptive to the idea of secondary distribution.596   
          The changing attitudes of the foundation culminated in a distribution 
agreement between the Fun and Facts project and the Modern Talking Picture 
Service.  In the postwar era, observers regarded this organisation as a 
specialist in business-subsidised distribution with an audience base that 
consisted of 53,000 schools, 36,000 churches, and 26,000 clubs and youth 
groups.  Clients of theirs included familiar industrial giants such as Ford and 
the DuPont Company, making it an ideal distributor for the Fun and Facts 
series.597  In a joint report on the progress of the first two cartoons, Harding 
and the Modern Talking Picture Service found that Make Mine Freedom had 
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been shown to a total audience of 522,964 people whilst Going Places 
reached 692,716.  From these figures, there was a breakdown of school and 
industrial audiences.  For the first picture, 51 percent of the audience was 
made up of students whilst 49 percent were industrialists.  For the second, this 
was 45 and 55 percent. 598   Evidently, the Fun and Facts cartoons were 
reaching the desired audiences. 
          Although comments on the project’s first four films are scarce, 
correspondence between the Fun and Facts team provide evidence of their 
overall success.  As was the case in theatrical distribution, these films received 
a positive response from both industrial and educational circles.  Fortunes 
changed, however, with the release of the series’ two most controversial films, 
Albert in Blunderland and Fresh Laid Plans.  Whilst Benson believed that the 
New York Times critique of Fresh Laid Plans garnered useful attention 
amongst anti-New Deal industrialists, the piece was harmful to potential 
educational audiences.  The article in the Educational Screen was influenced 
by the New York Times piece and garnered interest amongst the nation’s 
educators. 599   In the following issue, readers responded to the editorial, 
‘Educators, Be Wary!’, with comments in support of the publication.  A 
Professor of Education at Wayne University, Detroit, offered his 
congratulations to the author, as did an Assistant Professor of Education at 
New York University adding, ‘Your editorial was timely and one that focuses 
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on a matter in need of clarification if films and all other visual materials are to 
be used intelligently in our schools.’   Another reader, who appeared not to be 
an educator, stated how he had ‘been increasingly disturbed by the 
“enlightenment” coming from that institution [Harding].  The efforts of the 
school, which may be sincere, nevertheless can do infinite harm to the 
progress of visual education.’600  In a letter to Sutherland on 20 August 1951, 
Benson wrote that the opposition to Fresh Laid Plans from those in visual 
education was ‘pretty severe.’601  He then tried to defend the film in a letter to 
the editor of Educational Screen that was published in its September edition.  
In this, Benson argued that the sponsorship behind the series was neither 
secret nor sinister and that the film was not available to viewers ‘free for 
nothing.’  He also made an effort to explain how Fresh Laid Plans represented 
what Harding believed to be ‘sound economic education.’602  Unfortunately for 
the Fun and Facts team, the damage was already done.  As Benson had 
predicted to Sutherland, ‘we may find 16mm distribution of these [prints] quite 
limited and we may find it almost nil in the field of education.’603  Although 
attitudes towards educational films had improved since the 1930s, many 
educators remained wary of corporate sponsored productions that appeared 
to have ulterior motives.  
          The decline of the Fun and Facts series in both primary and secondary 
distribution channels encouraged the team to explore new ways of 
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broadcasting the cartoons.  As a new and rapidly growing medium, television 
was the next logical step.  In 1950, almost four million American households 
owned a television.  This figure increased by an average of five million each 
year until 1955, when just over thirty million households possessed a television 
set.604  Even if the Fun and Facts series managed to uphold the theatrical 
momentum behind the release of Meet King Joe, it would have later been 
jeopardised by the decline of ticket sales as a direct response to the growth of 
home-based media. 605   Sensing the danger, film studios, advertising 
companies, and public relations firms began to move into this new market with 
haste.  As Anna McCarthy explains, television in the postwar period was a 
perfect instrument to ‘spread morality, education, and happiness’ as it was 
readily available to millions of viewers in the comfort of their own home.  
Influenced by fears of Communism, the nation’s industrialists and educators 
(i.e. Sloan, Benson, and their associates) utilised television broadcasting to 
disseminate their own brand of Americanism; freedom in the form of the free 
enterprise system.606  Sloan had already considered the use of television 
when in 1949, he showcased the first three films to the president of the 
American Broadcasting Company.  Although it was too early for the Fun and 
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Facts cartoons to enter secondary distribution (two of them being under 
contract with MGM), Sloan believed that ‘television will ultimately offer a 
tremendous field for exploitation of a film of ideas of this kind.’607  It was best, 
he thought, to think about the process sooner rather than later. 
          However, the widespread television broadcasting that Sloan, and later 
Benson, had hoped for never came to fruition.  During the decade of the 1950s, 
only one Fun and Facts cartoon made it to the small screen.  A report by 
Harding notes that during the months of July and August 1951, Going Places 
experienced a trial in television broadcasting.  This document states: 
During this period 63 stations or well over half of the national 
107 TV stations throughout the country televised it on a 
sustaining basis.  Statistics reported by the stations 
themselves indicated that a total of 6,770,370 people viewed 
the film during 63 television screenings.  Virtually every major 
city in the United States was covered.608 
 
These were impressive statistics for an economic educational cartoon and 
both Sloan and Benson were pleased with the outcome of the experiment.  
However, further tests were not conducted and Going Places remained the 
only cartoon in the series to be televised.  The findings here coincide with 
existing research by Hicks who, when analysing the success of the series, 
could only name Going Places as a televised production.609  There is the 
possibility that the series did not translate well to the black and white television 
sets of the era, where the impressive use of Technicolour could not be 
appreciated by audiences at home.  Benson may have made further attempts 
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in the following decade as advances in colour technology were introduced, 
however sources to support this are difficult to locate.  The cartoons were not 
widely advertised and letters that could suggest the creation of broadcasting 
contracts are non-existent.  As such, it is likely that Fun and Fact’s venture into 
the realm of television was nothing more than a fleeting experiment despite its 
initial success.   
          Whilst the mixed responses on individual cartoons are significant in 
determining the project’s success, it is also important to note the comments 
made about the series as a whole.  According to Quimby, the ‘Harding 
cartoons became the most popular short subjects ever distributed by MGM.  
Never in the history of MGM’s shorts department have so many letters been 
directed to my desk praising an effort.’  Every exhibitor, he stressed, ‘begged 
for more of their type . . . promising not only more playing time but more 
important billing.’ 610   Quimby’s remarks, however, do not represent the 
thoughts of all who viewed the series.  The reaction to the overall content of 
Fun and Facts was not as overwhelmingly positive as the direct comments 
made about individual cartoons.  For example, in 1961 Newsweek claimed 
that ‘What M.I.T. is to engineering and Harvard is to Law, Harding is to the far 
right . . . the academic capital of ultra-conservatism.’611  Similarly, the New 
York Times labelled Harding as ‘perhaps the most prolific centre of aggressive 
anti-Communist propaganda in the United States.’612   
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          Organisations such as the Anti-Defamation League were also keen to 
criticise Harding.  In 1964, the ADL completed a study of the major financial 
supporters of right-wing propaganda in which it attacked the Sloan Foundation 
for aiding in ‘the extremist assaults on American democratic processes’ by 
providing grants to the NEP.  Harding, according to the ADL, was ‘the largest 
producer of radical Right propaganda in the country.’613  What is interesting 
about these comments, apart from their non-corporate conservative origin, is 
the timing.  Both the Newsweek and New York Times article were published 
in 1961, whilst the ADL report was released in 1964.  By the 1960s, the nation-
wide hysteria surrounding the Red Scare and McCarthyism had largely 
subsided, with the exception of groups like the John Birch Society.  As such, 
anti-Communist propaganda was subjected to greater scrutiny and increasing 
opposition.  It is likely, therefore, that the Fun and Facts series was a product 
of its time and that after the early 1950s, there was no longer a large market 
for Benson’s brand of  free market Americanism in the form of animated 
propaganda. 
          Nevertheless, the overall response to the Fun and Facts series was 
positive.  In both primary and secondary distribution channels, the first four 
cartoons were widely received and generated a wealth of praise in the form of 
viewer comments and screening requests.  Unfortunately, the anonymity of 
theatre comment cards prevents an in-depth analysis of those who viewed the 
cartoons on the big screen, though the response was overwhelmingly 
optimistic.  Of course, there were numerous negative remarks, but these were 
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few and far between.  Outside of the theatre, the series was incredibly popular 
with like-minded businessmen who were eager to screen the film for their 
employees.  In these areas, the Fun and Facts cartoons mirrored the public 
relations films that others, such as the Iron and Steel Institute and General 
Foods, were attempting to produce.  These companies were often under the 
umbrella of the NAM, an organisation close to Sloan and General Motors, who 
shared the political and economic ideology of the Fun and Facts team.  From 
the start of the project, these viewers were a target audience and vital to the 
success of the series.   
          The project did start to dwindle, however, following the release of the 
series’ flagship cartoon Meet King Joe.  As the third film in the series, Meet 
King Joe found the perfect balance of education and humour to satisfy 
audiences in primary and secondary distribution channels. However, whilst the 
team had created a formula that worked, it was not transferred to future 
productions.  With the release of Albert in Blunderland and Fresh Laid Plans, 
the Fun and Facts series showcased films that contained greater political and 
educational themes that put off viewers and initiated controversy.  With the 
absence of humour, MGM rejected the remainder of the series and the films 
began to falter in educational circles.  Sadly, for Sloan, Benson, and 
Sutherland, the Fun and Facts cartoons appeared to be a product best suited 
for the anti-Communist tensions of the early 1950s.  Here, their cartoons 
flourished but with political and social change, the series lost its standing with 
national audiences.  It would always remain popular, however, with corporate 
conservatives such as themselves. 
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Conclusion 
 
By 1980, George Benson’s brand of conservatism – which fused hyper 
patriotism, free market ideology, and evangelicalism – was deeply imbedded 
in the political campaigns of Republican nominees fighting for the presidency.  
In his research on the National Educational Program, L. Edward Hicks argues 
that Benson utilised a variety of educational tools in a successful attempt to 
influence the changing political landscape of the post-WII era.  His critical, in-
depth study of Benson claims that ‘an internally consistent conservative social, 
political, and economic philosophy,’ as demonstrated through the Fun and 
Facts series, resonated with the New Christian Right and helped to propel 
Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980.614  In an interview with Hicks, 
Benson himself casually remarked that he had performed a significant role in 
laying the groundwork for a conservative mentality and political activism 
central to the 1980 election campaign.615  Indeed, from 1936 to 1980, Benson 
had promoted the political principles crucial to Reagan’s success: a 
conservative, limited government as prescribed in the Constitution, belief in 
God, and the necessity of the free enterprise system.   
          Of course, much of the latter half of the twentieth century is beyond the 
scope of this thesis and warrants further study into Benson’s postwar activities.  
As such, mention of the 1980 election may seem out of place in these 
concluding remarks, however, Hicks’ bold claims of Benson’s political 
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significance raises a critical issue concerning the conclusions of existing 
historiography.  The published works of Hicks and Stevens stress the long-
lasting powerful impact of Benson’s activities; from his missionary efforts in 
1920s China to his political activism up to his passing in 1991.  Hicks even 
praises the Fun and Facts series as a success, though restricts his research 
to the confines of the reception of the first three cartoons.  Benson’s efforts, 
they argue, contributed significantly to the major realignment in American 
politics that allowed a conservative-dominated Republican Party to gain 
political control in 1980.616   Here, the focus is largely placed on the seemingly 
close relationship between Benson and Reagan.  After shifting politically to the 
right during the 1950s, Reagan espoused the same ideology promoted by 
Harding’s NEP.  Patriotism, free enterprise economics, and fervent anti-
Communism lay firmly at the core of his public activities, making him a 
desirable ally for Benson.617  In 1962, Reagan collaborated with Benson for 
Harding’s anti-Communist film project titled The Truth about Communism.  
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Reagan, who narrated the film, argued that it was a factual documentary in 
which most scenes ‘were photographed by Communist cameramen as the 
actual events were taking place . . . The words of the Communist leaders are 
their own.’618  The aim of the film was to provide viewers with a ‘real’, albeit 
biased, account of the realities of a Communist ’tyranny.’619   
          Bound by a desire to protect the freedoms of the United States from the 
perils of Communism, Benson and Reagan appeared to remain close over the 
coming decades.  In 1978, Reagan congratulated Benson on his service to the 
nation through a telephone message made for the latter’s eightieth birthday, 
reminding him of ‘all that he has meant to our land.’  He made sure to point 
out how Benson had spent over forty years campaigning for many of the same 
issues Reagan was now promoting in the upcoming campaign.  ‘I have been 
out on the mashed-potato circuit now for a great many years talking about the 
evils of big government, the conspiracy against this freedom of ours, both from 
within and without,’ Reagan claimed.  He ‘couldn’t possibly count’ how many 
times he had quoted Benson in his own speeches.620  As such, it is important 
not to dismiss both Hicks’ and Steven’s positive accounts of Benson’s legacy 
given his evident impact on conservative politics.  It is necessary, however, to 
note that the existing histography places too much emphasis on the role of 
Benson’s brand of Americanism on the 1980 election and fails to provide any 
substantial conclusions on the struggles of his crusade and the level of 
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success of the Fun and Facts series.  Ultimately, these works have greatly 
exaggerated his long-term, nation-wide influence.  
          Recently, these narratives have been challenged by a new generation 
of scholars.  This thesis, together with that of Robbie Maxwell’s, offers a new 
insight into the life of Benson and the power of the NEP from a different, more 
detached, perspective.  Maxwell, for instance, found that Benson’s activities 
during the 1960s were subjected to unprecedented scrutiny with much of it 
unflattering.621  After the decline of the Fun and Facts series, Benson was 
persistently identified as a ringleader in the ‘Radical Right’ and associated with 
extreme right-wing organisations such as the John Birch Society (JBS) and 
the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade (CACC).  Historians of modern 
American conservatism have demonstrated a keen interest in these groups, 
yet have, at best, fleetingly touched upon Benson’s contributions.622  The 
1960s American press, however, regularly highlighted his involvement.  In 
1961, Time listed the NEP alongside the JBS, the CACC, and the Christian 
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Crusade as ‘a few of the manifestations of a US phenomenon: the resurgence 
of ultra-conservative anti-Communism.’  The NEP alone, the article claimed, 
had influenced twenty-five million people annually with the ultra-conservative 
literature highly ‘favoured by the far-rightists in their forums.’ 623   Those 
associated with Harding faced public criticism, similar to the attacks on the 
Sloan Foundation by the ADL.  The 1964 Republican presidential nominee 
Barry Goldwater was a particular target.  Throughout his campaign, Goldwater 
received widespread support from the ‘Radical Right’, including Benson who 
openly endorsed his nomination in a summer edition of ‘Looking Ahead’.  
Goldwater supporters were increasingly powerful, Benson argued, because 
their man had expressed a positive political philosophy.  It 
was his detractors who had labelled as extremist one who 
champions the rights of the individual, who would curtail 
expanding power in the central government, who would 
prefer a free enterprise economy than socialist experiments, 
and who would endeavour to slow the march of 
Communism.624 
 
Unfortunately for Goldwater, such endorsements only served to damage his 
reputation.  His links to the ‘Radical Right’ were not the primary explanation 
for his heavy defeat, though moderate conservatives within the Republican 
Party were keen to suggest that this was the case.    
          Benson’s affiliation with extremism damaged his relations with the 
business community and prevented the creation of new evangelical/alliances 
with up-and-coming businessmen.  Consequently, Benson relied heavily on 
his existing donors, the remaining old guard of radical anti-New Dealers.  This 
presented a glaring issue as the generation of industrialists who had occupied 
                                                        
623 Anonymous, ‘Organisations: The Ultras,’ Time, 8 December 1961, pp. 22 – 24.  
624 George S. Benson, ‘Looking Ahead’, Malakoff News, 24 July 1964, p. 2.  
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the front lines in the fight against the New Deal was diminishing.  Irénée du 
Pont and Charles Hook both died in 1963, whilst Sloan passed away in 
1966.625  The Sloan Foundation continued to support organisations dedicated 
to promulgating the importance of private enterprise, though no additional 
funds to Harding can be located beyond the Fun and Facts project.  
Additionally, Charles White retired as chairman of Republic Steel in 1960, 
halting donations to Benson, and Republic Steel gave nothing to the NEP after 
1965.  By 1968, Benson announced that the nation’s largest steel and oil 
companies, who often provided the largest sums, had almost entirely 
withdrawn their funding.  Gulf Oil, for example, had donated $10,000 a year 
for 15 years up to 1965; in 1966 it provided a final figure of $5,000.626  The 
decline of Benson’s relations with leading industrial conservatives, together 
with the end of his corporate-evangelical alliance with Sloan, also robbed him 
of the non-monetary benefits these relationships provided, including outlets for 
NEP materials and access to a broad range of networks. 
          These problems coincided with a decline in the NEP’s overall activities.  
By 1968, the circulation of ‘Looking Ahead’ had fallen to just over 1,000, its 
lowest level since the early 1940s.  Likewise, ‘Listen Americans!’ and the 
NEP’s Monthly Letter suffered a similar reduction in scale.627  Harding College 
                                                        
625 Unlike Benson, Sloan did not suffer from a damaging reputational decline in the 
aftermath of the Fun and Facts series.  Sloan did not live to see much of the latter 
half of the twentieth century, passing away at the age of 90 in 1966.  In his final 
years, he worked on a manuscript detailing his management of GM that was 
published in 1964.  My Life with General Motors is still in print today, with a 
testimonial from Microsoft CEO Bill Gates on the cover.  This industrial memoir, 
together with Sloan’s greatest legacies of GM and the Sloan Foundation, has 
guaranteed him a place in America’s corporate history.   
626 Benson to Ganus, letter, 17 September 1968, box G-185, folder: National 
Education Program – Benson, Dr. George – 1968, Clifton L. Ganus Jr. Papers, Ann 
Cowan Dixon Archives & Special Collections, Brackett Library Harding University. 
627 Ibid. 
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continued to host the Freedom Forums on an annual basis, however, its 
appeal could not rival that of its pre-1960s popularity.  Though still alive, the 
activities of the NEP continued at a significantly reduced rate until Benson’s 
death in 1991.  As a result, his influence in politics began to wane.  The 
overarching reality was that Benson’s career diminished just as many of his 
political principles gained traction during the resurgence of twentieth-century 
American conservatism.   
          Notably, the decline in Benson’s relationship with business was not part 
of a broader decline in business engagement with politics.  As Maxwell 
explains, the ‘newer and younger management,’ whose ambivalence towards 
the NEP Benson lamented, were spending their time and money on more 
sophisticated projects.628  The growth of think tanks, lobbying organisations, 
and Political Action Committees established organisational frameworks and 
created an intellectual edge to conservative ideas that the NEP could not 
compete against.  The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage 
Foundation, for example, were ‘business-friendly’ conservative think tanks that 
actively sought the financial backing of America’s elite corporate class.  In 
1971, the president of the AEI, William J. Baroody Sr., spoke before a group 
of corporate leaders, arguing that there now existed ‘a monopoly hostile to 
business.’  His rhetoric was similar to that of Benson, in which he encouraged 
big business to fight for the ‘basic values of this free society and its free 
principles.’629  Benson’s reputation as a leader of the radical right, however, 
                                                        
628 Robbie Maxwell, ‘Educator to the Nation,’ p. 262. 
629 Jason Stahl, Right Moves: The Conservative Think Tank in American Political 
Culture Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 1 – 
2.   
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deterred the new generation of corporation conservatives from backing the 
NEP over the likes of Baroody and the AEI.  They preferred to financially 
support those from a seemingly intellectual standpoint, rather than an alleged 
radical who continued to espouse outdated anti-Communist arguments.  
          Nevertheless, Benson did briefly resurface as a notable figure during 
the 1980 Presidential election, as documented in the works of Hicks and 
Stevens.  His resurgence coincides with the wider context of the rise, fall, and 
then revival of free market ideals throughout the twentieth century.  When 
Reagan, a former ally and supporter of Benson’s brand of Americanism, stood 
as the Republican nominee, the importance of the free enterprise system was 
once again thrust onto America’s political stage.  The themes within the Fun 
and Facts series were prevalent once more, even if the cartoons themselves 
did not make a return.  Unfortunately for Benson, the conditions that could 
have facilitated his return had come too late.  At 82 years old, he was too old 
to champion the principles of free enterprise as he had done during the 1940s 
and 1950s.  Instead, Benson revelled in his egotistical opinion, encouraged by 
Reagan, that during these turbulent years he was ‘the only person in the 
country really coming out with a persistent voice for private enterprise and for 
big business.’630   
          Reagan’s routine paeans to free enterprise echoed Benson’s economic 
principles as they were, first and foremost, articulations of evangelicals’ social 
and political aspirations.  In the 1980s, as in the 1910s, 1930s, and 1950s, 
conservative evangelicals once again became advocates for the nation’s 
business elite to advance their vision of a business-friendly, Christian 
                                                        
630 Benson, cited in Robbie Maxwell, ‘Educator to the Nation,’ p. 262. 
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America.631  As such, one of the main tenants of this thesis, the power of 
corporate-evangelical alliances in American conservatism, continued far 
beyond the decades pertaining to Sloan and Benson’s relationship.  In this 
instance, Baptist pastor Jerry Falwell led the way by exploiting the 
circumstances of the time – the economic anxieties of the 1970s, the courting 
of conservative politicians like Reagan, and the specific concerns of 
evangelicals over matters of desegregation, privatisation, sex, and religious 
right – and advocating for the protection of private enterprise.  His rhetoric was 
orientated around results, technology, individualism, and corporatism. 632  
Such activity arose most recently in the 2016 Presidential election in which 
more than 81% of the US’s protestant evangelicals voted for Donald Trump, a 
controversial businessman with no prior experience in politics.633  Moreover, 
the Green family, owners of Hobby Lobby, provides an outstanding example 
of a modern connection between business and religion.  In addition to 
supporting evangelical organisations and schools such as Oral Roberts 
University and Liberty University, the business was at the forefront of the 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Supreme Court decision.  Here, the company was 
successful in their fight against federal regulations requiring that employer 
provided health insurance covered contraception, arguing that it violated their 
                                                        
631 Darren Grem, The Blessings of Business: How Corporations Shaped 
Conservative Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 226. 
632 Ibid. 
633 ‘Evangelicals and Trump – Lessons From the Nixon Era,’ The Conversation 
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religious freedom. 634   Corporate-evangelical alliances, therefore, remain 
significant to modern American conservatism.   
          Again, much of the latter half of the twentieth century is beyond the 
scope of this thesis and a deeper appreciation of the complexities of modern 
conservatism deserves further study elsewhere.  Regardless, the 
reappearance of themes pertinent to the Fun and Facts series over the past 
several decades warrants at least a notable mention here.  It is evident that, 
under the right circumstances, Benson’s Americanism flourished.  His 
reputation as an individual, however, was unrepairable meaning that Fun and 
Facts did not survive past the 1950s despite its later relevance. 
          These findings, reiterated in Maxwell’s research, offer an interesting 
‘what next’ in the aftermath of the Fun and Facts series, whilst coinciding with 
an overarching narrative of decline presented in the final chapter of this thesis.  
With the more positive accounts of Hicks and Stevens, earlier estimations of 
the project were optimistic.  That was the case especially after the generous 
commentary of the series found in Hicks’ Sometimes in the Wrong.  However, 
the conclusions of this research demonstrate how the series diminished just 
as the production team found the perfect balance of education and humour to 
satisfy both cinematic and independent audiences.  The fervent anti-
Communist rhetoric in Albert in Blunderland, together with the perceived 
attacks on the farming industry in Fresh Laid Plans, did not sit well with viewers 
and sparked nation-wide controversy, despite their acceptance by MGM.  The 
creative formula that propelled Meet King Joe to success was not transferred 
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to these two features which, instead, served to disseminate the anti-New Deal 
and anti-Communist ideology of its creators, most notably Benson.  The 
overtly propagandistic themes in the latter half of the series were not 
considered to be entertaining, nor educational, and the project gradually lost 
support from MGM and began to falter in educational circles.  Whilst the 
postwar public welcomed the use of nontheatrical films in everyday life, there 
were many that continued to reject productions that clearly showcased the 
subjective interests of its producers.  This was particularly prevalent in the final 
years of the 1950s with the end of the Red Scare hysteria and the decline of 
the New Deal.  As the market for Benson’s brand of free market Americanism 
diminished,  the viewership for Fun and Facts was all of a sudden restricted to 
like-minded educational institutes, such as Pepperdine College, and the old 
generation of anti-New Deal industrialists.635  When his free market ideals did 
resurface towards the end of the century, it was Benson who reclaimed a 
glimpse of his former success and not the Fun and Facts series itself. 
          That is not to say, however, that the Fun and Facts series was not at all 
successful.  In fact, the first three cartoons achieved noteworthy praise and 
found audiences in both primary and secondary channels of distribution.  
Released between 1948 and 1949, these films benefitted from a renaissance 
of the nontheatrical film genre following the propaganda campaigns of the 
Second World War.  As a medium that facilitated the victory of the Allies, 
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nontheatrical films developed a heightened sense of respectability and 
witnessed a remarkable increase in production in the immediate postwar 
period.  The Fun and Facts team recognised the power of this newfound 
popularity and worked to utilise the genre for their own gains.  With the 
assistance of John Sutherland Productions, Sloan and Benson conceptualised 
their idea of Americanism through the use of high-end animation and 
advancements in Technicolour technology.  The unique blend of bright and 
colourful cartoons, an economic education, and entertainment provided 
audiences with a change from the often dull, self-centred industrial films of the 
interwar years, during a time in which they demanded more from the short-
form motion picture.  Naturally, Fun and Facts gained the most attention from 
conservative circles and was featured in a range of articles written by right-
wing authors.  These publications, nonetheless, were to be found in both local 
and nation-wide outlets such as the Los Angeles Herald & Express, Look 
Magazine, and The Motion Picture Herald, ensuring that Harding’s more 
successful features reached national attention.  Though not for everyone, 
Make Mine Freedom, Going Places, and Meet King Joe received widespread 
praise for their innovative techniques in educating the public in the workings 
of the free enterprise system.  As such, it is difficult to agree with Jack’s 
assertion that the Fun and Facts team struggled – at least at first – to craft a 
highly persuasive product with wide popular appeal; that balanced education 
on the one hand and entertainment, particularly humour, on the other.636 
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          With the initial success of the Fun and Facts series culminating in its 
eventual decline, it is clear that the project was very much a product of its time.   
The implementation of the New Deal during the 1930s provided corporate 
conservatives and their religious counterparts with a reason to believe their 
American way of life was under threat.637  The hostile climate that arose in 
response to conservative agitation encouraged a plethora of public relations 
campaigns that sought to defend the principles of the free enterprise system 
against the growing power of the labour movement.  It was a fight that involved 
the nation’s most distinguished industrialists who often worked together 
through organisations such as the American Liberty League and the NAM, a 
group that was closely associated with Sloan and one that Benson easily 
infiltrated.  Through their involvement in pro-business and free enterprise 
propaganda, Sloan and Benson gained valuable experiences, though not all 
of them successful, in disseminating their own brand of Americanism.  Benson, 
who was deeply committed to both religious and economic education, relied 
on the funds of like-minded businessmen to produce high quality propaganda, 
whereas Sloan required a seemingly objective organisation of which he could 
privately fund to publicise his ideology.  Upon recognising their separate needs, 
the two would eventually form a partnership based on their shared desire to 
restore the old order of limited government intervention in the economy.  The 
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1930s may not have provided the ideal climate in which industrial propaganda 
could thrive, but it laid the foundation for what could be achieved in the future.   
          Armed with a renewed sense of optimism, the business community 
reignited their old feuds following America’s victory in the Second World War.  
The economic conditions of the postwar period were unprecedented and the 
emergence of a consumer culture that relied heavily on mass production 
placed industry in a far greater position than that of the interwar years.  With 
economic stability, public opinion towards big business improved significantly, 
despite the largest strike wave of the twentieth century occurring in the 
immediate aftermath of the war.  The labour created a rift between employers 
and employees, yet a political shift to the right ensured management reaped 
the benefits of the ongoing strife.  After intense lobbying, the business 
community succeeded in reversing the 1935 Wagner Act, the legislation 
responsible for an all-out war against the New Deal.  The newly implemented 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 severely limited the influence of labour unions and 
shifted the power of balance back to management.  It was a significant 
achievement for the business community, allowing it to reclaim its 1920s 
reputation, and signified the re-emergence of American conservatism.  The 
ideological battles of the Cold War provided further ammunition for anti-New 
Dealers, who associated the Communist movement with FDR’s policies in an 
attempt to keep it within the confines of the Depression.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the postwar period provided the perfect conditions for an 
animated economic films series such as Fun and Facts.638   
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          However, whilst the timing was ideal for Sloan and Benson to embark 
on their ambitious propaganda project, societal changes in the latter half of the 
1950s instigated the series’ decline.   In a nation far removed from the 
conditions of the Depression, the New Deal was seemingly outdated.  There 
was no longer a need for Sloan and Benson’s fervent opposition to its policies, 
especially after the Taft-Hartley Act reversed the very legislation they sought 
to overthrow.  Furthermore, the ending of the Korean War, together with the 
downfall of McCarthy, greatly subdued anti-Communist tensions throughout 
the country.  This was so much the case that by the 1960s, the conservative 
movement sought to distance itself from staunch anti-Communists such as 
Benson.  The Fun and Facts series, therefore, was best suited to early years 
of the long-1950s. 
          Outside of the substance of the series itself, it is clear that the project 
was successful in maintaining the longevity of Sloan and Benson’s corporate-
evangelical alliance.  As well as exploring the success of Fun and Facts as an 
educational production, this thesis sought to provide an analysis of a 
surprisingly overlooked partnership between two leading conservative figures 
of the New Deal era.   Although it is difficult to locate the exact date of their 
meeting, it is known that Sloan and Benson worked together, with relative ease, 
from 1945 – 1954.  Their ideas for the series, together with the motives behind 
their actions, often challenged this seemingly perfect partnership by 
highlighting the differences between them.  Sloan, who fought to have the 
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series circulated to the widest possible audience in order to improve public 
opinion of big business, regularly agreed with MGM’s demands for distribution, 
whereas Benson placed his efforts exclusively in the realm of economic 
education with a Christian focus.  Nevertheless, both parties settled their 
differences without disrupting the production of the project.  The desire to 
disseminate their free enterprise ideology ultimately kept this alliance alive, 
allowing scholars to place it within the wider historiography of twentieth century 
business and religious activism.  Despite its eventual decline, therefore, the 
Fun and Facts series is a fine example of the result of a successful corporate-
evangelical alliance that arose in response to the New Deal, with its initial 
success demonstrating the power of American conservativism in the 
immediate postwar period. 
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